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Stein: The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic

NOTES ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY
POWERS

(PART I)

THE FRAMERS' INTENT AND THE EARLY YEARS
OF THE REPUBLIC
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Most talk about the intent of the Framers-whether in the
orations of politicians, the opinions of judges, or the monographs of
professors-is as irrelevant as it is unpersuasive, as stale as it is
strained, as rhetorically absurd as it is historically unsound."' Clinton Rossiter, in reaching this conclusion, points out the snares that
can trap scholars who attempt to analyze the Framers' objectives.
He notes that on some major issues,
the Framers expressed no clear intent, or invited their descendants
to generate an intent of their own; on others they divided into a
dozen or a score or even fifty-five different camps . . .on still

others they framed their intent in words whose meaning is now so
different from what it was in 1787 that to quote a Framer at all is
to quote him quite out of context.'
1. C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 333 (1966) (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 333-34. Justice Jackson, in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, offers some amusing and instructive comments about determining the Framers'
intent:
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modem conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of
partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more
or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They
largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial
practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government.
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Yet, Rossiter feels that throughout most of American history the
Constitution has been interpreted well.'
Provided that care is taken to avoid the pitfalls of which Rossiter warns, discussion of the Framers' intent can be quite fruitful.'
In and of itself, such discussion is interesting from an historical perspective because study of the Convention records and the historical
context surrounding the Convention furnishes much insight into the
values and perceptions of the Framers. Additionally, since the courts
are frequently called upon to resolve constitutional issues, analysis of
the Framers' intent can provide valuable clues as to how the Constitution should be interpreted and applied. Examination of the history
of the Confederation period, in conjunction with the concerns of the
Framers and the intellectual currents of the time, helps to elucidate
the meaning that the Framers attached to particular phrases and
sections of the Constitution and provides guidance as to how various
sections should be construed.
Determining the Framers' 5 intent, however, is an extremely difYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
3. C. RossITER, supra note 1, at 333.
4. In the early years of the republic, legislators shied away from discussing what the
Framers intended. James Madison claimed in a speech (Apr. 6, 1796) in the House of Representatives that "he did not believe a single instance could be cited in which the sense of the
Convention had been required or admitted as material in any Constitutional question" and he
noted that when he made reference to the Convention during a discussion on the national bank
several members criticized him. 3 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
372, 373 (rev. ed. M. Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Farrand, RECORDS]. Madison's
disavowal of the usefulness of the intentions of the Framers must be viewed, however, with an
awareness of the partisan struggle that precipitated his speech: Madison objected to President
Washington's use of the Convention journals to justify his decision to withhold information
from the House on the Jay Treaty. For Madison and Washington's statements see id. at 37175.
Elbridge Gerry (a future vice-President), in a speech in the House of Representatives on
February 7, 1791, highlighted a crucial problem of attempts to analyze the Convention. He
emphasized the difficulty of relying on the members' memories because their recollections
would vary. Id. at 362. The factors that constrained the House in the early years from relying
on the sense of the Convention are no longer present today. Neither closeness in time between
the Convention and debates in the House nor the need to rely on divergent memories of the
Convention delegates concern present-day scholars and legislators. Though difficulties remain,
modern scholars, by utilizing the Convention records, can at least make an attempt to determine the Framers' intent on a particular issue.
5. This note will cover all the debates in the Convention. Special attention will be given
to certain key Framers, principally James Madison, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris,
who made 161, 168, and 173 speeches, respectively, at the Convention. C. RoSSInER, supra
note 1, at 252. Wilson played a key role in the details committee and Morris was responsible
for the final version of the Constitution. (For discussion of the contribution of Wilson and
Morris to the Constitution see Id. at 247-48).
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THE FRAMERS' INTENT

ficult task.' Some difficulties derive from the delegates' decision to
conduct the Convention in secret. Fearing that communication about
the proceedings to the American public would stifle debate and result in misconceptions about the Convention, the delegates took great
care to guarantee the secrecy of their meetings.7 According to a contemporary account, sentries were used to prevent outsiders from approaching the hall.8 James Madison would not even discuss the Convention proceedings with such a personage as Thomas Jefferson, who
was in France at the time. Madison informed Jefferson that the best
he could do to satisfy Jefferson's curiosity was to tell him the names
of the delegates.9 In a later letter, Madison told Jefferson that he
was "still under the mortification of being restrained from disclosing
any part of their proceedings." 10 It was not until many years after
the Convention that anything definite became known regarding the
proceedings." The political leaders of the time were prolific letter
writers and, no doubt, but for the stricture on communication, their
letters would be an invaluable source of information. Unfortunately,
the agreement to maintain silence regarding the proceedings has severely limited the primary sources available regarding the Framers'
intent.
The general difficulties encountered in researching the Framers'
intent are intensified in the field of foreign policy. The Convention
members spent a great deal of their time determining how to apportion representation in Congress and devoted very little time to the
question of how to conduct foreign policy. In fact, the delineation of
control over treaties was developed by the Committee on Postponed
Matters1 2 and, in the initial two months of the Convention, the dele6. See Reveley, ConstitutionalAllocation of the War Powers Between the Presidentand
Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J.INT'L L. 73, 74-85 (1974).

7. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 28, 29 (R. Rutland ed. 1977). See also Letter from Phineas Bond to Lord
Carmarthen (July 2, 1787), excerpted in R. MORRIS, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 168, 168 (1970). For the actual rules adopted by the Convention, see
I Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 15-16.
8. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58
(1972). William Paterson, a delegate from New Jersey who had to leave the Convention, wrote
to his fellow delegate, Oliver Ellsworth, on August 23, 1787: "[I]t is said, that you are afraid
of the very Windows, and have a Man planted under them to prevent the Secrets and Doings
from flying out." 4 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 73.
9. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 28, 29.
10. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1787), in id. at 105.
11. M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 59.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 13-34.
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gates adopted only one resolution that dealt explicitly with foreign
affairs. s By the end of the Convention the delegates were growing
weary and simply wanted to conclude their task and return to their
homes.1 4 The fact that the debate on foreign policy did not begin in
earnest until a time when most of the delegates were anxious to leave
resulted in little discussion of foreign policy issues. Thus, only a
small number of debates offer any insight into the Framers' intended
scheme for the direction of foreign policy.
II.

INFLUENCES ON THE FRAMERS

To understand the Framers' intent regarding foreign policy and
the role of the three branches of government in general, there are
three major areas that must be examined: the condition of the government under the Articles of Confederation; the manner in which
American foreign policy functioned under the Articles; and the concerns and views of the Framers prior to the Convention. The inade-

quacies of the Confederation caused many Framers to espouse creation of a strong national government. 15 They felt that the flaws of
the Confederation necessitated changes, but were fearful of the
wrongful exercise of power. Realizing the need for increased powers
in the national government, the Framers sought to develop a governmental structure which could protect against improper use of these
powers.
A.

The Articles of Confederation

George Washington, on November 5, 1786, wrote to James
13. Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the
Constitution HistoricallyExamined, 5 SEroN HALL L. REv. 527, 577 (1974).
14. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 328; M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 134-35.
James Madison noted that Colonel Mason had departed from the Convention in "an exceeding
ill humour indeed" and that "[a] number of little circumstances arising in part from the impatience which prevailed towards the close of the business, conspired to whet [Colonel Mason's]
acrimony." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 206, 215.
15. The inadequacies caused George Washington's early realization that a convention
should be called for the purpose of strengthening the Federal government. Letter from George
Washington to Reverend William Gordon (July 8, 1783), in 27 THE WRITNGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 48, 49 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931) [hereinafter cited as WASINGTON WRITINGS].

See also J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIoN (1775-1783),
514 (1968). Washington, in a letter to Lafayette, expressed his view that the country needed a
new constitution to bolster the government: "To form a constitution that will give consistency,
stability, and dignity to the Union, and sufficient powers to the great council of the nation for
general purposes is a duty which is incumbent upon every man who wishes well to his country." Id. at 521.
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Madison: "How melancholy is the Reflection, that in so short a
space, we should have made such large strides towards fulfilling the
prediction of our transatlantic foe! 'Leave them to themselves, and
their government will soon dissolve.' "16 Washington's unhappiness
over the flaws of the Confederation was representative of a concern
expressed by others about the Confederation's defects.17 The concern

over these defects crystalized at the Annapolis Convention, a gathering of commissioners from five states that met at the urging of the
Virginia Assembly." On September 14, 1786, the Annapolis Convention adopted a report calling for delegates to meet in Philadelphia
to discuss the situation of the United States and "to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the [federal] Government adequate to the exigencies of
the Union.""u
The Framers viewed the lack of adequate authority in the Congress as a major flaw of the Confederation. John Jay, in an address
on the Constitution made September 17, 1787,20 enumerated the
powers granted by the Confederation and deplored the great restric16.

Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Nov. 5, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS
supra note 7, at 161, 162 (1975).
17. For example, see Otto's discussion of the fact that the condition of Congress caused
much concern among patriots. Letter from Louis-Guillaume Otto, French Charge d'Affairs at
Philadelphia, to the Comte de Vergennes (June 17, 1786), in R. MORRIS, supra note 7,at 166,
166. Madison spoke of the "mortal diseases of the existing constitution." Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 7, at 317, 318 (1975). For Madison's discussion of the defects of the Confederation, see
Vices of the Politicalsystem of the U. States (Docket Apr. 1787), in id. at 348-58 [hereinafter cited as Vices of the Politicalsystem], and NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (REPORTED BY MADISON) 7-16 (A. Koch ed. 1966) (Madison's preface to the
debates in the Convention) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES]. Koch believes that the preface
was written between 1830 and 1836. Id. at 3 n.2. See also the discussion of Edmund Randolph
urging George Washington to attend the Convention that provided the one hope for rescuing
"America from the impending ruin," found in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
7, at 226 n.2. G. WOOD, in THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969)
notes that "nearly everyone in 1787 conceded 'the weakness of the Confederation'" and that
even anti-federalists were willing to alter the Confederation. Id. at 471-72. Thomas Tredwell,
a New York opponent of the Constitution, said that "[i]t
is on all hands acknowledged...
that the federal government is not adequate to the purpose of the Union." Id. at 471.
OF JAMES MADISON,

18.

See

DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERI-

38-43 (C. Tansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as Tansill, DOCUMENTS]. Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and Edmund Randolph all served as commissioners at Annapolis.
Id. at 43.
19. Id.
20. An Address to the People of the State of New-York On the Subject of the ConstituCAN STATES

tion (Sept. 17, 1787), reprintedin PAMPHLETS

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

67 (P. Ford ed. 1888 & photo. reprint 1968) [hereinafter cited as Ford,
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tions on these powers.2 1 Jay, for example, noted that the Congress
could make war but was not empowered to raise the men or money
needed to wage a war; it could make peace but did not have the
power to enforce treaty terms; it could form alliances but had no
ability to comply with them; and it could borrow money but had no
means to repay the loans. Additionally, he observed that while Congress could deliberate and make requisitions, the states either could
follow the Congress or ignore it at their discretion. 2 This lack of
authority in the Congress particularly was felt in the conduct of war,
for the states' partial compliance with congressional
requisitions in23
creased war expenses and frustrated war plans.
Likewise, the lack of congressional authority to enforce its policies had serious consequences in the realm of foreign affairs. Congress had no power to force the states to abide by principles of international law and could not compel them to observe treaty
provisions.24 Consequently, states could ignore treaty provisions and
in fact some acted contrary to various treaties made by the United
States.2 5 Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, in a report on violations of the peace treaty of 1783, noted infractions by both sides, but
admitted the justice of British claims in his lengthy list of state violations of the treaty.2 6 One extreme example of a state's infringement on congressional power in the Confederation period was the
state of Georgia's waging war against and making treaties with the
Indians. Because the states were under no compulsion to obey the
treaties, it was likely that they would continue their transgressions
unless changes were made in the Confederation government.2 8
21. Id. at 72-73. For the text of the Articles of Confederation, see Tansill, DOCUMENTS,
supra note 18, at 27-37.
22. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at 72-73.
23. George Washington's last "circular letter to the States" (June 8,1783 letter to the
states as he prepared to resign as commander-in-chief), in 26 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra
note 15, at 483, 495.
24. See the discussion in M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 46-47.
25. Madison noted that the Treaty of Peace, the treaty with France, and the treaty with
Holland were all violated by particular states. Vices of the PoliticalSystem, supra note 17, at
349.
26. See 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 263 (1975) (citing Jay's
report, found in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 781-874).
27. Vices of the PoliticalSystem, supra note 17, at 348.
28. For example, John Jay's urging of the states to repeal all laws "repugnant to the
treaty of peace," 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 263 (quoting 31 JOuRNAtS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 869-70), did not cause Virginia to change its course.
Virginia passed a resolution calling for repeal of all acts contrary to the peace treaty, but the
resolution was to take effect only when the other states had acted in a similar fashion. Later,
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The repeated violations of treaties and the lack of congressional

control over relations with foreign countries greatly hindered
America's ability to negotiate treaties with other nations. As James
Madison stated, "[t]he confederation is so notoriously feeble, that
foreign nations are unwilling to form any treaties with us - they are
apprised that our general government cannot perform any of its engagements; but, that they may be violated at pleasure by any of the
states."'29 No nation would concede any advantages to the United
States when it had no means to prevent states from violating a
treaty.30 In fact, Great Britain justified its refusal to give up its frontier posts because of treaty violations by the states, and said that it
would perform its part of the agreement only when the states fulfilled their obligations.31 Most importantly, given the weakness of the
government, other nations derived advantages from American trade
without granting favors in return.3 2 Foreign nations, such as England, France and Spain, sent large quantities of goods into the
United States while putting commercial restraints on the United
States and preventing it from trading with the foreign countries' best
Virginia decided that it would terminate laws contrary to the peace only after Britain had
complied with the treaty. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 20, 1787), in
10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 331, 331-32.
29. Speech by Madison in the Virginia Convention on the weakness of the confederation
(June 7, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 90, 97. See also
speech by James Wilson in the Convention in 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 443.
30. See Madison's speech in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 90,
97. The "Report of the committee of the Privy Council on trade between the British dominions
and America" supported legislation restricting American merchants in the British West Indies
and Canada because "the divided nature of the American Government provided no authority
for the making of national treaties of commerce." S. BEMIs, JAY's TREATY 32, 32 n.7 (1962).
31. See Letter from William Grayson to James Madison (May 28, 1786), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 61, 62 (1975). See also S. BEMIS, supra note 30,
at 5-6. American violations of the Treaty of Peace (1783) provided a convenient excuse for the
British who desired to avoid the treaty provision that dealt with the surrender of their frontier
posts to the Americans. Id. at 14, 138. In The Jay Treaty, Combs declared that strategic and
commercial motivations, rather than American violations, provided the impetus for England's
decision to maintain its posts. J. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY 11 (1970). Although the British
said they would relinquish the posts when the states complied with the treaty provisions, Lord
Grenville, Foreign Secretary of England at the time, told the English ambassador to America
that Great Britain would be justified in holding the posts even if the states conformed to the
treaty "because when a party refuses for an indefinite time to comply with a treaty it cannot

after so long a refusal and the resulting damage suddenly fulfill the stipulations and claim all
advantages originally reserved for it in the treaty." S. BEMIS, supra note 30, at 125 (paraphrasing C. Grenville).
32. As one American said, "they treat us accordingly, they severally shut the Door of
commercial Hospitality against us, while ours being open they enter and partake with us at
their Pleasure." Quoted in P. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 55-56

(1963) (footnote omitted).
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markets."3 The foreign nations had nothing to lose by their monopolistic policy because without the ability to regulate commerce the
Congress could not make policies to counter the foreign trade
barriers."'
Finally, the Confederation "Congress was unable to provide security against invasion because it had neither the power to prevent a
war nor the ability to conduct one. Particular states, by their conduct towards foreign nations, might provoke hostilities, yet Congress
had no power to check offenses by these states and thereby stave off
the possibility of war.3 5 If war had been declared, the situation
would have been quite grave because the Congress could not have
commanded the country's resources in a critical situation. 3 Moreover, critics of the Constitution believed that the Confederation
could not protect the nation against coastal attacks because it lacked
33. See Speech by Madison in the Virginia Convention (June 7, 1788), in 11 THE PAMADISON, supra note 7, at 90, 97. See also John Jay, An Address to the
People of the State of New-York on the Subject of the Constitution (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted In Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at 73. For a discussion of British restrictions on
American trade see P. VARG, supra note 32, at 51-52. France, though it maintained a less
restrictive trade policy toward the states, enforced a tobacco monopoly, thus hindering American trade in one of its crucial export products. F. GILBERT, To THE FAREWELL ADDRESS:
PERS OF JAMES

IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 88 (1961).
34. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 17, at 14. See also James Wilson's viewpoint expressed in Wilson, Commentaries on the Constitution 1787 in SELECTED POLITICAL ESSAYS OF

JAMES WILSON 163, 177 (R. Adams ed. 1930) (speech in the Pennsylvania Convention, November 24, 1787). Angered by British trade policies, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams (who
were representing the United States in Europe at the time) discussed means of retaliation
against British policies. Adams suggested possible measures against Britain including enacting
tariffs, giving a preference to France and having each state pass a Navigation Act. Letters
from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 7, 1785, Oct. 3, 1785, and'Oct. 24, 1785), in 1
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 50, 77-78, 85-86 (L. Cappon ed. 1959). Jefferson hoped that

the state assemblies would quickly transfer power to the Congress to enable it to pass a navigation act against England. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Nov. 19, 1785), in id.
at 94. George Washington believed that commercial regulations by states could not provide a
solution because whenever one state passed prohibitory laws another would seek trade advantages by allowing importation of the goods. S. BEMIS, supra note 30, at 34. The British, in
determining their trade policies, understood the fact that it was unlikely that the states could
act as a nation and institute retaliatory policies. Lord Sheffield who, according to Bemis, was
the principal force behind British trade policy, wrote in his 1784 work, Observations on the
Commerce of the American States, that the British "might as reasonably dread the effects of
combinations among the Germans as among the American States." Id. at 35.
35. See Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Virginia Speaker of the House of Delegates (Oct. 10, 1787), in Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at 261-63. Randolph deplored the
fact that the "confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check offenses against [the law of nations]." Id.
36. See David Ramsay, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolinaon the subject of
the Federal Constitution, in Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at 371, 379.
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naval forces and the means to support an army.a7
There is no doubt that the difficulties that plagued the Confederation in the area of foreign affairs, and the Confederation's susceptibility to invasion, were important factors in convincing American
leaders of the need to make major changes in the Confederation.
The Framers realized that the Confederation had to be powerful
enough to maintain itself against foreign and domestic dangers. 38
This need to make the country strong was particularly pressing because of America's neutral status.3 9 Once the United States had respectable power, it could engage in commerce with belligerents without fears of being dragged into war because no warring party would
risk hostilities with a United States capable of defending itself.40 In
addition, a strengthened United States would no longer be forced to
accept degrading trade relations. Instead, it would be able to establish favorable commercial treaties and to develop permanent trade
relations with other countries.41
37. Id.
38. See H. COMMAGER, THE EMPIRE OF REASON: How EUROPE IMAGINED AND
AMERICA REALIZED THE ENLIGHTENMENT 191 (1977). Alexander Hamilton declared that the
government could not provide the country with tranquility at home until it possessed "sufficient
stability and strength to make us respectable abroad." 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at
467.
39. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 109. Hamilton said that a
nation could follow a neutral path only if it had a strong government. 1 Farrand, RECORDS,
supra note 4, at 473.
40. 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 109. The War of 1812 is the
perfect example of the dangers that faced the neutral United States until it developed sufficient military and economic strength.
41. See Iredell (Member of the First North Carolina Convention), Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, reprinted in Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at
358; see also Letter from Cyrus Griffin to James Madison (May 19, 1788) (discussing a letter
from John Adams), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 52, 53. Griffin
wrote to Madison that "the Courtiers jest very much upon our debelitated [sic] situation, but
all seem to think that the new Constitution if adopted will place this Country upon a respectable foundation-and untill [sic] that period arrives they can have no permanent Intercourse
with us." Id. Hamilton noted that when the government could take measures against British
merchants, it could force the British to relax its trade restrictions. P. VARG, supra note 32, at
58; THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 85.-86 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also J.
COMBS, supra note 31, at 24. In fact, even after the ratification of the Constitution, the British
still restricted American trade. Congress could have promulgated discriminatory policies
against the English, but the British might have retaliated with additional measures. Most importantly, the Americans were dependent on British trade. Britain had a great advantage over
the United States because as Lord Sheffield argued (1) the states could not produce their own
manufactures, (2) the British goods were of better quality and were cheaper than those of the
rest of Europe, (3) the British could do without American products and therefore did not have
to worry about loss of American products, and (4) only the British could provide the credit
that American merchants needed in order to deal in the European trade. S. BEMIS, supra note
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Given the perceived risk of foreign invasion and the desire for
trade benefits, it is no surprise that there was substantial agreement
among the American leaders regarding the need for increased powers in the national government over foreign policy matters. A congressional committee recognized the need for increased federal powers in regulating trade, noting that it was necessary for Congress to
be able to put restraints on other nations in order to force them 4to3
42
reciprocate in giving trade advantages. Even the Federal Farmer
the most famous opponent of the Constitution, stated that powers
respecting external affairs, including actions on the seas, war and
peace, and foreign commerce, could properly be lodged only in the
national government.4 Finally, in its draft that accompanied the
Constitution that it sent to Congress, the Convention noted that the
country's friends long had desired that the war and treaty powers
"should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of
the Union."'15
It has been argued that the Federalists found foreign affairs to
be the crucial element in building a consensus favoring the Constitution.' The Federalists stressed the issues of weak national defense,
30, at 37-40; J. COMES, supra note 31, at 7-8.
42. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 84 n.10, 85 (1975) (citing the
JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS).

43. The Federal Farmer wrote two pamphlets during the ratification controversy examining the Constitution and promoting efforts to secure amendments to the Constitution. LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN xiii (W. Bennett ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL FARMER]. As the letters indicate, the Federal Farmer espoused both
federalism and republicanism. Id. at xx. Soon after the publication of the first pamphlet, a
Connecticut writer attributed the work to Richard Henry Lee and denounced him for writing
it. For many years it was generally accepted that Lee wrote the Federal Farmer letters. However, despite similarities between Lees proposals and those of the Federal Farmer, there is
much doubt regarding the authorship of the pamphlets. Id. at xiv-xx. Bennett, the editor of the
complete Federal Farmer letters, says that "it]he evidence supporting the attribution of authorship of the Federal Farmer's letters to Lee, while strong, hardly seems sufficient to justify
continuing this attribution." Id. at xx. Gordon Wood feels that Lee probably did not author
the pamphlets. Wood, The Authorship of the Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer,WM. & MARY
Q., 3rd Ser. XXXI, (April 1974), at 299-308. Instead, Wood feels that the pamphlets were
likely written by a New Yorker. Id. at 308. Richard Henry Lee played a prominent role in the
revolutionary era. He was a Continental Congress member who introduced the resolution calling for a declaration of independence, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, president
of the Continental Congress (1784-1785), and a United States Senator (1789-1792) who argued strenuously for a Bill of Rights. See 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 117-120
(D. Malone ed. 1961).
44. FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 43, at 18.
45. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 666-67.
46. Marks, Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of the
United States Constitution, 86 POL. SCI. Q. 444, 445, 469 (1971).
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national honor, and the need to retaliate against trade restrictions
because nearly everyone in the country believed that the government
needed to be strengthened in the area of foreign affairs.4
B. PoliticalBeliefs of the Framers
In the years prior to the Convention, Americans had common
notions regarding man's love of power. The Marylander, in 1776,
said that men by their nature were fond of power and were unwilling
to part with it.48 The New Hampshire Convention declared that
"[t]he love of Power is so alluring. . . that few have ever been able
to resist its bewitching influence. '49 John Adams was especially dis-

trustful of human nature and man's quest for power. In a letter
dated April 5, 1788, Adams expressed a belief that "[mien are not
only ambitious but their ambition is unbounded; they are not only
avaricious but their avarice is insatiable." 50
It is no surprise, given his view of the human spirit, that Adams
was such a persistent advocate of checks and balances.51 Still, the
need to provide safeguards against the abuse of power was taken for
granted by most Americans. Americans generally believed that whoever held the authority would continually seek to increase his influto
ence--"[w]herever power is lodged there is a constant propensity
5 2-- and, therefore, had to be restrained. 53
enlarge its boundaries"
Closely related to the fears regarding officials' grasping for
power was a concern over the possibility that a tyranny might develop in the United States. Initially, Americans believed that the executive presented the greatest danger to the Union." Filled with
strong feelings against executive authority, Americans quickly subordinated the role of the executive branch. Eight state constitutions
were adopted between 1776 and 1778, and all except New York reduced the executive to a subordinate position. 55 When important
47.

Id. at 445-46, 450 n.21. "Of the first 36 articles, 25 concerned the lack of national

security." Id. at 446.
48.

G. WOOD, supra note 17, at 150.

49. Id. at 447.
50. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Brand-Hollis (Apr. 5, 1788), reprintedin E.
CASSARA, THE ENGLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 97 (1975) (quoting J. DISNEY, MEMOIRS OF
THOMAS BRAND-HOLUS 32-33 (1808)). For the idea that distrust of human nature was a key
element of John Adams' political beliefs see H. COMMAGER, supra note 38, at 215-16.
51. E. CAssARA, supra note 50, at 97.
52. G. WOOD, supra note 17, at 447 (quoting the New Hampshire Convention).
53. See THE FEDERA IST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
54. G. WOOD, supra note 17, at 432.
55. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGIs
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powers were assigned to the executive, they were usually given subject to the consent of a council or a legislature."6 This prejudice
against and fear of the executive was still prevalent in the United
States when the delegates convened in Philadelphia. The Convention
debates highlight the delegates' trepidation regarding the increase of
executive power,57 despite the delegates' belief in the necessity for a
17 (1976).
56. Id.
57. Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, the strongest advocate of executive
power at the Convention, provides the most striking evidence that the Framers' fears were
justified: Although historians disagree about the significance of Hamilton's activities, it is clear
that he was guilty of gross indiscretion in his dealings with British Ambassador George Hammond and Major George Beckwith, an aide to the British governor of Canada and a British
secret agent. Hamilton desired to conceal his relationship with Beckwith, advising him that he
"did not 'chuse to have this go any further in America.'" J. BOYD, NUMBER 7: ALEXANDER
HAMILTON'S SEcREr ATrEMPTS TO CONTROL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 12 (1964) (footnote
omitted). Hamilton told Beckwith of America's desire for a political alliance with Britain and
attributed this desire to Washington and a majority of the Senate. Combs has declared that
this communication was "way out of bounds [because] Washington had authorized no such
statements; and while he certainly did want a commercial treaty with England, he had no
predilections for Great Britain and no desire for a political alliance." J. COMBS, supra note 31,
at 49. At the very least, Hamilton's relationship with these British officials was indiscreet.
Viewed most critically, it furnishes ammunition to attack Hamilton's foreign policy activities
and has been interpreted as an attempt to manipulate the American government's official policy. J.BOYD, supra, at xiii. Boyd has suggested that Hamilton went substantially beyond indiscretion by actually misleading the administration regarding the British position on American
relations. Boyd claims that Hamilton deceived Washington because he wanted to offset the
damaging effect of a report by Gouverneur Morris questioning Britain's sincerity in seeking to
improve relations. Id. at 46; for a discussion of the Morris mission, see infra notes 320-23 and
accompanying text. Boyd summed up his analysis of the Hamilton-Beckwith affair by declaring that "[t]he calculated and continuing use of deception by the Secretary of the Treasury is
thus a major factor that must be reckoned with in the assessment of foreign policy in the first
administration and beyond." Id. at 85. But see G. LYCAN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 122-23 (1970) (criticizing Boyd's treatment of Hamilton's relationship
with Beckwith).
Another commentator has suggested that Hamilton seriously undermined America's bargaining position during the Anglo-Spanish War Crisis of 1790 by assuring Beckwith that the
United States would not support the Spanish. Kaplan, The Consensus of 1789: Jefferson and
Hamilton on American Foreign Policy, 71 So. ATL. Q. 91, 102-03 (1972). Later, Hamilton
would substantially destroy Jay's bargaining chip by informing the British ambassador that
the United States would not enter into an armed neutrality with the Baltic powers. J.CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, 7 GEORGE WASINGTON 239 n.157 (1957) (completing the biography by D. Freeman); S. BEMIS, supra note 30, at 337; for a discussion of Jay's mission and
treaty, see Infra notes 480-517 and accompanying text.
Even Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton's adversary in the Cabinet and an advocate of a more
limited executive role, is not above reproach. While he cannot be accused of the sustained
misconduct of Hamilton, his involvement with the French Minister Genet bordered on treason:
Genet informed Jefferson of a plan to go to Kentucky to organize an expedition to attack the
Spanish city of New Orleans. C. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793, at 183 (1931).
Despite the possible consequences of an attack on the Spanish city from American territory,
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strong leader.58 Colonel Mason, a delegate from Virginia, denounced
monarchy and warned that the Convention was going too far in
granting powers to the executive. 59 Pierce Butler, a delegate from
South Carolina, dismissed claims that the United States had no reason to fear the head of the government and stated that "a Cataline
or a Cromwell [could] arise in this Country as well as in others." 60
Finally, Benjamin Franklin expressed his concern that giving absolute veto power to the executive would enable him to subject the
legislature to his will. He also cautioned the Convention that the
chief official could keep increasing his power until he became a monarch. 61 The delegates at the Convention, in developing the Constitution, acted with an acute awareness of the great risks to liberty
posed by a powerful executive.
While some Convention delegates feared that an excess of executive power would lead to tyranny, others were just as fearful of
legislative tyranny. James Wilson warned that tyranny could come
in many forms, noting that besides despotism from the executive and
military there could develop a legislative despotism. 62 Thomas
Jefferson believed that concentrating legislative, executive and judicial authority in the same hands was the essence of tyranny and concluded that 173 despots in the legislative branch would be just as
oppressive as a single despot.6 3 The Framers' wariness of the legislature stemmed from their awareness of the state legislatures' usurpation of the powers of the other branches during the Confederation
period.' The experience of the Confederation had shown the FramJefferson failed to notify Washington of Genet's plans, S. BEMIS, supra note 30, at 198, and
assisted Genet by putting him in contact with several people in Kentucky. C. THOMAS, Supra,
at 184.
For a discussion of the questioned allegiance of Edmund Randolph, who replaced Jefferson as Secretary of State, see generally J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra,at 265-298.
58. Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson went so far as to advocate an absolute veto.
1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 98.
59. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 101-02. Mason hoped that nothing resembling
a monarchy would develop in the United States. He objected to giving the Executive an absolute veto saying that it would be enough to allow him "to suspend offensive laws, till they shall
be coolly [sic] revised." Id. at 102.
60. Id. at 100.
61. Id. at 103.
62. Id. at 254.

63.

THE FEDERALIST No.

48, at 310-11 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (quoting

Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia).
64. See G. WOOD, supra note 17, at 550-51. For example, the legislatures "meddled
constantly in judicial affairs, nullified court verdicts, vacated judgments, remitted fines. ..."
H. COMMAGER, supra note 38, at 214; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison)
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ers that they had to protect against legislative as well as executive

attempts to aggrandize their respective powers.6 5
Due to their distrust of power and their worries about tyranny,
the Framers desired that the government contain safeguards against
the abuse of power. They, like most Americans, were in agreement
as to the importance of a separation of powers." Madison, for example, "conceived it to be absolutely necessary to a well constituted
Republic that the [executive and legislative branches] be kept distinct [and] independent of each other.167 He felt that a concentration of powers in the same hands "may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." 68 The ease and speed with which the Convention adopted the doctrine of separation of power indicates that the
Convention delegates generally shared Madison's belief in the need
to separate powers.6 9
The Framers, while espousing the doctrine of separation of powers, felt that additional means to protect against tyranny were essential.7 0 Again, the proposals formulated by the Framers recalled the
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
65. For Convention proposals to restrain the legislature, see, for example, 1 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 158, 254 and 2 id. at 407.
66. The roots of the American theory of separation of powers are found in the writings
of Montesquieu. As James Madison said, "The oracle who is always consulted and cited on
this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu." THE FEDERA sT No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). The doctrine comprised the idea that the legislative, executive, and judicial
functions had to be entrusted to three separate and distinct branches of government each responsible for one of the functions.
Examples of the belief in the desirability of separation of powers abound in the years prior
to the Convention. The instructions of the town of Boston to its representatives in the General
Court in May 1776 expressed the view that it was "essential to Liberty" that the three powers
should be "as nearly as possible, independent of and separate from each other." G. WOOD,
supra note 17, at 150. Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786)
that for the government to exercise its powers in the best manner it should be organized and
separated according to legislative, executive and judicial functions. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 7, at 211 (1975). John Jay, in An Address to the People of the State of
New-York on the Subject of the Constitution (Sept. 17, 1787) noted that there were numerous
instances where governments in which all powers were held by the same body had plunged into
tyrannies, and it was therefore prudent that the three governmental functions should be placed
in different hands. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 20, at 75.
67. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 35.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
69. On May 30, the second day of full business in the Convention, the delegates passed
a resolution [ayes-6, noes-l, divided-l] that "a national government ought to be established
consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive." 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra
note 4, at 30-31.
70. Madison noted that separation of departments on paper was not a sufficient guard
against encroachment, and it was therefore necessary to introduce a system of balances to
guarantee the separation. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 77.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/10

14

Stein: The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic
1982]

THE FRAMERS' INTENT

responses of state leaders to the need to provide checks against the
concentration of power. The example of the Confederation legislatures had proved to the American political leaders that a pure system of separation of power"' was an inadequate guard against
branches grasping excessive powers.72 New York, in its 1777 constitution, reacted against pure separation of powers and began the
movement toward a system of checks and balances." The shift in the
pre-Convention period toward a theory of checks and balances
culminated in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which developed a system of separated powers based on checks and balances.7 4
The Confederation experience demonstrated that a constitutional
separation was not sufficient to guard against encroachment by one
branch upon another branch's powers. 5 The Framers, therefore, felt
it necessary to construct a system of checks and balances that would
effectively restrain each of the branches.
By the time of the Convention, key Framers, such as Madison
and Wilson, had developed ideas about the mechanics of the system
of checks. Madison and Wilson altered the conception that separa71. Pure separation of powers means a rigid separation. Madison claimed that, notwithstanding the sweeping declarations found in the state constitutions, none of them had kept the
governmental departments absolutely separate. THE FEDERALUST No. 47, at 303-04 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For Madison's examination of the states' mixing of governmental departments despite the broad statements in the constitutions denouncing such blending of powers, see id. at 304-07.
72. M. VILE, CONSTTUIONAISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 148 (1967). The
excesses of radicals in the Pennsylvania legislature and the tendency of state legislatures to
accumulate additional powers caused American political leaders to shy away from a pure separation doctrine. Id.
73. Id. at 134, 148. There are numerous ways of defining the concept of checks and
balances. The Essex Result, a reply from the town of Essex on the proposed state constitution,
that influenced the Massachusetts Constitution, advocated that "[e]ach branch is to be independent, and further, to be so balanced, and be able to exert such checks upon the others, as
will preserve it from a dependence on, or a union with them." Id. at 151 (footnote omitted).
Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, described a government in which the
powers were so divided and balanced "that no one could transcend their legal limits without
being effectually checked and restrained by the others." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 311 (J.
Madison quoting Jefferson) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison said that the states had to develop
a system whereby the branches would, by their mutual relations, provide the means of keeping
each other confined to their proper spheres. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton noted that the doctrine of separation of powers was "entirely
compatible with a partial intermixture" of the branches for specific purposes. He stressed that
in certain circumstances this intertwining of the departments was "not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government against each other." THE
FEDERAUST No. 66, at 401-02 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
74. See M. VILE, supra note 72, at 148.
75. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310-11 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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tion of powers meant that each department exclusively handle different governmental functions. Wilson claimed that "[s]eparation of
the departments does not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act separately tho' on the same objects. '78
He cited as an example the fact that the Senate and House, though
separate bodies, would act on the same objects.7 7 Rather than complete separation, the system required that the departments remain
connected. As Madison stated, "unless these departments be so far
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control
over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires
. . . can never in practice be duly maintained.17 8 The Framers desired that each branch carefully scrutinize the others and, when necessary, act to prevent the other branches from usurping the others'
79
authority.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

With this understanding of the background of the Framers' beliefs, it is possible to begin a study of the Convention debates. In the
opening days of the Convention, the delegates quickly discarded any
thoughts of narrowly viewing their purpose. The Continental Congress, by its resolution of February 21, 1787, had summoned the national Convention for "the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several
legislatures such alterations and provisions

. .

. [to] render the fed-

eral constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government [and] the
preservation of the Union."' 0 Delegates like General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina s " and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts asserted a belief that this resolution limited the possible
scope of the Convention. 2 As Madison noted,' "[General Pinckney]
76. C. SMITH,
77. Id.

JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER

1742-1798, at 258 (1956).

78.

THE FEDERAuST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

79.

Bestor, supra note 13, at 536.

80.

3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 13, 14.

81. His cousin, Charles Pinckney, was a fellow member of the South Carolina delegation. C. ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 132.
82. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 34. Though Gerry voiced his disapproval he
acquiesced in the expanded scope of the Convention because he felt that to "preserve the
Union, an efficient government was indispensably necessary, and that it would be difficult to
make proper amendments to the Articles of Confederation." Letter Containing the Reasons of
the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq., (For Not Signing the Federal Constitution), in 1 J. ELLIOT,
THE

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

CONSTITUTION

ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

492, 493 (1836, revised ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as
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expressed a doubt whether the act of Congs. recommending the Convention, or the Commissions of the deputies to it, could authorize a
discussion of a System founded on different principles from the federal Constitution."'" New York delegates Robert Yates and John
Lansing justified their departure from the Convention and their opposition to the Constitution in part on their disapproval of the Convention's acting in contravention of its narrowly defined authority.85
The other delegates rejected this viewpoint and began to discuss the
radical changes they thought vital to the well-being of the country. 8
The Randolph Resolutions,8 which provided the focus for the
early Convention debates and from which the basic outline of the
Constitution evolved, 8 sheds little light on the Framers' intention regarding executive powers89 and foreign policy authority. The plan
does not mention foreign relations and provides no substantive
description of the scope of executive power.90 The Randolph Propo83. Madison's notes of the Convention debates comprise the best source about the Convention proceedings. Farrand's first two volumes of Records are a compilation of the notes of
the Convention debates kept by Madison and other delegates. Madison provides the only day
by day account; other delegates' accounts provide only sketchy glimpses of occasional debates.
Quotations from Farrand's Records are not the actual words of the particular Framers but are
merely records of the speeches made by delegates.
84. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 34.
85. Letter from Robert Yates and John Lansing to the Governor of New York (Clinton), in 1 ELLiOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 480.
86. In fact, on the same day that Pinckney voiced his objections to the Convention acting beyond its powers, the delegates voted that a "national Governt. ought to be established
consisting of a supreme Legislative[,] Executive & Judiciary," thus replacing the Confederation Congress with a government comprised of three branches. I Farrand, RECORDS, supra
note 4, at 35.
87. The Randolph Resolutions (also known as the Virginia Plan) developed out of discussions held by the Virginia Convention delegates just prior to the start of the Convention on
a plan for a new government. Randolph presented the plan to the Convention on May 29,
1787. 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 593. For the text of the resolutions, see 1 Farrand, REcoRDs, supra note 4, at 20-22.
88. 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 593.
89. As illustrated by the Randolph Plan, the delegates at this time did not use the term
president. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 21. It was not until later in the Convention
that the delegates decided that the executive branch should be composed of one man rather
than several men. On July 17 the Convention unanimously passed a resolution of the Committee of the Whole House "[t]hat a national Executive be instituted to consist of a Single Person." 2 Farrand, REcoRDs, supra note 4, at 22. The draft of the Committee of Detail,
presented on August 6, 1787 and the first draft to be presented to the Convention, stated that
the executive would be known as "The President." Id. at 185.
90. Resolutions 7 and 8 concern the national executive. Resolution 7 gives the executive
"general authority to execute the National laws" and says that the executive "ought to enjoy
the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." Section 8 joined the Executive
with members of the judiciary as a council of revision that could examine and veto laws. These
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sal merely sketches an outline for a national government without addressing the specific powers of the branches it deemed necessary to
create.
The first debates on Randolph's seventh resolution, which called
for a National Executive, highlighted the delegates' conviction that
the executive's powers should be strictly confined. All of the delegates who spoke on this issue indicated their wariness of an executive
and proposed limits on executive power.91 Roger Sherman and James
Wilson, at this time, held especially narrow views of executive powers. Sherman "considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more
than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect," 2 while Wilson stated that "[t]he only powers he conceived
strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing
officers." 93 Wilson and Madison claimed that the power over war
and peace was of a legislative nature, and the delegates who expressed their sentiments on this issue likewise hoped that the executive would not be vested with this power.9 ' General Pinckney's view
illustrates the attitude of the delegates. He advocated a "vigorous
Executive" but expressed anxiety about the executive having power
over war, asserting that giving an executive such power would create
"a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one."9 5 Clearly, as
the early discussion of the Randolph executive resolution indicates,
the delegates as a whole wanted strict limits on the executive and
thought that he should not be given power over war and peace.
Alexander Hamilton provided a brief interlude from the debate
concerning the Randolph Resolutions. Hamilton's plan,98 stirred little discussion, and the delegates immediately resumed their examination of the Randolph governmental scheme. 97 Although Hamilton's speech generated little support 8 and his plan was not
powers are the only executive powers included in Randolph's Resolutions. See I Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 21.
91. For the debate, see id. at 64-67, 70.
92. Id. at 65.
93. Id. at 65-66.
94. Id. at 65-66, 70.
95. Id. at 64-65.
96. For the contents of the proposal, see id. at 291-93.
97. The delegates adjourned after the speech. Id. at 293. The next day, June 19, 1787,
the body returned to the issues that were being discussed prior to Hamilton's speech. Id. at
312. There was a short discussion, concerning the role of the states in the new government,
prompted by Hamilton's speech. See id. at 322-23.
98. William Johnson, a delegate from Connecticut, remarked on Hamilton's plan that
"though he has been praised by every body, he has been supported by none." Id. at 363. One
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considered by the Convention,9" it remains crucially important to an
understanding of the Framers' intent regarding foreign policy. Hamilton's beliefs differed markedly from the average delegate's perspective.100 Hamilton declared that "the British Govt. was the best in the
world" and proclaimed the House of Lords "a most noble institution." 101 He went so far as to claim that the "English model" of an
executive was "the only good one."102 Lastly, he even proposed that
the Senate and the executive be appointed to life terms to be served
"during good behaviour." 103
Hamilton's sentiments in favor of an independent executive
elected for life furnish the backdrop for a discussion of his outline of
a new government. Most importantly, while Hamilton favored a
strong executive, he envisioned significant restraints on the executive's role in foreign affairs. Though Hamilton felt that executive
qualities were necessary in treatymaking, he constrained the president's power to mold American foreign policy by requiring the Senate's "advice and approbation" for treaties. In addition, Hamilton
placed a substantial limitation on the executive's control over war.
He proposed that the Senate have "the sole power of declaring war,"
and that the executive direct the war effort only "when authorized or
begun."'' 04 That one of the Convention's strongest proponents of ex-

ecutive power placed such limits on executive foreign policy authority10 5 exemplifies the delegates' desire to have the legislative branch
delegate, George Read of Delaware, said that Hamilton's scheme was the best plan proposed.
Id. at 471.
99. See infra note 101. Hamilton, in his speech introducing his scheme, stated that he
"did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee," but
rather meant to suggest amendments to the Randolph plan. Id. at 291. The Committee of the
Whole House referred several plans to the Committee of D-tail (which was to draw up the
first sketch of a constitution) but did not transmit Hamilton's proposal to it. 2 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 106.

100. 1 Farrand, REcoRDs, supra note 4, at 291. Hamilton himself said that "[h]e was
aware that [his sketch of a government] went beyond the ideas of most members." Id.
101. Id. at 288.
102. Id. at 289.. Nevertheless, he realized the need to propose a republican form of government to the nation. Id. at 288-89.
103. Id. at 291-92.
104. See id. at 292.
105. At the end of the Convention, Hamilton presented to Madison his thoughts on the
type of constitution he favored. Hamilton still approved of the strict limits on executive authority that he had advocated in his speech early in the Convention. He called for limits on a
presidential foreign policy role, proposing that the Senate have exclusive power over declarations of war, and that the Senate give its advice and consent to treaties by the President. In
addition, he favored restrictions on the President as commander-in-chief. He sought to prevent
the President from taking actual field command without congressional approval and from di-
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play, at the very least, a prominent role in foreign policymaking.
The first preliminary draft of a constitution, presented by the
Committee of Detail to the Convention on August 6, 1787,106 illustrated the delegates' leanings toward a predominant legislative role
in foreign affairs. The draft gave the legislative bodies nearly exclusive control over the development of foreign policy. At that time, the
crucial foreign policy powers concerning war, the high seas, commerce, and treaties were all placed in the legislative sphere. The
committee draft called for congressional control over the war power,
as it gave Congress control over both making war and fielding an
army.10 7 It also supplied Congress with authority over the enactment
of laws involving the "high seas," the "law of nations," and commerce. 10 8 The Committee bestowed on the Senate complete control
over treaties, including the appointment of ambassadors.1 09 The
President's powers in the foreign affairs area were limited to acting
as commander-in-chief and receiving ambassadors 1 ° This distribution of powers, therefore, juxtaposed an executive possessing the ceremonial power to receive ambassadors and the military power to
command the armed forces, with a powerful Senate able to control
treatymaking. 1 "1
The Committee's draft also provided that "[t]he Executive
Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. 1 1 2 It
should be noted that in this draft the Committee used the same
wording to introduce the legislative branch-"The legislative power
shall be vested in a Congress"--; 1 3 therefore, no special grant of
executive authority could be implied from the executive clause.
Given the extensive powers granted to Congress, it could be argued
recting any war efforts until war was actually commenced. 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82,
at 584, 586-87.
106. On July 23, 1787, the convention voted unanimously to refer the proceedings (except those regarding the executive) to a "Committee for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably to the Proceedings aforesaid." 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 85. The
Convention selected John Rutledge (S.C.), Edmund Randolph (Va.), Nathaniel Gorham
(Mass.), Oliver Elsworth (Conn.), and James Wilson (Pa.) to serve on the committee. Id. at
97. For the contents of their draft see 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 177-89.
107. Id. at 182.
108. Id. at 181-82.
109. Id. at 183. The appointment power was very important because the appointees
would be empowered to make treaties. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 595.
110. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 185. The draft referred to the executive as
the president. Id. See supra note 92 for a discussion of the use of the term "executive."
111. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 594-95.
112. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 185.
113. Id. at 177.
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that the Committee expected Congress to control policymaking in
foreign affairs and did not intend the executive clause to confer any
special presidential authority in external matters.
After the Committee presented its report, the delegates seemed
to take for granted the fact that the Senate would have complete
control over treaties. Charles Pinckney, for example, said that "[a]s
the Senate is to have the power of making treaties and managing our
foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening
its door to those who have foreign attachments. 114 There were numerous practical reasons pointing to a Senate rather than a House
role in treatymaking. 1 5 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney thought that
the House, with its many members, could not be expected to maintain secrecy, and that it would not be in session often enough to permit it to be entrusted with this power.11" He felt that the Senate had
special advantages for treatymaking in that it had substantially
117
fewer members, six year terms, and equal state representation.
Hamilton similarly concluded that the House should not have
treaty power, noting that the requisites for treaties-uniformity, secrecy and dispatch-could not be maintained by such a large
body.118 Hamilton also recognized the inconvenience and expense involved in keeping the members of the House in session for this purpose."' Concisely stated:
[T]here apparently was serious question in many Framers' minds
whether the House, as opposed to the Senate, had the institutional
capacity to deal with foreign affairs. The House was thought too
large and infrequently in session for the requisite speed and secrecy, too short-term and fluctuating in its membership for the development of the necessary expertise, and too prone to factions to
reflect the national interest.120
114. Id. at 235.
115. The Federal Farmer suggested several reasons for a Senate treaty role:
[P]erhaps the senate is sufficiently numerous to be trusted with this power, sufficiently small to proceed with secrecy, and sufficiently permanent to exercise this
power with proper consistency and due deliberation. To lodge this power [advice
and consent] in a less respectable and less numerous body might not be safe.
FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 43, at 75.
116. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 280-81. See also id. at 264-65.
117. Id.at 281.
118.

THE FEDERALIsT No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

119. Id. at 452-53.
120. Reveley, supra note 6, at 119. For further discussion on treatymaking powers, see
the views of Corbin in the Virginia ratifying convention, in ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82,
Book I, vol. 3, at 509.
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A final practical justification for giving the Senate treaty power was
the belief that the Senate would be more insulated from the public
than the House and would therefore be less likely to "yield to the
impulse of sudden and violent passions. 121
In addition to the practical justifications, there were important
political considerations underlying the Senate's treaty role. In a letter dated December 10, 1803, Gouverneur Morris commented that
the small states would never have accepted the Constitution if it had
placed all of the great powers in the House, and that the Convention,
therefore, granted special powers, including treaty authority, to the
Senate.1 22 The discussion of treaties by Convention delegates from
North Carolina in their state ratifying convention also indicates that
the concerns of the small states constituted the chief rationale for
Senate influence over treaties. Delegate William R. Davie noted the
small states' "extreme jealousy" and their fear that their interests
might be sacrificed in negotiations. He felt that these fears prompted
the small states' inflexibility and, therefore, he advocated a provision
assuring "absolute equality" among the states in treatymaking. 12
Delegate Richard Spaight stated that giving the Senate treaty power
resulted in "the interest of every state [being] equally attended to in
the formation of treaties."1 2 ' It is impossible to determine from the
debates the influence of the small states in promoting the Senate
role; but it is obvious that the small states' desires had some impact
over its maintenance. James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, deplored the Senate's popularity with small states and
spoke of the great problems in providing. checks on the body's power:
"[T]he Senate is a favorite with many of the states, and it was with
difficulty that these checks could be procured; it was one of the last
exertions of conciliation, in the late Convention, that obtained
them.,, 25
Despite a willingness to placate the small states, there developed
121.
122.

THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 379 (probably J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Lewis R. Morris (Dec. 10, 1803), in 3 Farrand,

RECORDS, supra note 4, at 404, 405. President Washington, in his message to the House of
Representatives in which he refused their request for information about the Jay Treaty, declared that the Senate was given great powers because the "sovereignty and political safety of
the smaller States were deemed essentially to depend" on their representation in the Senate.
To The House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796), in 35 WASHINGTON WRTINoS, supra note
15, at 4.
123. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 120.
124. Id. at 27; see also Iredell's view, found in id. at 125.
125. 2 Id., at 507. See also Id. at 466.
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a strong opposition to the Senate's exclusive authority over treatymaking. Delegates expressed general disapproval over the Senate's
role in the government 126 and many were eager to find means of
checking its power. 127 Madison noted that Colonel Mason had denounced the Senate's ability to make treaties "without legislative
sanction," and that Mason had expressed a desire to limit the powers

of the Senate which "could already sell the whole Country by means
of Treaties." 128 Likewise, Gouverneur Morris expressed his misgivings, remarking that he "did not know that he should agree to refer
the making of Treaties to the Senate at all."1 29 Madison advocated
presidential involvement in the treaty process, objecting to the fact
that the Senate "represented the States alone," and alluding to
"other obvious reasons."130 Though the delegates did not eliminate
Senatorial domination at this time, there was enough dissatisfaction
with the Senate role that changes seemed possible in the future.
Still, on August 31, 1787, the date of the appointment of a Committee on Postponed Matters,1 3 treaty power remained in the Senate's
32
1

hands.
The Committee on Postponed Matters initiated a startling
change in the treaty process. The Committee proposed that the
"President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
have power to make treaties. . . . But no Treaty . . . shall be made
without the consent of two thirds of the Members present." 33 Although it is not important in the context of this article to determine

126. Edmund Randolph observed that "almost every Speaker had made objections to
the clause as it stood." 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 393. See also the discussion of
opposition to Senate treaty power in W. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 4 (1964).
127. Reveley, supra note 6, at 96. For possible motivations underlying the disapproval
with the Senate treaty function see C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789,
at 164 (1969).
128. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 297.
129. Id. at 392.
130. Id.
131. On August 31, the Convention appointed a committee to produce a report on parts
of the Constitution that still had not been acted upon. Id. at 481. Delegate James McHenry
spoke of a referral to a "grand committee [of] all the sections of the system under postponement." Id. at 482. The Committee was also referred to as "The Committee of Eleven to whom
sundry resolutions . . . were referred on the 31st. of August." Id. at 497. For a listing of the
committee members, see id. at 481.
132. The Convention began its formal proceedings May 25, 1787. 1 Farrand, RECORDS,
supra note 4, at 1, and concluded its work on September 17. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note
4, at 650. The Committee on Postponed Matters was appointed on August 31 and presented its
report containing the treaty clause on September 4. Id. at 481, 498.
133. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 495.
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the roots of this scheme, it is noteworthy that this radical change
came from the Committee rather than from the Convention debates.
"with
Moreover, this major change was adopted by the Convention
13 4
debate."
little
surprisingly
and
unanimity
surprising
Unfortunately, the motivation for the Convention's acceptance
of this significant modification is a matter of pure conjecture. Possibly, the delegates' increasing weariness and their desire to conclude
the Convention caused them to accept the changes so willingly.13 5
Certainly the fact that many delegates had grave misgivings about
the Senate contributed to the willingness to have a system with
checks to protect against abuses by this body.136 The clause requiring two-thirds consent of the Senate may have helped to engender
support for the Committee's proposal, because delegates felt that the
two-thirds requirement would prevent Congress from acting against
a particular region's interests. For example, many delegates favored
the clause because they feared that a simple majority might vote to
compromise the country's navigation rights to the Mississippi.137 The
eastern states also supported this clause, basically because it protected their interests in Newfoundland fisheries.138 Lastly, the experiences under the Confederation may have helped convince the delegates of the need for an executive role in treatymaking and in
foreign policy in general.
During the course of the Revolution, American leaders realized
that Congress as a body could not maintain the war effort. The Continental Congress understood that it had to delegate authority over
the nation's struggle and established a variety of congressional com134. M. FARRAND, supra note 8,at 171.
135. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
137. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2, 1788), in 3 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 306. Williamson, a delegate from North Carolina, said that this
clause had been placed in the constitution for "the express purpose of preventing a majority of
the Senate. . .from giving up the Mississippi." Id. at 306-07. Anxiety over the negotiations
involving the Mississippi was widespread in states like Virginia because people in those states
still remembered with bitterness the course of negotiations with Spain over the river rights.
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 319 (1975). Williamson noted "the Navigation of the
Mississippi after what had already happened in Congress was not to be risqued in the Hands
of a meer [sic] majority." 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 307.
138. Colonel Mason In Debate in Virginia Convention, reprinted in 3 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 4, at 335. For differing views about the Eastern states' willingness to
relinquish the navigation rights, see speeches in the Virginia convention by Madison, Patrick
Henry and William Grayson, in 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 345-49, 351-56.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/10

24

Stein: The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic
19821

THE FRAMERS' INTENT

mittees to conduct the war. 39 These committees, however, proved
inadequate because they met irregularly, their membership changed
frequently, and the members' congressional responsibilities prevented
them from devoting the time required to run the war effort. 140 These
problems compelled Congress, in October 1777, to establish a new
Board of War, composed of five men who were not members of Congress, with supervisory power over the conduct of war.141 Still,
George Washington informed General Sullivan that Congress could
142
not supply the army unless it established executive departments.
Despite its reservations about giving excessive power to one man, the
Congress realized that it was necessary to have an executive controlling key departments.1 43 As a result, the Congress, in 1781, appointed secretaries of war and treasury.1 4 '
The Congress also had problems maintaining correspondence
with other nations due to delays in relaying messages abroad. These
delays convinced Congress that its Committee of Secret Correspondence had to be replaced by an executive agent. In 1781, it named
Robert Livingston as Secretary of Foreign Affairs1 45 and permitted
Livingston to correspond directly with American agents in Europe.
Further, members of Congress could inspect his letters only when
they concerned "great national objects. 1 46 John Jay took over as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1784, after a brief hiatus during
which Congress again attempted to direct diplomatic activity, and he
restored the office to the prominent status it enjoyed during Livingston's tenure. 47 Jay became the chief congressional adviser on for139.

Guggenheimer, The Development of the Executive Departments 1775-1789, in Es-

SAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

1775-1789, at 118-20 (J.Jameson ed. 1889 & photo. reprint 1970). Among committees
formed were a committee to introduce the manufacture of saltpetre, a cannon committee and a

medical committee. Id. at 119-20.
140.

For discussion of the insurmountable flaws of the committees, see F. GILBERT,

supra note 33, at 79; Guggenheimer, supra note 139, at 126; T. FROTHINGHAM, WASHINGTON:
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 314 (1930).
141. Guggenheimer, supra note 139, at 125.

142. J.FLEXNER, supra note 15, at 398. By this time, General Sullivan had resigned his
commission and been elected to Congress. Id.
143. For the view that a need for presidential diplomacy was demonstrated by the ineffectiveness of the Congress, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37
(1972).
144.

Guggenheimer, supra note 139, at 126-27.

145.

Id. at 161.

146.

F. GILBERT, supra note 33, at 82.

147. Id. at 83.
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eign affairs and essentially directed American foreign relations. 48
Congress had learned that it could not function effectively in areas
involving foreign relations or control of the militia. It, therefore,
found it necessary, for the smooth functioning of the government, to
create executive departments. These departments were given broad
discretionary powers to control the conduct of the country's military
and foreign affairs.
Just as the Confederation period provided lessons to the delegates about the need for executive action, it also illustrated the advantages of "executive-style" treaty negotiations. The Continental
Congress sent commissioners to Europe to attempt peace negotiations with the British, 149 carefully instructing them to act closely
with the French allies. It ordered the commissioners "to undertake
nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without [the French
allies'] knowledge and concurrence," and ordered them to govern
themselves "ultimately" by the views of the French government. 150
At the same time that Congress was assuring France that it would
not enter peace talks without first consulting the French monarch,
the American commissioners were deliberately ignoring their instructions and arranging a peace treaty without French
knowledge. 151 Congress did not know how to respond to the treaty
made by the commissioners. 1 2 Some people, especially Foreign Sec148. See Id. at 82-83.
149. The American commissioners were John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and
Henry Laurens. R. MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS 215-16 (1965). Congress also selected
Thomas Jefferson as a commissioner but he did not serve in this capacity. Id. at 376. Jefferson,
as a member of Congress, participated in the debate regarding the completed treaty. Id. at
447.
150. Id. at 215 (quoting 20 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 651, 652) (June
15, 1781). For a discussion of Jay's criticisms of the instructions, see R. MORRIS, supra note
149, at 245.
151. Id. at 438-40. See also A. DECONDE, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE: POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY UNDER GEORGE WASHINGTON 9 (1958). For the commissioners' justification of
their decision not to consult France, see R. MORRIS, supra note 149, at 382. It should be noted
that Jay learned that French Foreign Minister Vergennes had secretly sent his secretary to
London. So, Jay had reason to suspect that the French were trying to negotiate a treaty with
England without consulting the Americans. T. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 44-45 (1974). Suspicions serve both to explain and justify the American
commissioners' actions.
152. The commissioners created a real dilemma for Congress. Congress was especially
angered by a secret clause of the treaty, but it did not want to renounce the treaty's liberal
terms. R. MORRIS, supra note 149, at 442. The English treaty concessions shocked and surprised the French Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes. He remarked, "The English buy
peace rather than make it. . . . Their concessions exceed all that I could have thought possible." Id. at 383.
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retary Livingston, were outraged at the peacemakers for violating
the Congressional dictates. 53 Congress, however, did not renounce
the treaty primarily because it was quite favorable to the
Americans.'"
Despite their initial mixed feelings toward the commissioners,
the Congressmen came to realize that American diplomats negotiating in Europe required greater discretion than their European counterparts. 55 Congress' initial instructions to John Jay, prior to his
mission to Spain in 1785, required that he receive advance approval
from Congress before proposing treaty provisions. This restriction
would have made it very difficult to negotiate given the time required
to send messages across the ocean, 158 hold Congressional debates,
and forward further instructions.157 Congress, therefore, modified its
instruction, setting forth only the essential provisions and giving Jay
flexibility on all other issues.'58 The delegates' own Confederation
experience had reinforced their awareness that commissioners had to
rely, to a large extent, on their own judgment and that the legislature could not play an effective role in treaty negotiation.
American leaders also believed that the executive had advantages over the legislature in the realm of military and foreign affairs.
Delegates catalogued the requirements needed in an executive, often
repeating the stock phrases of secrecy, vigor, dispatch and responsibility. 59 Hamilton, writing in 1780, exemplifies this attitude toward
executive power: "There is always more decision, more dispatch,
more responsibility, where single men than where bodies are con153.

Id. at 442-43.

154. A congressional committee report shows the contradictory feelings towards the
commissioners. The report thanked them for their zealous efforts, but mildly criticized them
for disobeying their instructions. C. SmriH, supra note 76, at 188.
155. Benjamin Franklin had suggested this point to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Livingston during the course of the peace negotiations, noting that since America was so far from
Europe, the American commissioners had to be given more discretion than their European
counterparts. R. MoRas, supra note 149, at 439. American experience in the Confederation
period provides support for Franklin's position. Diplomatic correspondence was so unreliable
that at one point in time there was an eleven month hiatus in which the Continental Congress
did not receive correspondence from any of its twelve agents in Europe. R. BAILEY, supra note
151, at 28-29.

156. Even under the most favorable weather conditions it took two months for a message
from Europe to reach the United States. T. BAILEY, supra note 151, at 28-29.

157. Bestor, supra note 13, at 615.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 66, 70 (Madison and Wilson's
views). Mason noted that these advantages were often discussed, but said that they might
prove "greater in theory than practice." Id. at 112.
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cerned."'' 10 Hamilton concluded that the executive was therefore
"the most fit agent in those transactions."'1 6' John Jay, who had

served as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, realized the need for presidential involvement in treatymaking. He emphasized that treaty negotiations might require secrecy and quick action. He added that, at
times, people might be willing to rely on a president's promise of
confidentiality but would be skeptical of the Senate's ability to maintain secrecy.162 American notions of executive characteristics, notably secrecy, dispatch, uniformity and responsibility, coincided with
their perception of the requisites for the successful conduct of relations with other countries, and may have convinced them of the
value of presidential authority over foreign relations. 63
The Convention debates and proposals demonstrate the delegates' belief that Congress should play a predominant role in foreign
policy. The earliest draft, by the Committee of Detail, granted extensive powers to the legislature while limiting the President to the
powers of commander-in-chief and receiving ambassadors. The great
change in the distribution of powers came just two weeks before the
end of the debates. The debates on Senate treaty power prior to this
time show that the impetus for the committee's radical revision of
the treaty clause was a disapproval of the Senate role rather than a
desire to increase presidential power.'6 4 The Convention intended

that Congress have extensive powers over the development of foreign
policy, but desired executive control over the conduct of this policy,
and provided for a presidential policymaking role, at least in the
treatymaking realm.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTION

In addition to examining the Convention proceedings, it is necessary to analyze specific constitutional clauses in order to determine
160. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris (1780), quoted in Guggenheimer, supra note 139, at 150.
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 451 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see A.
SOFAER, supra note 55, at 50.
162. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392-93 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
163. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 119-20 (W. Davie in the North Carolina

Convention).
164. One historian, William Stull Holt, concluded that, given the delegates' belief that
the House could not adequately exercise the treaty power and the strong currents of opposition

in the Convention against either the Senate or the President having sole responsibility over
treaties, "the compromise giving it jointly to the President and Senate was almost inevitable."
W. HOLT, supra note 126, at 8.
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the Framers' intent. Two basic principles underlie the clauses that
specifically deal with foreign policy. The crucial notion, which determined the distribution of the foreign policy powers throughout the
Constitution, was the subordination of states to the national government in the area of foreign affairs.16 5 The other major principle derived from the Framers' recognition, on the one hand, that the wellbeing of the country required the vesting of foreign policy power in a
national government and their fear, on the other hand, of the abuse
of this immense national power. They, therefore, incorporated into
the Constitution a system of checks and a separation of powers,1 66
designed to prevent any of the governmental bodies from exceeding
their authority. With these safeguards, the Constitution provides for
a predominant national role in foreign relations, destroying pretensions of state authority over external affairs that had thrived during
the Confederation period. 6 7 Most importantly, the Constitution prevents states from entering into treaties, 168 limits their authority to
conduct war, 6 9 and restricts their ability to interfere with foreign
commerce.1 70 The Framers realized, however, that states might need
some degree of power in each of these spheres. Accordingly, the
Constitution provides that states can lay tonnage duties and can
enter into "Agreement[s] or Compact[s]" with foreign nations if
they secure congressional consent.1 71 In addition, since the Framers
feared that the national government would be unable to respond with
enough speed in an emergency situation, they allowed states to engage in war if they were invaded or if they were "in such imminent
Danger as [would] not admit of delay."1' 2 The Constitution, therefore, places all powers over foreign relations in the federal government, excepting state power in a war emergency and some state ac165. See Kaplan, supra note 57, at 99.
166. For a discussion of the separation of powers among the branches as applied by the
Framers, see Bestor, supra note 13, at 531, 534-37.
167. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 99.

168. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.
1. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation." Id.
169. The Constitution forbids states from granting Letters of Marque and Reprisal.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.1. For a discussion of permissible state military action see infra
notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.2: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Con-

gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws."
171. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, c!.3.
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.3. This clause also can be seen as enabling states to
"keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace," provided that Congress gives its consent. Id.
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tions subject to congressional control. 173' Further, state authority is
restricted by the supremacy clause mandate that state
judges be
17 4
bound by the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties.
The Constitution grants extensive and vital powers to Congress
with regard to the control of foreign relations. 75 Regulation of foreign commerce, commencement of war, negotiation of treaties, and
involvement in the system of the law of nations were the crucial areas of foreign policy concern at the time of the Convention. The delegates, by placing control over external commerce in the legislative
domain, 17 6 anticipated that Congress would play an important role in
shaping foreign policy. 17 ' Congress was given additional powers regarding the high seas and the law of nations, 78 with which they
could greatly affect relations with other countries.""9 Congress was
given further responsibility through its power to control state involvement in the external sphere.'80 It was only in treatymaking that
congressional foreign policymaking was limited, as treaties were to
be made by the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senate. 81
The Framers also gave the legislature crucial functions regarding the military. They were frightened that a standing army might
endanger liberty and were especially wary of the possibility that a
President might utilize the army to usurp control of the government.182 The delegates therefore vested Congress with the power to
173. For a discussion of the predominance of the national government and the limitation
placed on the states in the realm of foreign relations, see Kaplan, supra note 57, at 99.
174. See L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 242. The supremacy clause may stem from
John Jay's report on violations of the Treaty of Peace. Jay recommended that treaties have the
same force as laws, and that states should not be permitted to pass laws contrary to an American treaty. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 326 (1975). For a discussion of
the report, see supra text accompanying note 26.

175.

For a discussion of the congressional powers, see A.

176.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce

SOFAER,

supra note 55, at 2-3.

with foreign Nations."
177. For a discussion of the importance to American foreign policy of American commercial relations with other countries, see L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 69. The institution of
an embargo on foreign trade was an important American foreign policy tool in the late eighteenth century.
178. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10: "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."

179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 265-66 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
180. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
181.

U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, c. 2: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate to make Treaties. .. "
182. The Framers knew the lessons of history too well not to fear that a powerful general could eventually become a dictator. Most importantly, the Framers knew from the
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raise the armed forces183 and to regulate the militia.18 4 To protect
against improper use of the militias, they granted Congress the authority to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."18 5 The
delegates provided additional protection against presidential usurpation of authority by making the President commander of the state
militias only "when called into the actual Service of the United
States. '18 Finally, the delegates guaranteed a congressional warmaking role by placing control over the declaration of war in Congress' hands, and by giving Congress authority over military actions
18 7
short of full-scale war, such as letters of marque and reprisal.
There is no doubt that the Constitution presumes a prominent
congressional role in the development of American foreign policy.
The fact that the Constitution gave Congress the war power, the
most important facet of foreign policy, lends strong support to this
view of congressional preeminence in foreign relations. In determining issues of war, the Congress would be responsible for crucial national policies. Control over foreign commerce, the law of the high
seas, the law of nations, and state relations with other countries also
result in congressional policymaking. 88 It has even been suggested
that the Constitution gives Congress the right to make foreign policy
while it makes the President a mere congressional agent.1 89 The
presidential role in treatymaking, however, seems to contradict the
theory that the President is simply an agent of Congress. The fact
that the President could make treaties and could appoint ambassadors to further his goals certainly furnishes at least some basis for
presidential involvement in important policymaking functions.
Revolution experience that a discontented army could endanger the nation. They likely had
heard the talk at the end of the Revolution that the army might refuse to disband until the
states took steps to enable Congress to pay its debts. J. FLEXNER, supra note 15, at 492. The
Framers also were aware of the fact that there was some sentiment in 1783 that Washington
should become a monarch. One example of this sentiment was the suggestion by Lewis Nicola,
one of Washington's colonels, that Washington should become king. Id. at 491. For further
discussion of the Nicola incident, see L. DUNBAR, A STUDY OF "MONARCHICAL" TENDENCIES
IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1776 TO 1801, at 41-48 (1970).
183.
184.

U.S. CONsT. art. I,
U.S. CoNsT. art. I,

§
§

8, cl. 12: "To raise and support Armies...
8, cl. 16.

185. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
187. For a full discussion of war-making in the Constitution, see infra notes 223-49 and
accompanying text.
188. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 83.
189. Henkin, noting this point of view, commented that the argument concerning the
extent of congressional authority is "debatable and continue[s] to be debated." Id. at 84.
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From the early years of the Washington administration 9 ° to the
present, Americans have debated the extent of presidential authority
in foreign policy. The Constitution clothes the President with few
express delegations of foreign policy power. trhe only express presidential foreign affairs powers to be found in the Constitution are
those of (a) commander-in-chief,9 1' (b) receiving ambassadors, 92
and (c) nominating ambassadors and making treaties. 193 Also, the
President could indirectly exert additional influence over external
matters by the use of his veto power. 194 These powers comprise the
only undisputed constitutional grants of presidential authority in the
international sphere. To justify an increased presidential role in the
field of foreign relations, proponents of broad executive authority
claim that the constitutional clauses concerning the commander-inchief, executive power, and receiving ambassadors furnish the President with substantial power regarding foreign relations.19 5 Yet, the
Framers specifically delegated control over almost the entire sphere
of foreign relations to the legislature."" This delegation, in conjunction with their extreme wariness of presidential power, indicates
their intention to make Congress the dominant branch in foreign policy, with the President acting solely within his narrowly enumerated
197
powers.
In determining the constitutional intent regarding foreign policy, it is necessary to examine more closely the meaning of several
crucial clauses: the commander-in-chief, the declaration 'of war, and
the treaty clauses.
190. For the discussion of the Pacificus-Helvidius debate, see infra notes 423-64 and
accompanying text.
191. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
192. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
193. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
195. The commander-in-chief clause is discussed infra notes 198-222 and accompanying
text. For an analysis of the implications of the President's executive power and his authority to
receive ambassadors, see Infra text accompanying notes 423-79 and 452-58. For another theory of the basis of executive authority see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936).
196. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
197. But see C. THACH, supra note 127, at 165. Thach declares:
To interpret the presidency strictly in terms of the language of the enumerated powers can then result only in [an] inadequate concept of what the office signified. At
least, we must extend the concept to include the sole right to administrative headship and to the management of the business of foreign affairs. And, we believe, in
the last should be included the right to negotiate treaties independently of the
Senate.
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A.

The Commander-in-Chief

Although the commander-in-chief clause has been used to justify enormous presidential war-making power, 198 evidence of the
Framers' intent indicates that this clause provides the President with
only limited war powers.1 99 It is especially noteworthy that the Convention accepted the commander-in-chief clause without recorded
debate. 200 As one modern writer has commented, "'This expeditious,
unremarked assent again suggests a narrow, non-controversial conception of the clause."' 201 The Framers' disavowal of British royal
prerogatives also suggests a desire for a limited commander. The
King's powers went far beyond that of being "the generalissimo, or
the first in military command.1 20 2 The King had control over all the
militia, had "the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies'2°3 and had the prerogative of handling the country's foreign
relations. In contrast, the President could only control the militia
when it was called into the actual service of the United States. In
addition, the President's power over the military was significantly restricted, because the Constitution provided that Congress was to
have power over raising armies and declaring war.2 4 The Framers
repudiated the broad powers of the British monarch, desiring instead
a much more confined role for the President.
Hamilton, in The FederalistPapers, commented on the limited
nature of the powers emanating from the commander-in-chief clause.
He noted that the President's authority was vastly inferior to that of
the British Crown and claimed that the post amounted "to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy. ' 20 5 Of
course, The Federalistmust be viewed with caution because it was
198.

See W. Rhenquist, The President's ConstitutionalAuthority to Order the Attack

on Cambodian Sanctuaries (Remarks of the then Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (May 28, 1970), excerpted in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 228-31 (1980).
199. Henry Steele Commager's views on presidential power parallels this viewpoint. He
claims that it is "inescapably clear" that the Framers intended the Congress to declare war
and the President to command the military forces. H. COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA
61 (1974).
200. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitutiorn The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 679 (1972).
201. Id.; see also Reveley, supra note 6, at 113.
202. See the discussion of Blackstone's Commentaries in Bestor, supra note 13, at 532.
203. Id. at 534 (quoting Blackstone).
204. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 532-34.
205. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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part of a partisan campaign to win support for the Constitution. It is
obvious, however, that Hamilton sincerely believed in the concept of
the commander as expressed in The Federalist,as he had advocated
a similar idea in his Convention Plan. Hamilton clearly envisioned a
commander who would take control of the troops only after war had
208
been authorized or begun.

What the Framers, for the most part, seem to have intended by
the clause was the post of head general. As a general, the President
would not decide the purpose for which troops would be used; rather,
he would command the troops as required by the war policy of the
legislature.2 07 Americans believed that it was crucial that one man
control the conduct of the war effort. 208 However, while realizing the
advantages of a single unified command during fighting, they feared
that the Executive might abuse his war powers.20 9 They therefore
designed safeguards against this danger by placing control over the
commencement of war and the raising of troops in the legislature. 10
The meaning attributed by the Framers to the role of commander-in-chief is evidenced by the context of Washington's tenure
in the post.1 11 Throughout the war, the Commander, remained the
servant of Congress, removable at its desire. Washington's commission reveals his subordinate position in relation to Congress. The
commission ordered that Washington "punctually . . .observe and
follow such orders and directions from time to time as he shall receive from this and future Congresses. 211 Though the Congress gave
206. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
207. See the discussion of Hamilton's views and the nature of a general found in L.
HENKIN, supra note 143, at 50-51. See also Reveley, supra note 6, at 130.
208. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 447 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
See also James Iredell's views expressed in the North Carolina ratifying convention, in 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 107.

209. See Madison's speech in the Convention concerning his resolution giving two-thirds
of the Senate the power to make peace treaties without the concurrence of the President. In
the debate, Pierce Butler, a delegate from South Carolina, stressed that Madison's amendment
was needed to secure the nation against "ambitious & corrupt Presidents." 2 Farrand,
REcoRms, supra note 4, at 540-41.
210. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
211. Unfortunately, Washington's diary furnishes no information about his attitudes
concerning his position as commander-in-chief. During most of the war he neglected his diary.
(It appears that from June 19, 1775 to January 1780 he did not keep a diary.) His diary
entries from January-June 1780 contain only accounts of the weather, and it was not until the
waning days of the war (May 1781) that Washington renewed his interest in diary writing. 3
THE DIARIES OF GEORGE WASmNGTON 1771-75, 1780-81, at 338, 356 (D. Jackson ed. 1978).
212. H. COMMAGER, supra note 199, at 61.
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Washington great responsibility as commander,21 Congress was his
superior, and, at times, even overruled his military plans. 214 Congress, at one point, informed Washington that he was not to withdraw more than 2,500 troops without first consulting General Horatio Gates and New York Governor Clinton. 1 5
Washington showed utmost deference to the Congress. He did
not desire to increase his powers and stated his willingness to limit
himself to those powers that Congress would delegate to him. He
made it known that "if the Congress [says] 'Thus far and no farther
you shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst I continue in their
service. "1216 On one occasion, Washington sought congressional approval of a crucial military decision regarding his determination to
burn New York City before abandoning it to British troops.21 7 Congress refused Washington's request218 and ordered him to avoid
damaging the city. 219 Though Washington felt that this decision
"may be set down among one of the capital errors of Congress, ' 220
he obeyed the congressional orders.
Prior to the Convention, the commander-in-chief, as exemplified
by Washington, was a powerful military leader who showed great
deference to Congress and who followed its military dictates even
when he questioned the wisdom of congressional policy. The Framers
understood the need for a unified military command 221 and, therefore, made the President the commander-in-chief. However, they
most likely viewed this power as a narrow one, as they were aware of
213.
214.
215.
216.

See T. FROTHINGHAM, supra note 140, at 169-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
T. FROTHINGHAM, supra note 140, at 230.
See Letter from George Washington to Joseph Reed (Mar. 3, 1776), in 4 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 367. For Washington's expression of this sentiment, using quite similar phrasing in a letter addressed to the Congress, see J. FLEXNER, supra note 15,
at 66.

217. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 2, 1776), in 6
supra note IS, at 4, 6.
Washington desired to set fire to New York City because if it were left standing it

WASHINGTON WRITINGS,

218.

would provide shelter to the British troops in the coming winter. Washington, therefore, applied to Congress, for permission to burn the city, "but was absolutely forbid." Letter from
George Washington to Lund Washington (Oct. 6, 1776), in 37 WASHINGTON WRITINGS,
supra note 15, at 532.

219. T.
220.

FROTHINGHAM,

supra note 140, at 142.

J. FLEXNER, supra note 15, at 119.

221. The Congress earlier had seen the dangers of having several commanders in the
field. After a military catastrophe attributed to Horatio Gates (the independent commander of
American forces in the South), the Congress placed General Nathaniel Greene, the new

Southern Commander, under Washington's control. T.

FROTMINGHAM,
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the influence and, in crucial matters, the control Congress exercised
222
over Washington during his tenure as commander-in-chief.
B.

War Powers

The view of a restricted commander-in-chief role supports a
general hypothesis that the delegates desired to ensure congressional
predominance over the outbreak of war. With the exception of the
commander-in-chief clause, the delegates placed all of the significant
war powers, including the declaring of war, the raising of troops, and
the issuing of letters of marque and reprisal, in the legislative
branch. Despite this grant of war-making power to Congress, there
has been some disagreement over the branch's authority over war. It
has been argued that the declaration of war clause governed merely
formal declarations and that the President could act on his own authority without a congressional declaration. 2 3 Examination of the
debates and contemporary statements reveals the flaws in any theory
favoring a strong executive role and points to congressional command of the war powers. 22 '
Historical evidence shows that the American political leaders
did not consider the declaration of war to be a mere formality; 225
rather, they viewed it as a critical action. The nature of the Convention debates regarding the declaration of war highlights the delegates' belief that the declaration of war clause was not devoid of
substance; rather, it gave the Congress a legitimate grant of
power.226 Madison did not dwell on the power in The FederalistPa222. However, early congressional consideration of a proposed amendment of the commander-in-chief clause suggests that the clause should be given a broader interpretation. Representative Thomas Tucker advocated modifying the clause to a grant of "power to direct
(agreeable to law) the operations" of the armed forces. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 791 (J. Gales ed.
1789). One historian has noted that "[t]he amendment. . . would have immeasurably weakened the position of the Commander in Chief by expressly making his direction of military
operations subordinate to the legislative dictates of Congress." J. HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACnON 1789, at 149 (1948). The House's total lack of enthusiasm for the amendment suggests the fact that the House wanted the President to have leeway in determining on

his own when to employ military force.
223.
224.

For a refutation of this viewpoint, see L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 80.
See SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP. No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.

12 (1972). In describing the placement of the war power in the legislative branch, the report
proclaimed the fact that "[w]hatever else they may have painted with a 'broad brush,' the
framers of the American Constitution were neither uncertain nor ambiguous about where they
wished to vest the authority to initiate war." Id.
225. By the time of the Convention, countries no longer transmitted formal declarations
of war. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 165 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
226. See 2 Farrand, RcoRws, supra note 4, at 318-19.
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pers, considering its importance obvious to all Americans: "Is the
power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question
in the negative. It would22be
superfluous, therefore, to enter into a
7
proof of the affirmative.1
The implication derived from views of the significance of the
clause and from the statements of major figures is that the Framers
intended to place control over the commencement of war in legislative hands. James Wilson dreaded the outbreak of war and hoped
that the placement of the war power in Congress, rather than in the
President or a single house, would provide a safeguard against hasty
entry into war. 228 Thomas Jefferson expressed approval over the
"check to the Dog of war" that derived from "transferring the power
29
of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body.
Robert Livingston, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, equated
the power derived from the clause with that of the Continental Congress, which during the Confederation had the power of determining
war. 23 0 There is, therefore, significant evidence that American leaders believed that the clause granted Congress control over war.
Unfortunately, the debate on this clause in the Convention does
not solve the puzzle concerning the clause's meaning. One major
problem is that the report of the proceedings regarding the clause
"occupies little more than one page out of the 1,273 which contain
the printed records of the Convention. '2 1 The other critical problem
concerns the ambiguity of the debate record. Since the delegates who
discussed the clause placed different interpretations on the import of
the clause, the debates do not provide a clear picture of the delegates' intentions.23 2 Finally, there is a discrepancy between the journal account and Madison's version. 233 The crucial question in determining the Framers' intent centers on the reasons for the choice of
wording. The clause originally read that Congress would have the
power to "make war. 234 The reason why the delegates decided to
alter the phrasing to "declare war" 235 is far from clear. In proposing
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
the power
235.

No. 41, at 256 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
See the discussion of Wilson's views in Lofgren, supra note 200, at 685.
Reveley, supra note 6, at 133.
Lofgren, supra note 200, at 685.
Id. at 675.
For the debate, see 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 318-19.
See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
Article VII, Section I of the Report of the Committee of Detail vested in Congress
"[t]o make war." 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4,at 182.
The Constitution says that "Congress shall have Power. . . [t]o
declare war." U.S.
THE FEDERALIST
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the change, Madison and Gerry expressed their desire that the President have "the power to repel sudden attacks."23 6 Thus, they thought
it necessary to make explicit the President's right to oppose an invading force. Roger Sherman thought that the President could
counter invasions even without the change in wording. He opposed
the change from "make" to "declare" war, finding it unnecessary
and fearing that the change would reduce the Congress' war
power. 237 The delegates may have felt the change was needed to
guarantee the President's right to combat invasion. Alternatively,
they may have believed that the President had the power to confront
an attacking force, but desired the change in phrasing as a means of
reducing congressional control over war. Both of these reasons for
the new phrasing imply important presidential war powers, since
even the granting of the authority to repel invasion results in important presidential discretion in war-making.2 38
Discerning the exact meaning of the clause is further complicated by the contradictory accounts of the vote on the alteration
from "make" to "declare" war. According to Madison's account, the
initial vote on the change was 7 to 2 in favor of a new version. After
Rufus King suggested that "make war" might be construed to mean
the conduct of war, which was an executive function, Oliver Ellsworth decided to vote for the change. Madison's version indicates
that only one state switched its vote for the purpose of guaranteeing
that the Executive would control the conduct of the armed forces in
the event of war.2 In contrast, the journal details a 4 to 5 vote on
the first roll call and an 8 to 1 vote on the second ballot.240 If this
vote was accurate and if King's speech preceeded the second vote,
then King's argument was the deciding factor in the adoption of the
change. This account would suggest that the change to "declare
war" was intended by many delegates for the primary purpose of
reaffirming the presidential role in the actual conduct of war and
was not meant to increase other presidential war powers. The record
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
236. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 318. See also A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at
31.
237. 2 Farrand, RECORDS,supra note 4, at 318.
238. For a discussion of alternative explanations of the implications of the phrasing
change, see Lofgren, supra note 200, at 677.
239. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 4, at 319. According to Madison, Connecticut
(because of Ellsworth) changed its vote in order to guarantee that the President would command the army in case of war.
240. Id. at 314.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/10

38

Stein: The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic
1982]

THE FRAMERS' INTENT

is quite confusing and the discrepancy cannot be resolved. Though
the intent underlying the debate must remain clouded, contemporary
statements and the nature of the Convention speeches indicate that
American leaders envisioned legislative control over the commencement of war.241
Finally, the placement of the power over letters of marque and
reprisal 242 in the legislative sphere indicates the Framers' desire to
ensure that Congress would decide, in all cases except sudden attack,
whether to engage military forces.243 The Framers were aware that
an outbreak of hostilities could take the form of a general war or
could be an "imperfect" war involving the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal. 44 In addition, the Framers were quite aware of the
possibility that issuance of letters of marque and reprisal could provoke a general war.245 In providing for congressional action regarding marque and reprisal, the Framers placed control over both the
actual declaration of war, and the use of military means that would
precipitate a war, in the legislature. 248 Thus, the Framers acted to
prevent the President from embarking on a war or from using armed
forces to provoke a war, unless Congress similarly desired to resort
247
to armed force.
241. See discussion in A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 31-32. Sofaer says that the new
phrasing seems to permit the President to repel sudden attacks but does not show any intent
"to allow the President a general authority to 'make' war in absence of a declaration." He
added, "indeed, granting the exceptional power suggests that the general power over war was
left in the legislative branch." Id. at 32.
242. Letters of marque and reprisal were of great import in the 18th century. A reprisal
was a "legal act of redress performed by a state to obtain satisfaction for an injury received."
6 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1943). Countries issued letters of
marque to commission citizens to act as privateers. See 2 id. at 689. (See also id. at 689-90 for
discussion of the difference between marque and piracy.) Letters of marque authorized the
particular citizen "to seize and take the person and property of the citizens of the offending
state wherever found." 6 id. at 153. The marque provided a "means of satisfaction without
resort to actual war" as the nation would seek redress by use of privateers rather than by
resort to a general war. Id. For an example of the use of letters of marque during the Revolutionary War, see T. FROTHIMNHAM, supra note 140, at 279.
243. A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 4.
244. Reveley, supra note 6, at 89-90, 144.
245. Lofgren, supra note 200, at 693. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson made this
point in an opinion submitted to President Washington. Jefferson noted that "the making of
reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing" and admonished Washington that reprisal had
never "failed to produce [war] in the case of a nation able to make war." Opinion on "The
Little Sarah" May 16, 1793, in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332, 335 (P. Ford ed.
1904).
246. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
247. Reveley, supra note 6, at 144. James Wilson, in his law lectures, declared that
[t]he power of declaring war, and the other powers naturally connected with it, are
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The attitude of the Framers and the constitutional provisions
that they adopted point to complete congressional authority, barring
a sudden attack, over the commencement of war. The Framers recognized the danger that a President might use a war to aggrandize
his powers, and, therefore, incorporated into the Constitution strict
limitations on his war-making power. 4 The placement of control
over the raising of an army and a navy, the declaration of war, and
the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal in the legislature's
hands, was designed to guarantee that the legislature would determine whether to commence hostilities. The Framers appreciated the
benefits of making the President the commander-in-chief, but they
wanted to limit his power solely to the command of troops and not
their initial commitment.24 9
C.

Treaties

The constitutional provision concerning the making of treaties
provided for both presidential action in negotiation and safeguards
against his improper use of treaty authority. Though delegates like
Hamilton may have considered the President to be "the most fit
agent" in negotiations,250 they perceived great dangers in giving him
complete control over treaty power. Hamilton, for example, stated
that "it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power
[over negotiations] to an elective magistrate of four years' duravested in Congress. To provide and maintain a navy-to make rules for its government-to grant letters of marque and reprisal-to make rules concerning captures-to raise and support armies-to establish rules for their regulation-to provide for organizing. . the militia, and for calling them forth in the service of the
Union-all these are powers naturally connected with the power of declaring war.
All these powers, therefore, are vested in Congress.
Id. at 132.
248. H. COMMAGER, supra note 199, at 60. Commager declared that the Framers "proposed to make it impossible for a 'ruler' to plunge the nation into war." Pierce Butler, who
represented South Carolina at the Convention, noted that the delegates opposed a proposal to
give the President control over determination of war because it would enable him to behave
like a monarch and involve the nation in a war "whenever he wished to promote her destruction." 3 Farrand, RzcoRis, supra note 4, at 250.
249. But see Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the
Framers,40 LAW & CoBrraMP. PIOOS. 12, 15 (Spring 1976) ("Enough has been said to establish that the constitutional allocation of powers relating to war making is far from unambiguous, Clearly, the Constitution accords Congress the upper hand, or final say, on most issues of
significance. But it also assigns the President great powers over the military, and in the execution of policy.") (footnote omitted).
250. A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 49. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 451 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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tion. ''251 To protect against this elective magistrate, it was necessary

to provide some legislative checks on the President's power.2 52 Therefore, the Constitution counterbalances executive treaty influence by
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. The "joint agency"
of the President and the Senate was intended to secure the nation
against "corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties. ' 2 5a
Although the Framers' desire to protect against abuse of treaty
power is obvious, their exact intentions regarding the treaty clause is
open to debate. Clearly, Americans expected the clause to prevent
the President from entering into a treaty solely on his own judgment.2M As Charles Pinckney opined, the President could not "take

a single step in his government, without their advice."2 55 While the
delegates all understood the need for Senate consent regarding treaties, they differed as to the nature of the Senate role.
Some of the Framers took an expansive view of the Senate role.
Pierce Butler, a delegate from South Carolina, advocated significant
Senate input into treatymaking, stating that treaties should "be gone
over, clause by clause, by the President and Senate together, and
modelled. 12 56 Hamilton and former Foreign Secretary Robert Liv251.

THE

FEDERAUST

No. 75, at 451 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Later in

this part, Hamilton said:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and
momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world,
to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.
Id.
252. The treaty clause clearly incorporates checks into the treaty process. Convention
history indicates that early in the proceedings the delegates anticipated an exclusive Senate
treaty role, but, because they had misgivings about Senate treaty authority, they approved a
presidential treaty role, for among other reasons, as a means of checking Senate powers. See
supra text accompanying notes 126-30. James Wilson expressed the idea of a presidential
check in a speech made at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Wilson declared that the
President served as a check on the Senate as it could "make no treaty without his concurrence." See 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 505. It was not until the ratification controversy that American political leaders, including Wilson, discussed the clause in depth and
assessed the future presidential treaty function. For a discussion of the views expressed about
the presidential role by American leaders after the Convention, see supra notes 255-66 and
accompanying text.
253. THE FEDERA.usT No. 66, at 406 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania Convention, said, "Neither the President nor the Senate, solely can
complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, and are so balanced as to produce security
to the people." 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 507.
254. Reveley, supra note 6, at 133.
255. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 258.
256. C. THAcH, supra note 127, at 157 (quoting J. ADAMs WORKS, vol. iii, at 409).
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ingston, in voicing their opposition to recall of Senators, stressed the
important role played by the Senate in foreign relations and the need
to have Senators experienced in the sphere of foreign affairs. Hamilton stated that the Senators, "together with the President, are to
manage all our concerns with foreign nations.1 251 Livingston detailed
a broader and more defined Senate role, claiming that the Senate
was "to form treaties with foreign nations" and was to negotiate
with foreign diplomats.2 58 Roger Sherman's views illustrate the
strongest posture in favor of an equivalent treaty role for the President and the Senate. Sherman felt that "the two bodies ought to act
jointly in every transaction which respects the business of negotiation
259
with foreign powers."
Though the delegates rejected the argument that treaty power
was purely executive in nature,260 they did not necessarily agree with
Sherman about the roles of the two treaty agencies. Hamilton,
though speaking about the concept of a joint agency in treatymaking, was of the opinion that "the management of foreign negotiations
will naturally devolve" upon the President. 26 1 Giving the President
the power over negotiations and the consequent ability to alter
American treaty positions would result in the President having more
influence over treatymaking than the Senate.262 After the Convention, delegates like Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and James Wilson
stressed the dominant role of the President. 6 Pinckney, for example, viewed the President as having the power of proposing treaties,
while the Senate was limited to accepting or rejecting the proposed
treaties. 64 Likewise, Wilson claimed that "[t]he Senate can make no
treaties: they can approve of none, unless the President of the United
257. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 306.
258. Id. at 291.
259. Reveley, supra note 6, at 138 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 1122-23 (J. Gales ed.
1789)).
260. Hamilton, for example, argued in THE FEDERALIST that classification of treatymaking as an executive function "is evidently an arbitrary disposition; for if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive
character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of them." THE
FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
261. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 519 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
262. Wilson went so far as to claim that in the treaty sphere the Senators were "only
auxiliaries to the President." 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 477. But later in the Convention Wilson stated that the President and Senate were "checks upon each other, and [were]
so balanced as to produce security [for] the people." Id. at 507.
263. Even a foe of presidential power like Richard Henry Lee admitted that the President held a greater share of treaty power than the Senate. C. THACH, supra note 127, at 163.
264. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 82, at 265.
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States lays it before them. 28 5 Wilson equated the President's control
with that of a helmsman who could prevent the ship from moving in
a particular
direction if he wanted the nation to follow a different
6
course.

26

The resolution of this dispute over the President's role had great
implications. By his management of negotiations, the President could
have a crucial impact on treatymaking. More importantly, if
Pinckney and Wilson's views prevailed, the President would have
sole power over proposing treaties while the Senate would be limited
purely to considering the product of the negotiations.
The phrasing of the treaty clause indicates a more restricted
role than suggested by Pinckney and Wilson. The clause requires
Senate "Advice and Consent." 8 7 In one commentator's view, the
meaning of this phrase is self-evident. The Framers intended the
Senate to advise the President on a potential treaty. The President
would negotiate with an awareness of Senate concerns and would
then present the treaty to the Senate for its approval. 2 8 This ex-

planation finds support in the historical significance of the phrase
"Advice and Consent." The Framers knew that this phrase appeared
at the head of all English statutes.2 69 From this, it may be inferred

that the Framers, in using the same language as that which appeared in British enacting statutes, intended the Senate role to relate
to the advice and consent practice of the British Parliament. That is,
the Framers most likely intended that the Senate play an important
270
deliberative and decision-making role in the treaty process.
The language of this "carefully phrased section" 271 furnishes
additional evidence regarding the desired Senate treaty role. The
clause reads that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
265.

2 id. at 466. Bestor notes that it was not until after the Convention completed its

work that any delegate claimed that the Senate could not consider treaties unless the President

laid the treaty before it. Bestor, supra note 13, at 653.
266. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, upra note 82, at 511.
267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c1. 2.
268. Bestor, supra note 13, at 540.
269. Id. at 541. The enacting clause of British statutes read, "[B]e it enacted by the
King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal." Id.
270. See id. at 543. Bestor even takes a stronger position, stating that in calling for a
presidential treaty role with Senate advice and consent, the Framers were using a phrase that

traditionally connoted "legislative deliberation and decision and executive concurrence." Id. at
547.
271.

H.C. LODGE, THm TREATY-MAKING POWERS OF THE SENATE, IN A FIGHTING

FRIGATE 231 (1902 & photo. reprint 1969).
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Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls. '2' 72 Henry Cabot
Lodge, Sr. highlights the contrast between the phrasing of the nomination and treaty clause. Lodge states:
[T]he carefully phrased section gives the President absolute and
unrestricted right to nominate, and the Senate can only advise and
consent to the appointment of, a given person. All right to interfere
in the remotest degree with the power of nomination and the consequent power of selection is wholly taken from the Senate. Very different is the wording in the treaty clause. There the words "by and
with the advice and consent of" come in after the words "shall
have power" and before the power referred to is defined. The "advice and consent of the Senate" are therefore coextensive with the
"power" conferred on the President, which is "to make treaties,"
273
and apply to the entire process of treaty making.
The system of international law suggested the need for Senate
involvement in developing instructions to diplomats, and also the
need for its advice and consent prior to the signing of treaties. According to international law, the "monarch cannot, in honor, refuse
to ratify a Convention made by a minister with full powers, unless it
can be proved that the minister had remarkably and openly deviated
from his instructions." 74 Thus, if the Senate rejected a treaty negotiated by the President, it would be acting contrary to a basic tenet
of international law. It is unlikely that the Framers would have
wanted to permit such a serious breach of international law, and
therefore they probably contemplated Senate advice and consent
prior to the signing of a treaty.27 5 Lastly, the juxtaposition of advice
with consent indicates a likelihood that the President was thought to
be required to get Senate "advice" before embarking on treaty
272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
273. H.C. LODGE, supra note 271, at 231-32. Senator Lodge, who served as chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of the Versailles Treaty, acknowledged
the "obvious fact that the President must be the representative of the country in all dealings
with foreign nations, and that the Senate in its very nature could not, like the Chief Executive,
initiate and conduct negotiations." Id. at 230. He claimed that "in every other respect, under
the language of the Constitution and in the intent of the framers, they stand on a perfect
equality with the President in the making of treaties." Id. at 232.
274. W. HOLT, supra note 126, at 26.

275. See Id. at 27-28. See also R. HAYDEN,

THE SENATE AND TREATES

1789-1817, at 9

(1970).
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negotiation. 7
The treaty clause safeguards the treaty process by providing for
joint Senate and presidential action regarding all treaties. Delegates
differed in their interpretation of the clause, but those favoring a
more prominent presidential role ultimately triumphed. As a result,
Americans accepted the view that the President would be the chief
agent in negotiations. However, presidential control of negotiation
does not preclude a significant Senate treaty role, as presidential diplomacy does not prevent the Senate from exercising advice and consent both before and after treaty talks. Regardless of the meaning
given to the phrase advice and consent, the Senate can ultimately
exert a critical treaty role by refusing to give its consent. Most
likely, the Framers intended that the Senate would participate in the
developing of instructions, and, also, would exercise its power of advice and consent before the President presented a formal treaty for
ratification.
V.

THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION

Enlightenment figures devoted much energy to the formulation
of model constitutions whose efficacy would never be tested in real
life circumstances.2 78 American leaders, in contrast, faced the rather
novel task of having to implement their abstract model. With their
awareness of the Confederation's flaws, their common beliefs about
the nature of government, and their knowledge of human nature, 7 9
the Framers attempted to lay a framework for the new government.
Since the Constitution provided only the barest outline for foreign
policy practices,2 8 ° it was incumbent on the first President and the
276.
277.

Bestor, supra note 13, at 540.
But see C. THACH, supra note 127, at 162-64. While Thach acknowledges that

there is much to support the opinion that the Senate had coextensive treaty powers with the
President, he emphasizes that the treaty clause must be interpreted in light of the Convention

delegates' disapproval with the Senate role. In addition, Thach states that although few
wanted the President to have exclusive treaty power, "it does not follow that these others

desired to see the Senate transformed into an executive council. It is this, we believe, that
determined the ready acquiescence given by the Senate to presidential negotiation without

prior consultation." Id. at 164.
278. See generally H. COMMAGER, supra note 38, at 109-13. Commager notes that
"[a]ll the philosophes were statesmen, or thought they were, ready to draw up a new constitu-

tion, draft a new code of laws, or design a new commonwealth on demand." Id. at 109.
279. See generally supra notes 15-79 and accompanying text. The Framers also acted
with an awareness of the history of ancient governments. See 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 7, at 3-4; Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in id. at 4-22.

280.

For a discussion of the constitutional distribution of foreign policy power, see supra

text accompanying notes 175-97.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:413

Congress to develop measures for the successful effectuation of foreign policy goals.
This section examines the course of foreign affairs during
Washington's administration, and the gradual evolution of presidential dominance in the external sphere. Special attention is given to
the development of the treaty process, the roots of significant diplomatic practices, the gradual expansion of presidential powers, and
the course of contemporary debates about the extent of executive
authority in the foreign policy realm. In addition to chronicling the
growth of presidential powers, an attempt will be made to speculate
upon the motives underlying presidential actions in the external
sphere.
At the start of his administration, President Washington showed
much concern about Senate sensibilities. Washington immediately
consulted the Senate and sought their advice on the best manner to
exercise their joint treaty responsibilities. He envisioned the Senate
as a council on treaty matters and established a scheme for consulting the Senate prior to treatymaking. However, although Washington acted deferentially toward the Senate regarding treaties, he established important precedents for an expanded presidential role by
unilaterally making an agreement with Canada and by sending
agents to foreign countries without seeking Senate consent. From
1793 to the end of his tenure, Washington embarked on a course of
action that resulted in presidential domination over foreign relations.
For example, he exercised complete control over the fashioning of
the American response to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in
1793. Further, Washington enhanced presidential control over
treatymaking by determining, at the time of the Jay mission, that he
should not seek Senate consent on the treaty until after Jay had negotiated and signed a treaty with the British. Finally, Washington's
Farewell Address consolidated the President's position as the American spokesman on issues involving foreign relations. By the end of
the Washington administration, presidential initiatives in the external sphere and congressional acquiescence in the. President's activities had resulted in the President being the dominant force in foreign
policymaking.
A. Early Forays Into Treatymaking
At the time they began their respective tenures in office, Washington and the Senators understood the need for Senate advice and
consent prior to the negotiation of treaties. Principles of international
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law induced them to adopt a system of prior consultation. According
to international law, a minister's consent to an agreement obligated
his country to ratify the compact unless he had "'remarkably and
openly deviated from his instructions.' ",281 Because the Senators
dreaded the repercussions that might result from their failure to
obey this well-established doctrine, they consciously followed it. The
Senate so desired to conform with this doctrine that they consented
to a treaty which they felt the nation had promised to ratify, even
though they believed the treaty would not be an advantageous one.282
A committee report on another treaty emphasized the treaty's conformity with the minister's instructions and implied that this conformity obligated the Senate to give its assent.2ea Only by advising
prior to the envoy's completion and signing of a treaty would the
Senate be able to exercise meaningful advice and consent while at
the same time corresponding to the dictates of international law.
Initially, Washington expressed the opinion to a Senate committee that "[iun all matters respecting Treaties, oral communications
seem indispensably necessary." '2" Two days later, he refined his
views regarding the best manner of treaty consultation, 285 noting
that for complicated treaties it might be best for him to submit proposals in writing and then consult the Senate after it had time to
consider the treaty suggestions. 286 Though Washington expressed his
approval of the concept of in-person consultation, he felt that experience and the particular circumstances surrounding a treaty would
dictate the most suitable approach for Senate treatymaking 87
It took only one attempt at prior consultation to dissuade Washington from ever again seeking advice and consent in person.2 88 The
details of what one commentator labeled "Washington's Famous Experiment in Prior Consultation of the Senate in Person with Respect
281.
282.
283.

W. HOLT, supra note 126, at 26.
R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 9.
Id. at 34 (Cherokee treaty).

284. Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee on the Mode of Communication
Between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations (Aug. 8, 1789) (footnote

omitted) in 30 WASHINGTON WRITNGs, supra note 15, at 373.
285.

See Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee at a Second Conference on the

Mode of Communication Between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations
(Aug. 10, 1789) (footnote omitted), in id. at 377. [hereinafter cited as Sentiments]. See also
G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (1938).

286. Sentiments, supra note 285, at 378.
287.

Id. at 378-79.

288. See supra text accompanying note 305.
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to a Treaty" 28 9 are of great significance and merit discussion.
Washington informed the Senate on August 21, 1789 that he would
"advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with
the Southern Indians.1 2 90 At this advisory meeting, Washington

played the crucial role by furnishing the questions that formed the
basis of the Senate discussions on proposed treaty instructions, 21
while the Senate was relegated to debating the presidential proposal.
Although the Annals of Congress gives little flavor to the proceedings on the treaty instruction, 9 2 the diary of William Maclay,
senator from Pennsylvania and an outspoken critic of the
Washington administration, 9 3 provides a colorful account of the
famed meeting. 9 ' In his description of the meeting, Maclay paints a
vivid image of Washington attempting to impose his will upon the
Senate, describing Washington as desiring "to tread on the necks of
the Senate.

2

95

Maclay's description of Washington's attitude re-

garding the consultation speaks for itself: "He wishes us to see with
the eyes and hear with the ears of his Secretary only. The Secretary
289. J. HART, supra note 222, at 86.
290. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 222, at 67.
291. For Washington's statement to the Senate and the questions he addressed to it, see
Id. at 68-71; 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 385-90.

292. See 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.,

supra note 222, at 71-72.

293. Maclay served as a senator from 1789 to 1791, during which time he kept a rather
detailed account of the proceedings of the first Senate. For biographical information on Maclay, see 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 43, Part 2, at 123-24. Also, see
the introduction by Charles Beard and the preface by Edgar Maclay in THE JOURNAL OF
WILLIAM MACLAY V-XViii (C. Beard ed. 1927 & photo. reprint 1965). Edgar Maclay notes
that "[f]or a hundred years [the journal had]. . . been jealously guarded from public scrutiny
by the descendants of the statesman" and that many passages "were suppressed, as being too
caustic in their strictures on eminent personages whom we are accustomed to regard with the
highest veneration." Id. at xviii.
294. THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, supra note 293, at 125-30. The historian J.
Franklin Jameson "deplores the fact that for much that took place behind the closed doors of
the Senate Chamber during the First Congress 'we have no other ample record except that of
this atrabilious and parvanimus creature. . . . Most readers think that because Maclay says
that men acted thus and so, they actually did. "All things look yellow to the jaundiced eye."
Everything this contemptible creature set down is poisoned and distorted by his mean malignancy.'" G. HAYNES, supra note 285, at 43 n.1 (quoting Dr. J. Franklin Jameson). Haynes
pokes fun at Maclay, saying that a "psychiatrist would note that Maclay suffered from dyspepsia, rheumatism, headache, nostalgia, and a pronounced 'inferiority complex.'" Id. Haynes
also criticizes Maclay in a more serious manner. He described Maclay as "a man of the bitterest prejudices" who "never hesitated to impute unworthy motives to others." Id. Haynes,
though he dislikes Maclay's personality, notes that Maclay's diary is a useful historical tool:
"With due allowance made for Maclay's unwholesome personality, his record of the Senate in
the First Congress is a valuable source of information, and his acrid humor is often highly
entertaining." Id.

295.

THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY,

supra note 293,
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to advance the premises, the President to draw the conclusions, and
to bear down our deliberations with his personal authority and pres6
ence. Form only will be left to us.

'29

If the senators had just accepted the President's proposals without examining their worth, then their advice and consent power
' 297
would have been, as Maclay expressed it, "ravished, in a degree. 9

Maclay, conscious of his fellow senators? unwillingness to confront
the President, realized that he had to initiate Senate discussion in
order to preserve the Senate's authority in the treaty realm. He
therefore requested greater information to enable the Senate to
make an informed decision. 98 Spurred by Maclay's initial speech,
the Senate began to debate the treaty provisions. 99 Maclay and
other senators had come to the realization that the Senate could generate a real discussion on the treaty's merits only if the President left
the chamber. They therefore called for a committee to examine
Washington's questions regarding the Indian treaties.300
Maclay made much of Washington's displeasure regarding the
course of the Senate meeting. According to Maclay, the proposal to
commit the treaty questions put the President into a "violent
fret."30 1 Washington said that the commitment defeated "every purpose" he had for coming to the Senate. 2 In addition, he voiced a
complaint over the delay in resolving the Indian treaties.303 Finally,
Maclay made note of Washington's disgruntled manner as he left
the Senate chamber at the end of the first day of the consultation:
"He did so with a discontented air. Had it been any other man than
the man whom I wish to regard as the first character in the world, I
would have said, [he left] with sullen dignity." 30
' If Maclay's account is an accurate portrayal of the consultation, Washington became angered at the proceedings because he anticipated that the
Senate would accede to his wishes without considering the merit of
296.

Id.

297.

Id. at 126.

298.

Id.

299.

See id. at 126-27.

300.

Id. at 127. Other senators opposed the commitment. Butler, one of the signers of

the Constitution, said that the Senate was acting as a council and that councils did not send
issues to committee. Id. Soon after this debate the Senate adjourned for the weekend. On the

following Monday, the Senate assembled as a whole, with the President again present, and
addressed Washington's treaty questions without sending them to committee. Id. at 128.
301.

Id.

302.

Id. (emphasis in original).

303.
304.

Id. at 128.
Id.
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his proposals.
Two significant points arise from the proceedings of Washington's famous prior consultation. Washington's consultation with the
Senate prior to sending instructions to the commissioners supports
the idea that the Constitution called for advice in the stages prior to
the completion of negotiations. Maclay's account elucidates the tension in the chamber and the impossibility of discussing the President's proposals in his presence. Thus, the meeting indicates the importance of having the Senate discuss treaties away from the
watchful and imposing glare of the President.. Whatever the validity
of these points, neither Washington nor his successors ever again
sought personal consultation with the Senate prior to the commencement of negotiations. 30 5
Although Washington decided against further attempts at consulting with the Senate in person, he continued to seek Senate advice
at early stages in his diplomatic efforts. 06 He sought advice and consent on a secret article of an Indian treaty prior to the completion of
the treaty negotiations. ° Washington also sought Senate advice
prior to negotiations with the Cherokees.308 After examining the
completed treaty, the Senate committee announced that the treaty
conformed to the instructions "founded on the advice and consent of
the Senate."' 0 9 It seems that, having exercised its advisory power
prior to negotiations, the Senate felt obligated to consent to a treaty
that complied with its instructions.3 10
Treaty negotiations with Spain3 11 illustrate both the continued
305. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 22; L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 131.
306. See G. HAYNES, supra note 285, at 68. See also R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 59.
In a 1790 message to the Senate, Washington dispelled any doubts about his continued approval of prior consultation. Regarding negotiations with the British, he said: "[I]n this instance, I think it advisable to postpone any negotiations on the subject, until I shall be informed of the result of your deliberations, and receive your advice as to the propositions most
proper to be offered on the part of the United States." Id. at 59.
307. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 27-28.
308. For the details of the Cherokee treaty negotiation, see id. at 30-34. Washington
requested Senate advice about three questions involving the treaty. Id. at 30-31. The Senate
carefully discussed the matter, without executive officers present, and then replied to the President's queries with two resolutions. Id. at 31.
309. Id. at 33.
310. Id.at 34. It should be emphasized that the Senate did not consider itself obligated
to give its consent in cases where it had not been previously consulted. Prior to the Spanish
negotiations, the Senate refused to give its consent to a treaty concluded by General Putnam,
based on instructions not approved by the Senate. Id. at 34-35. For a discussion of the Spanish
negotiations, see Infra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
311. The treaty negotiations finally resolved the longstanding disputes between Spain
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existence of the original conception of treatymaking and the gradual
inroads that political necessity had carved out of strict compliance
with prior consultation. Washington sought both confirmation of his
envoys and consent to his treaty instructions.3 12 The Senate consented to additional instructions, and, acting in accordance with doctrines of international law, resolved that it would ratify any treaty
made in conformity with its instructions.31 3 While the Senate strictly
conformed to this doctrine, Washington abandoned strict prior consultation by withholding delicate portions of the instructions and
thereby asking prior Senate consent for only part of the instructions. " The Spanish Treaty thus contributed to the decay of the
system of prior consultation. Still, the Senate, by its advisory power,
continued to play an important treaty role in the early 1790's and
3 15
constantly influenced foreign relations in this period.
B.

Diplomatic Activities In General

At the same time that the Senate maintained its advisory role
on treaties, the Washington administration established significant
precedents in the realm of foreign relations. For example, Washington made executive agreements with other nations3 1 6 and sent agents
to Europe without seeking congressional approval. Washington's decision to send agents to Europe without seeking Senate assent had
far greater significance at the time than the use of an executive
agreement. Washington was unsure whether to consult the Senate
"on the propriety of sending public characters abroad, say, to England, Holland, and Portugal ' 3 17 and, therefore, sought Madison and
and the United States over territorial boundaries and navigation of the Mississippi. For background information showing concern over the issue of the Mississippi navigation, see supra
notes 137-38 and accompanying text. For a general study of the Spanish negotiations, see S.
BEMIS, PINCKNEY'S TREATY: A STUDY OF AMERICA'S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE'S DISTRESS,

1783-1800 (1926).
312. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 55-56.
313. Id.
314. Washington decided for reasons of political convenience not to seek consultation on
the specific instructions involving territorial boundaries and rights to navigation of the Mississippi. Id. at 56.
315. Id. at 11, 40. The Senate played an important role, for example, concerning negotiations with Algiers and Spain. Id. It even played a significant role in the negotiation of the Jay
Treaty. Id. at 40.
316. An executive agreement is a compact with a foreign nation concluded by the President without Senate consent. For an analysis of executive agreements, see L. HENKIN, supra
note 143, at 173-85. Historians regard a postal agreement made by Washington with Canada
as the first executive agreement. E.g., A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 97.
317. Letter from George Washington to James Madison [Aug., 1789], in 30 WASHING-
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Jefferson's advice on the matter."' Jefferson's viewpoint was that the
Constitution did not require this consultation. He defined the Senate's role as limited to approving the presidential choice for ambassador and asserted the President's authority to select and place diplomats.31 ' Less than two months after this exchange, Washington
authorized Gouverneur Morris to embark upon discussions with the
British as a private agent to ascertain British sentiments about the
unresolved portions of the Treaty of 1783 and to discuss the possibility of a commercial treaty. 320
Washington most likely resorted to using a private agent as a
way to preserve American dignity. He desired a restoration of diplomatic relations with England but felt that, given England's prior disdain of an exchange of ambassadors, America could not send an ambassador until England made the first move to establish relations.3 2
Thus, Washington acted with an awareness of important national
concerns when he authorized Morris' informal discussions with the
British ministry. Washington also appointed a "private character"
with confidential instructions to undertake a diplomatic mission to
Lisbon. 322 These two missions evidence Washington's willingness to
act on sensitive foreign policy issues without requesting congressional
approval. By sending diplomatic representatives without seeking Senate confirmation, Washington significantly increased presidential
control over American diplomatic activities. 23
supra note 15, at 393, 394.
17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 245 (J. Boyd ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as

TON WRITINGS,

318.

JEFFERSON PAPERS].

319. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 102.
320. Washington requested Morris' service as a private agent on October 13, 1789. For
the text of Washington's appeal to Morris, see Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur
Morris, in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELAIONS 122 [hereinafter cited as
A.S.P.F.R.]. Correspondence concerning Morris' mission can be found in id. at 122, 123-25.
See Letter from [British Foreign Minister] Leeds to Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 28, 1790), in id.
at 123. Morris expressed his view of the failure of the mission in a letter to Washington. See
Letter from Gouverneur Morris to George Washington (Sept. 18, 1790), in id. at 126-27.
321. H. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 370-71
(1967). In his message to Congress on the Morris mission, Washington expressed his belief
that sending an informal agent best suited America's interests, as it was impossible to determine how the British would respond to a formal diplomatic mission. Message of the President
of the United States, relative to a Commercial Treaty with Great Britain (Feb. 14, 1791), in I
A.S.P.F.R., supra note 320, at 121.
322. Washington sent Colonel David Humphreys to Lisbon. For the text of Washington's message to the Senate regarding the Lisbon mission, see I A.S.P.F.R., supra note 320, at
127.
323. As one commentator has stated, Washington's appointment of Morris "constituted
a practical assertion of a right on the part of the President to appoint agents for diplomatic
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Had Congress voiced strong disapproval, presidents might have
acted cautiously before again attempting this action on their own;
however, as Congress expressed no opposition to Washington's extension of his foreign policy powers, his early actions set a precedent for
greater presidential authority. Congress' positive response to Washington's diplomatic moves and its enactment of legislation granting
him important powers concerning the use of secret envoys, helped to
strengthen presidential prerogatives in the foreign policy sphere. The
Congressional Act of July 1, 1790,321 in providing a lump sum grant
to the President for diplomatic expenditures, delegated to him control over placement of American representatives.3 25 The Act required
the President to "account specifically" to the Congress for all expenditures "as in his judgment may be made public," and gave him
discretion on what he thought "it advisable not to specify. ' 326 Thus,
Congress allowed the President to authorize and conceal those sensitive missions that required secrecy. It was not until months after the
enactment of this law, and long after he had sent the envoys on their
respective missions, that Washington notified the Congress about the
missions. 27 Possibly, the legislature's awareness of the need for secret presidential diplomatic maneuvers lay behind the fact that there
was almost no disapproval expressed over Washington's action. The
only evidence of discontent is found in Maclay's writings which displayed his anger about Washington sending the envoys and asking
approval only after the completion of their mission.3 28 Congress,
service." H. WRISTON, supra note 321, at 210.
324. An Act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations. 1 Stat. 128, ch. 22 (1790).
325. See id.
326. Id. § 1, at 129. For a discussion of the Act, see A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 80; 6
THE DIARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 211, at 78-79.
327. G. HAYNES, supra note 285, at 69. Washington notified Congress of the Morris
mission on February 14, 1791. H. WISTON, supra note 321, at 209. He informed the Senate
of Humphrey's Lisbon mission on February 18, 1791. Id. On October 13, 1789, Washington
had requested that Morris make the special mission to England. See supra note 320.
328. See G. HAYNES, supra note 285, at 69. Maclay wrote in his diary that Morris "has
acted in a strange kind of capacity, half pimp, half envoy, or perhaps more properly a kind of
political eavesdropper about the British court." THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, supra
note 293, at 389.
Charles Beard, who wrote an introduction for an edition of Maclay's journal and who had
a high regard for its historical value, suggests reasons why Maclay's journal has such a caustic
tone at various points. Among other reasons, Beard notes:
Maclay was unacquainted with that great law of political science according to
which the bee fertilizes the flower that it despoils, working wonders in destiny beyond the purposes of the hour; and being ignorant of that law, he allowed his bitterness to get the better of his discretion, filling his pages with savage comment and
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however, by its legislation and by its failure to evince any displeasure
with Washington over his protracted delay in informing the Senate
of the private diplomatic missions, buttressed Washington's dominant position in the international sphere.
C.

The Neutrality Proclamationand War Powers

The French declaration of war against Great Britain on February 1, 1793329 alarmed American leaders and prompted concern that
the conflict would disrupt American shipping and draw the country
into the hostilities. Government leaders quickly realized the need to
establish neutral policies33o and began Cabinet discussions about the
proper response to the European situation.33, 1 Prior to the Cabinet
meeting, Washington sent the Cabinet officers "sundry questions"
for the purpose of "forming a general plan of conduct for the Executive. ' 33 2 Among the questions that Washington submitted to the
Cabinet were: "Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of
preventing interferences . . . ?"83 and "Is ,it necessary or advisable
to call together the two Houses of Congress with a view to the present posture of European Affairs? If it is, what should be the particterrible scorchings, unrelieved by a regard for extenuating circumstance and noble
motives.
Id. at vi. For a discussion of Maclay, see supra notes 293-94.
329. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY 631 (W. Langer ed. 1972).
330. Both Washington and his Secretary of State Jefferson feared that the European
hostilities would engulf the United States and believed that the country had to maintain a
neutral policy. Jefferson, in his letter informing Washington of the French declaration of war
against Great Britain, stated that the government had to "take every justifiable measure for
preserving [its] neutrality." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 7,
1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (P. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as
JEFFERSON WORKS]. See also 3 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 65-67
(1962). Washington also expressed the need for the government to preserve its neutral status.
Washington wrote Jefferson that it "behoves [sic] the Government of this Country to use every
means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with [France or Great
Britain]." Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of State [Thomas Jefferson] (Apr.
12, 1793), in 32 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 415, 415.
331. In a letter to C.W.F. Dumas, Jefferson expressed beliefs on the European war that
mirrored the attitude of the Cabinet. Jefferson stated that "[w]e wish not to meddle with the
internal affairs of any country, nor with the general affairs of Europe." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to C.W.F. Dumas (Mar. 24, 1793), quoted in 3 D. MALONE, supra note 330, at 6263 (emphasis omitted). As he told Dumas, the American government desired to keep the nation at peace and to secure neutral rights for its ships. See id.
332. Letter from George Washington to the Heads of Departments, and the Attorney
General (Apr. 18, 1793), in 32 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 421, 421.
333. Questions Submitted to the Cabinet by the President (Apr. 18, 1793) (footnote
omitted), in 32 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 419, 419.
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ular object of such a call?" 33 The Cabinet members all agreed that
the government should issue a proclamation forbidding American

citizens to take part in hostilities and decided unanimously against
calling the Congress into special session. 3 5 Thus, the Cabinet decided that it could make momentous foreign policy decisions on neutrality without even seeking congressional participation. 336
The text of the proclamation demonstrates the importance of
the proclamation in the growth of presidential power. In the proclamation, 337 Washington declared "the disposition of the United
States" to maintain an impartial stance and exhorted American citizens to avoid any acts contrary to this posture of impartiality.3 8 In
addition, Washington instructed American officials "to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations,
'339
with respect to the Powers at war, or any of them."
The significance of the proclamation cannot be overemphasized.
Without consulting Congress, Washington had proclaimed that the
United States would maintain a position of neutrality and ordered
334. Id. at 420. Though Washington submitted the questions to the Cabinet it seems
that Hamilton actually wrote the questions. Jefferson expressed this idea in his journal, stating
that it was "palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite, that [the questions] were
not the President's ... that the language was Hamilton's, and the doubts his alone." THE
ANAs OF THOMAS JEFRSON 118 (F. Sawvel ed. 1903 & photo. reprint 1970) [hereinafter
cited as THE ANAS] (According to the Oxford English Dictionary,eighteenth century Englishmen defined "ana" as a collection of notable sayings or table-talk of modern authors. 1 OxFORD ENGUSH DICTiONARY 299 (1933 & photo. reprint 1961)). One scholar of the neutrality
states that Hamilton was undoubtedly responsible for the questions, and that the Cabinet
members must have known that he was the author. See C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 29-30 &
n.3.
335. Questions Submitted to the Cabinet by the President (Apr. 18, 1793), supra note
333, at 420 n.14.
336. It should be noted that war issues first came up during the Nootka Sound Incident,
also known as the Anglo-Spanish War Crisis of 1790. See Sofaer, supra note 249, at 18. The
circumstances of the Nootka Sound Incident were quite unusual in that the nation was so new
and so weak militarily that the Cabinet was faced with the question of how to respond should
a foreign army cross America to attack another nation's territory. Because of the uniqueness of
the circumstances and the fact that discussions merely involved a theoretical possibility of a
foreign army crossing American borders, discussion of the war issues is confined to the section
on the neutrality proclamation and the war powers. See supra text accompanying notes 32935; infra text accompanying notes 339-61: For sources on the Nootka Sound Incident, see J.
BoYD, supra note 57, at 3.
337. Washington issued the proclamation on April 22, 1793 declaring the United States'
impartial stance on the European conflict. For the text of the proclamation, see 1 A.S.P.F.R.,
supra note 320, at 140.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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officials to prosecute those who violated the neutrality. He thus
boldly asserted a presidential right to issue a proclamation of neutrality, ignoring any arguments that Congress, by virtue of its power
to declare war, had ultimate authority over whether the nation
should adopt a belligerent posture.140 Additionally, it certainly can
be argued that Washington may have usurped legislative authority
by threatening prosecutions based on his proclamation and international law, rather than on legislative enactment. By his proclamation, Washington exercised exclusive control over the determination
of an American neutrality policy and made an initial inroad into
congressional war-making power.
Cabinet members expressed divergent opinions about the precise
nature and scope of the proclamation. During the Cabinet meeting
called to address the American stance, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson voiced objections to a "declaration of neutrality," 3 4 ' but
supported the issuance of the proclamation after the Cabinet came
to an understanding that the proclamation would not bind the ' in'4
coming Congress and would not contain the word "neutrality. a 2
340. Both Jefferson and Madison questioned the propriety of the President's proclamation. In a letter dated June 29, 1793, Jefferson wrote Madison that "[t]he declaration [by the
President] of the disposition of the U.S. can hardly be called illegal, tho' it was certainly
officious [and] improper." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1793),
in 7 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 418, 421. In a later letter to Madison, Jefferson
declared that "[t]he instrument was badly drawn, and made the P. go out of his line to declare
things which, tho true, it was not exactly his province to declare." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in id. at 471, 473. Madison questioned the constitutionality of the proclamation, saying "[alnd it seems to violate the forms & spirit of the Constitution, by making the executive Magistrate the organ of the disposition, the duty and the
interest of the Nation in relation to War & peace, subjects appropriated to other departments
of the Government." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 10, 1793), quoted
In 3 D. MALONE, supra note 330, at 72.
341. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 48. In the Cabinet meeting Jefferson offered two reasons for his opposition to a neutrality proclamation. First, he argued that
the President did not have the power to declare neutrality, which amounted to a declaration
that the United States was not at war, because Congress alone had the power to determine
issues of war. Id. In a similar vein, Jefferson claimed that since the President could not affirmatively declare war he should not declare a state of neutrality. See C. THOMAS, supra note 57,
at 35-36. Second, Jefferson wanted the United States to hold off before issuing a proclamation
in order to exact some British concessions. Id. at 36; see J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra
note 57, at 48. C. Thomas notes that partisan motives had also likely influenced Jefferson, who
expected people sympathetic with his views to control the next Congress. See C. THOMAS,
supra note 57, at 37. For a discussion of the possible reasons underlying Jefferson's ultimate
conclusion that the Congress should not be immediately called, see A. SOFAER, supra note 55,
at 104.
342. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 48. Thus, the "neutrality proclamation" does not specifically use the word neutrality. C. HYNEMAN, THE FiRsT AMERICAN

NEUTRALITY 12 (1974). Hyneman states that the omission of the word neutrality had no real
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Despite apparent agreement on the proclamation at the date of its
issuance, by the time that Washington began preparing his fifth annual address, 34 3 Cabinet members differed sharply about presidential
powers in the foreign affairs sphere. In the Cabinet discussion over
the forthcoming address, Hamilton disagreed with fellow Cabinet
members, Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Jefferson, over
how the President should handle the proclamation issue. Though
Hamilton grudgingly admitted that the proclamation could not legally bind Congress, 44 he stressed the President's right to declare to
the United States' citizens and to foreign nations his support "for a
future neutrality."3 45 Hamilton wanted the President to avoid the
issue in his speech as a way of leaving open the question of presidential rights over the proclamation of neutrality.346 In contrast,
Randolph felt that the President should discuss the context in which
he issued the proclamation in order to affirm the limited nature of
the proclamation.34 7 Randolph took the view that foreign nations
should consider the proclamation as only reflecting the President's
belief that neutrality best served the nation's needs.3 4 8 Jefferson
stressed the fact that the President had no power to guarantee neutrality 49 and provided his own interpretation of the meaning of the
proclamation, saying that Congress adjourned with the nation at
peace and that Washington was bound to preserve this state until
Congress reconvened.35 0 He added that a proclamation could go no
further than to proclaim this present state of peace. 51 Thus,
Randolph and Jefferson envisioned a far more limited view of presisignificance and that the effect of the proclamation was one of neutrality. Id. at 13.
343. Fifth Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 WASHINGTON WRITINGS,
supra note 15, at 163.
344. THE ANAS, supra note 334, at 175. But see C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 241.
(Thomas states that at the time of the address Hamilton took a broad view of the proclamation, claiming that the President was competent to give it, and that it bound the nation. Washington disavowed Hamilton's approach.)
345. THE ANAs, supra note 334, at 178 (emphasis in original). See also 15 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 425-26 (H. Syrett ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON
PAPERS].

346.
347.
348.
349.

HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 426.
See id.
THE ANAs, supra note 334, at 176.
See id.

350. Id.
351.

Id. For Jefferson's reasons for supporting the proclamation and his view on the

meaning of it, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 11, 1793), in 7
JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 471.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

57

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:413

dential authority than that proposed by Hamilton. a5 2
Randolph and Jefferson also refuted Hamilton's pronouncement
concerning the President's general ability to determine America's
war footing. Hamilton took the position that the President and the
Senate could make a treaty that would have the effect of stripping
Congress' power to declare war in the event that certain prescribed
conditions occurred.3 53 Randolph stated that, if the government desired to act by a treaty in a field exclusively in the legislative domain, it was incumbent on the treatymakers to seek legislative confirmation of the treaty.35 4 Jefferson, fearing that the Senate and
President might act beyond their powers, wanted the Constitution to
be construed narrowly. He viewed the possibility of amendment as
the proper means for expanding treaty power, rather than the expansion of power by the acceptance of the President and Senate acting
in a manner forbidden by the Constitution. 5
Washington, both in Cabinet discussions and in his Fifth Annual Address to Congress, rejected Hamilton's approach to presidential war powers. At the Cabinet meeting, Washington stated that he
never intended that the proclamation "look beyond the first day" of
the next session of Congress.3 58 Similarly, in his address to Congress,
Washington reiterated this limited view of presidential war-making
authority. Washington told the Congress that he thought it was his
duty to make known the nation's "disposition for peace" and therefore concluded that it was necessary to issue a proclamation. 57 He
stressed the fact, however, that it rested "with the wisdom of Con'358
gress to correct, improve or enforce this plan of procedure.
Though political considerations motivated Washington's expression
of congressional authority over neutrality, it is clear from his views
expressed in the Cabinet meeting regarding his address that Washington truly believed that his proclamation was meant only for the
period prior to the reconvening of Congress.
Despite Washington's view of his restricted powers to determine
352. Jefferson expressed basic agreement with Randolph's views, but felt that the proclamation should have even a more limited scope than that suggested by Randolph. See THE
ANAS, supra note 334, at 180.
353. Id. at 179.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 179-80.
356. Id. at 176.
357. Fifth Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 WASHINGTON WRIINGS,

supra note 15, at 164.
358.

Id.
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neutrality, the neutrality proclamation proved to be a watershed in
the development of expanded presidential power in foreign policy. By
issuing the proclamation, the President asserted his exclusive right to
determine national policies and "assumed the power to make unilateral decisions in foreign affairs that could have led to war." 5 9 Although Washington's proclamation failed to become a precedent for
presidential neutrality declarations, 3 " it signalled the beginning of
presidential domination over foreign policymaking. 6 1
D.

Additional Issues Involving Neutrality

Besides the actual proclamation, there are other important issues that surfaced involving neutrality. Principally, these issues revolve around the relationship of the branches of government, the enforcement of neutrality and the administration's refusal to convene
Congress. Discussion of the diametrically opposed interpretations of
presidential powers formulated in response to the neutrality procla3 86 2
mation will be addressed in a later section.
To the modern observer, one of the most unusual aspects concerning the enforcement of neutrality is Washington's attempt to solicit Supreme Court advice on a number of unresolved legal questions about neutrality.8 3 The Supreme Court refused, for
359. Sofaer, supra note 249, at 18.
360. In subsequent administrations, Congress has proclaimed and implemented neutral
policies. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 85; Loss, Introduction to THE LETrERS OF PACIFICUS
AND HELvius (1845) wITH THE LETrERS OF AMERICANUS at xiii (1845 & photo. reprint
1976) [hereinafter cited as PAcircus-HELVIDIus LETTERS]. Henkin notes that while Congress
has made subsequent neutrality proclamations, presidents have not admitted that they could
not act unilaterally, and have strayed on occasion from congressionally proclaimed neutrality.
L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 48.
361. See A. DECoNDE, supra note 151, at 90. DeConde refers to the proclamation's
"precedent-making significance" and labels it a "bold step" in establishing the executive's
claim to the "exclusive right to determine policy." Id.
362. See infra notes 423-64 and accompanying text.
363. Jefferson, Hamilton, and Knox wrote an opinion that the President should seek the
Supreme Court's advice on "certain matters of public concern." Cabinet Meeting, Opinion on
Vessels Arming and Arriving in United States Ports (July 12, 1793), in 15 HAMILTON PAPERS,
supra note 345, at 87. The President sent a list of twenty-nine questions on the European war
to the Supreme Court, with an accompanying letter written by Secretary of State Jefferson.
Jefferson made note of the executive department's limited experience in interpreting laws and
treaties and stated that the Supreme Court would provide security against error in interpretation. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court of
the United States (July 18, 1793), in 7 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 451, 452.
Jefferson added that "[t]he President would ... be much relieved if he found himself free to
refer questions of this description to the ... Judges ....." Id. His letter shows the Cabinet's
awareness of possible constitutional limitations on giving this advice. Jefferson stated that the
President desired to know "[wihether the public may, with propriety, be availed of [the
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constitutional reasons, to consider Washington's questions. The Justices stated:
The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the
three Departments of government-their being in certain Respects
checks on each other-and our being Judges of a Court in the last
Resort-are Considerations which afford strong arguments against
the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded
to; especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly limited to the executive
Departments.:"
The Court's action was of crucial importance because it cemented
the political separation of the branches and reaffirmed the Court's
purely judicial role.3 65 If the Court had responded to Washington's
entreaties, constitutional development might have been radically different because the Court might have assumed an advisory role to the
President on issues involving foreign policy.
While Washington had narrowly interpreted his power to issue
a neutrality proclamation,366 he took an expansive view of his power
to enforce the neutrality. Despite the absence of any congressional
legislation granting the President power to implement neutral policies, Washington began to enforce the neutrality. He issued instructions in May, 1793 to state governors and port collectors requiring
them to prevent any foreign vessels from arming and to notify him
whenever ships began to arm.367 Furthermore, the administration issued a code comprised of eight rules 6 8-- referred to as "deductions
Court's] advice on these question[s]!" Id. For the text of the questions, see Questions Proposed
to be Submitted to the Judges of the Supreme Court (July 18, 1793) (footnote omitted), in 33
WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 15-19.
364. 15 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 111 n.1 (emphasis in original).
365. This refusal to address Washington's questions especially was significant because
earlier relations between the branches had suggested the possibility that the Supreme Court
would advise the President. Chief Justice Jay had responded to a question posed by Washington concerning the Anglo-Spanish War Crisis of 1790, also known as the Nootka Sound Incident. See C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 149 n.5. In addition, prior to the issuance of the
neutrality proclamation, Jay replied to an April 9, 1793 letter in which Hamilton had asked
his views about the wisdom of issuing a proclamation and had requested that Jay submit a
draft of a proclamation. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 9, 1793), in 14
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 299-300. Not only did Jay advise Hamilton, but he also
sent a proposed draft for Washington's use. See Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton
(Apr. I1, 1793), in Id. at 307-10.
366. See supra text accompanying note 356.

367. C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 77.
368. Cabinet Meeting. Proposed Rules Governing Belligerents [Aug. 3, 1793], in 15
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from the laws of neutrality" 36 9 -to provide guidelines to port collectors in their enforcement of the President's measures. 37 0 The administration's neutrality measures resemble a legislative enactment
rather than a mere executive enforcement of the laws.
Washington took another significant step without congressional
consultation when he expressed his opinion to the French and English ambassadors that he considered it "incumbent upon the United
States" to compensate, in certain circumstances, parties who lost
ships.371 Washington told Hamilton that he had "pointedly desired"
the letter to the ambassadors to "be so guarded as to convey nothing
more than an opinion of the Executive."37 2 There is no doubt that
Washington and Jefferson believed that only Congress could provide
compensation to foreign ship owners. The carefully phrased letter to
the ambassadors demonstrates Washington's concern that the ambassadors realize that he could give only his opinion and could not
guarantee compensation. 3 Notwithstanding Washington's stated intentions, his letter to the ambassadors had significant implications
for both Congress and foreign relations. According to diplomatic
conventions of the age, foreign countries would have expected that
Washington's "opinion" essentially amounted to a commitment by
the country. 7 4 Washington's action placed great pressure on Congress to provide funds for compensation because its refusal could
have had serious international consequences and could have greatly
embarrassed the President.375 Nevertheless, Congress did not feel
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 168-70. Washington enclosed these rules in the Trea-

sury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs, in id. at 179 n.2.
369.

Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), in

id. at 178, 178-79.
370. Id. at 178-81.
371. C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 200. For the letter to the French ambassador Genet,
see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the French Minister (Aug. 7, 1793) (footnote omitted), in
7 JEFFERSON

WORKS,

supra note 330, at 468.

372. Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of the Treasury [Alexander Hamilton] (July 2, 1794), in 33 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 420, 422 (emphasis in
original).
373.

See C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 200. Thomas states that while Washington and

Jefferson took care to follow constitutional mandates on this matter, Hamilton had no such
scruples. Id.

374. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (June 22, 1794), in 16
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 513, 514. Hamilton wrote Washington that "between

nation & nation [a President's opinion] is equivalent to a virtual engagement that compensation will be made." Id. at 514 (emphasis in original).
375.

As Hamilton said, "[N]on compliance with [the President's opinion] would be a

serious commitment of the character of the Nation the Government and the President. Indeed
if the Legislature should not do its part, under such circumstances, it would necessarily give
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bound by Washington's opinion and ignored his request to provide
By its action, the Congress
funds to compensate the shipowners.3
asserted its authority over expenditures and reinforced the need for
presidents to proceed cautiously before declaring their thoughts on
37 7
the nation's financial obligations.
In regard to issues involving the law of nations, it can certainly
be argued that Washington acted beyond the scope of his powers.
The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power [t]o...
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."' 87s In addition, it gives to Congress the power "[tjo define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations. 37 9 Yet, notwithstanding these grants of power to
Congress, Washington instituted rules concerning captures on the
high seas. He set United States' jurisdictional limits at three miles
(one sea league) and prohibited the warring nations from engaging
in hostilities within this territorial limit.3 80 Also, in accordance with
the law of nations, he determined that war ships could not give chase
after a vessel leaving port until twenty-four hours had elapsed.38 1 He
announced that the government would view any vessel violating this
rule as being in contravention of the law of nations and that would
take action against prizes seized by the offending ship.38 2 Washington thus had acted to make "Rules concerning Capture" and had
defined "Offenses against the Law of Nations" even though the Conbirth to considerations very embarrassing to the delicacy of the President." Id. at 514 (empha-

sis in original).
376. Ultimately, the issue of compensation was resolved by the Jay Treaty. C. THOMAS,
supra note 57, at 200 n.4. For a discussion of the Jay Treaty and constitutional questions
concerning it, see infra notes 480-574 and accompanying text.

377.

Washington explained why the Congress did not feel obliged to furnish the funds:

"[A]lthough the usage of other Nations may be opposed to [the Congress' action], the differ-

ence may result from the difference between their Constitutions and ours, and from the prerogative of their Executives." Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of the Treasury
[Alexander Hamilton] (July 2, 1794), supra note 372, at 422.
378. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
10.
379. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
380. C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 102. See Cabinet Meetings, Opinions Concerning
the Relations of the United States with Several European Countries (Nov. 1-22, 1793), in 15
HAMILTON PAPERs, supra note 345, at 381. The Cabinet agreed upon a "[c]ircular letter to

the representatives of France, Gr. Brit., Spain & the U. Netherlands, fixing provisonily [sic]
the extent of our jurisdiction into the sea at a sea-league." Id.

381.

C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 69. Randolph, in announcing the rule, stated that

it was "reasonable in itself, and conformable to the law of nations." Id.

382.

Id. The British ambassador scorned Washington's failure to act more quickly to

implement a twenty-four hour rule, saying that Washington did not make a decision until the

arrival of a British fleet in American waters compelled him to do so. See id. at 70.
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stitution explicitly granted this authority to the legislative branch.38 3
In addition to establishing rules for captures on the high seas,
the executive branch went so far as to contemplate and ultimately
institute prosecutions against Americans accused of violating the
neutrality. The Cabinet asked Attorney General Edmund Randolph
to determine whether the government could punish American
seamen who joined French privateers. 8 4 Randolph informed the
Cabinet that since the United States had a treaty with Great Britain
and treaties were law, citizens who acted contrary to the treaties
could be prosecuted at common law.3 85 Besides Randolph, all the
lawyers consulted by the Cabinet felt that the government could
prosecute American citizens who served on French privateers. 388 Bolstered further by a jury instruction by Chief Justice John Jay indicating that he thought such prosecutions permissible, 8 7 the government decided to prosecute American seaman, Gideon Henfield, for
serving on a French ship.3 88
Despite Supreme Court Justices Wilson and Iredell's acquiescence in the prosecution,3 89 Henfield's case raises serious constitutional questions. The fact that the Constitution delegated to Con383. The Cabinet did show some awareness of the constitutional limitations on its right
to act without congressional consent. For example, the Cabinet decided that it should refrain
from preventing the sale of legally condemned prizes because this action could only be made
by the legislature. Feeling that it was important to prevent these sales, the Cabinet believed
that Washington should recommend to Congress that it prohibit them. C. THOMAS, supra note
57, at 219 n.3.
384. Id. at 170.
385. Id. at 170 & n.3.
386. Id. at 171. But other lawyers questioned whether the government could prosecute
people for violating the law of nations. Even the district judge and the prosecuting attorney
had some reservations about the prosecution. Id. at 172.
387. See id. at 172 n.1; see also C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 129.
388. For a discussion of the Henfield affair, see C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 12931; F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
WASMNGTON AND ADAMS

49-89 (1849).

389.

They presided at the trial along with federal district judge Richard Peters. F.
WHARTON, supra note 388, at 83. Wilson charged the jury that "[i]t is the joint and unanimous opinion of the Court, that the United States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the
present war, the acts of hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are an offence against this
country, and punishable by its laws." Id. at 84. Wharton provided a concise summary of Justice Wilson's several justifications in support of the government's right to prosecute violators of
the neutrality: (1) citizens of a neutral state who aided in attacks on belligerents were guilty of
an offense against the law of nations and could be punished by the neutral state for this action;
(2) the federal courts had jurisdiction over such offenses and could punish offenders according
to "the forms of the common law," even though Congress had not defined any offenses against
the law of nations; and (3) a citizen could be punished for violating a treaty with a foreign
government. Id. at 85.
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gress sole authority to define crimes against nations, and the
Congress had not prohibited Americans from serving on belligerent's
ships, prompts one to agree with contemporary critics of Washington
who felt that he was improperly "trying to give a proclamation the
force of a law." 390 Henfield's acquittal only increased suspicions that
Washington was exceeding his authority. 39' The lack of congressional authorization posed a related question: Did "the federal judiciary have jurisdiction under the common law even though Congress
[had] not given it the statutory jurisdiction[?]" 3 92 One neutrality
scholar has declared: "One may well doubt that the federal courts
would uphold in the twentieth century the acts of a president who,
without statutory authority, issued such important rules as many of
those announced by President Washington prior to the act of June 5,
1794.,,3o3

Besides seemingly usurping the legislative function, the President acted in a judicial capacity. Washington established a procedure for impartial arbitration, but ordered district attorneys, in the
event that ship owners and captors could not agree on a panel of
arbitrators, to collect evidence and submit the data to the President
for resolution.394 In one case, involving the Fanny, the President
evaluated the evidence and determined the fate of the ship.395 Thus,
the President decided the dispute over possession of a ship arising
from rules that he had issued.
A final subject of importance concerning neutrality is Washington's refusal to convene Congress to address problems in enforcing
America's impartial posture. Prior to the issuance of the proclamation, the Cabinet members had decided unanimously against convening the Congress at that time to deliberate upon American policy
regarding the European war.396 On August 3, 1793, Washington,
390. C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 172 n.7.
391. See id. at 175.
392. Id. at 173 n.4.
393. C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 155 n.15. But see C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at
173 n.4 (stating that there is some justification for the viewpoint that the Henfield jury charge
remained good law).

394. C.

HYNEMAN, supra note

342, at 102.

395. See Id.
396. See THE ANAs, supra note 334, at 119. Jefferson had some doubts about the President's authority to deal with neutrality problems, but he agreed with the rest of the Cabinet
that the President should not convene the Congress. By June, he desired that Congress convene
at an earlier date than scheduled, but he still wanted Washington to refrain from calling Congress until the beginning of October. C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 236 n.5. For further discussion of Jefferson's views on the question of when to convene the Congress, see infra note
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noting among other reasons the "general complexion of public mat-

ters" and the jury verdict in the Henfield case, again consulted the
Cabinet about whether he should assemble the legislature at an earlier date than scheduled. 9g No doubt Washington's desire for legislation to support his neutrality program underlay his thoughts about
convening the Congress.398 The Cabinet decided, however, against
calling the Congress into session early, with only Jefferson favoring
an early date for the next session. 3 9 Hamilton justified this decision
by noting that the Constitution mandated that the President convene
a special session only in extraordinary circumstances. He also emphasized that the saving in time would not compensate for the resulting public alarm. 00 Jefferson's discussion of the Cabinet meeting
sheds much light on the de~ision not to convene Congress. Jefferson
declared:
Knox said we should have had fine work, if Congress had been sitting these two last months. The fool thus let out the secret. Hamilton, endeavored to patch up the indiscretion of this blabber, by say400; text accompanying notes 399, 401-02.
397. Letter from George Washington to the Heads of Departments and the Attorney
General (Aug. 3, 1793), in 33 WASUNGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 35, 36 (emphasis
omitted). The Cabinet discussion of whether to convene Congress at an earlier time than
scheduled so concerned Washington that he wrote Jefferson on the next day to inquire about
whether the Cabinet had reached any conclusions on this question. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 4, 1793), in id. at 37-38.
398. This point is evidenced by Washington's Fifth Annual Address to Congress. Fifth
Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at
163. In this Address, he informed the Congress that "it will probably be found expedient, to
extend the legal code, and the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, to many cases,
which, though dependent on principles already recognized, demand some further provisions."
Id. at 164-65. Washington made note of the Henfield circumstances, stating that the Congress
should quickly examine offences against the law of nations in cases where the penalties were
"indistinctly marked." Id. at 165.
399. See Letter from George Washington to the Heads of Departments and the Attorney General (Aug. 3, 1793), in 33 WASINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 36 n.48. Hamil-

ton opposed the idea of advancing the date on which Congress was to be called, but said that
he would follow the majority. THE ANAS, supra note 334, at 160. Washington informed the
Cabinet that he personally favored calling Congress prior to the scheduled date, but decided to
follow the Cabinet's advice. Id. at 161.
400. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1793), in 15
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 194, 195. Jefferson felt that starting the first Monday
in November would enable Congress to begin earlier than scheduled without causing public
alarm. Opinion on Calling of Congress (Aug. 4, 1793), in 7 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note
330, at 465, 466. Jefferson proposed an early meeting of the Congress because among other
reasons, "several legislative provisions are wanting to enable the government to steer steadily
through the difficulties daily produced by the war of Europe, and to prevent our being involved
in it by the incidents and perplexities to which it is constantly giving birth." Id. at 465.
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ing "he did not know; he rather
thought they would have
1
strengthened the executive arm.'4'0
Jefferson followed this discussion by expressing his belief that the
Cabinet's real motivation for not convening Congress was that the
Cabinet did
"not wish to lengthen the session of the next
40 2
Congress.'
Most likely Washington and his Cabinet acted without calling
Congress because they were wary of popular enthusiasm and congressional support for the French.40 3 Feelings were so strong that,
after a French military victory in September 1792, there were
"[p]opular demonstrations, almost unprecedented in fervor," from
Boston to Charleston. 40 ' The Cabinet clearly perceived the strong
popular feelings toward the French. Hamilton wrote in a February 5,
1793 letter that "[tihe popular tide in this country is strong in favor
of the last revolution in France; and there are many who go, of
course, with that tide, and endeavour always to turn it to account.' 4 5 Jefferson wrote to the same man that ninety-nine in one
hundred Americans favored the French cause.40 Although quite
sympathetic to the French cause, Jefferson expressed his wish that
"we may be able to repress the spirits of the people within the limits
of a fair neutrality.'4 07 Undoubtedly, the Cabinet's perception of the
fervent public approval of the French Revolution, and its fear that
Congress might jeopardize the neutrality because of its French sympathies, underlay the Cabinet's decision to delay the convening of
Congress until months after the neutrality proclamation took effect.
401. THE AN s, supra note 334, at 160.
402. Id. at 160-61 (emphasis in original).
403. For a discussion of the enthusiastic American response to the French Revolution,
see C. HAZEN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OPINION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 164-87

(1897).
404. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 24. The residents of Charleston
showered their affection on newly arrived French Ambassador Genet, and Genet was accorded
enthusiastic receptions throughout the Carolinas. See id. at 69-70; C. HAZEN, supra note 403,
at 173-89. But see J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 70 n.163 (noting that the

local newspapers do "not substantiate . .. altogether" the traditional view of Genet's
reception).
405. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Short (Feb. 5, 1793), in 14 HAMLTON
PAPERS, supra note 345, at 7, 7. According to Jefferson, Hamilton considered the public disposition towards France to be a "serious calamity." THE ANTs, supra note 334, at 182 (Nov. 28,

1793).
406.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Jan. 3, 1793) (footnote omitted),

in 7 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 202, 203-04. Jefferson speaks here in glowing
terms about the French Revolution and the Jacobins. See Id. at 202-05.
407.

3 D. MALONE, supra note 330, at 73.
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Though Washington's decision not to assemble the Congress to
address the neutrality issue, in retrospect, seems to be justified on
grounds of expediency, 0 8 this justification does not eliminate constitutional questions regarding Washington's determination not to call
Congress. Thomas Jefferson, in a statement made several weeks
prior to the Cabinet meeting in which he voted against calling Congress, provides an important insight on this issue. Jefferson stated
that since the President could not declare war he should not determine the issue of war "on the negative side, by preventing the competent body from deliberating on the question."'409 The contradiction
between Jefferson's statement and his actions suggests that, despite
his reservations about the constitutionality of presidential actions,
Jefferson felt that the preservation of peace was too important to risk
trusting to the francophile Congress. Madison, in a letter inquiring
of Jefferson why the President had not summoned Congress into session, decried the "assumption of prerogatives, not clearly found in
the Constitution and having the appearance of being copied from a
monarchical model. 410 Madison's outburst provides a summary of
the crucial constitutional issue involving the neutrality; that is,
whether Washington's neutrality measures violated the constitutional
distribution of foreign policy power. Ignoring the substantial congressional role in foreign policy dictated by the Constitution,411
Washington instituted a series of enforcement measures without convening Congress. In enforcing the neutrality, Washington seems to
have exercised distinctly legislative and judicial functions.
Washington's actions must be considered, however, in light of a developing nation whose existence would have been endangered had
Congress decided against a neutral stance toward the British. 2
Congressional action in the foreign policy realm furnishes a convenient epilogue for the neutrality issue. Early in its session, Congress asserted itself in foreign affairs. In March 1794, Congress reacted angrily to increased British captures of American ships, by
passing an embargo that restricted all shipping in American ports
408. See C. THoMAs, supra note 57, at 33 (Thomas noted the need for quick action
before Americans had a chance to join in the hostilities).

409.
WORKS,

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, (Mar. 1793), in 7
supra note 330, at 250, 250.

410.
CARROLL

411.

JEFFERSON

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1793), quoted in J.

& M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 53 n.47.
See supra text accompanying notes 175-80.

412. For a discussion of the American leaders' concern over possible American entanglement in the European hostilities, see supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
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for a month.41 For the most part, however, rather than adopting its
own position in foreign policy matters, Congress just showed its approval of Washington's action during the congressional recess. It endorsed Washington's broad exercise of power prior to the convening
of Congress by permitting the President, while Congress was in recess, to impose an embargo "whenever, in his opinion, the public
safety shall so require.'

14

' In addition, since this embargo act per-

mitted the President to determine whether to lay an embargo, it signalled congressional willingness to allow the President to use his discretion in a field that the Congress had a right to control. 1 5 On June
5, 1794, Congress enacted a general neutrality act that provided the
statutory authority needed for effective enforcement of Washington's
neutrality program. 4'

The Act eliminated the difficulties that

plagued Washington concerning the refusal of the courts to assume
jurisdiction over captures, because it provided that district courts
would "take cognizance of complaints by whomsoever instituted, in
cases of captures made within the waters of the United States, or
within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof.'

17

Further,

the Act authorized Washington to prevent foreign vessels fitted out
in the United States from carrying out hostile acts and to force vessels to depart whenever the law of nations or American treaties indicated a need to demand their departure. 18 One scholar notes that
the Act of June 5, 1794 incorporated "the essence of [Washington's
413. S. BEMIS, supra note 30, at 267. Congress extended the embargo for another
month, but the Senate later defeated a non-intercourse bill as Vice President Adams cast the
deciding vote. C. THOMAS, supra note 57, at 246-47; see infra text accompanying notes 50103. It should be noted that in authorizing an embargo, the Congress gave Washington much
leeway over how to enforce it, as the Congress resolved that Washington should issue instructions to the revenue officials that were "best adapted" to give the embargo "full effect." Res. 2,
3d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Stat. 400 (1794).
414. An Act to authorize the President of the United States to lay, regulate and revoke
Embargoes, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 (1794). The emergency nature of the statute is shown by the
fact that the statutory authority expired fifteen days after the convening of the next session of
Congress. See Id.
415. See Id. It should be noted that the Congress carefully restricted the President's
discretion, since the President had discretion to lay an embargo only when Congress was not in
session, and the presidentially authorized embargo would expire fifteen days "from the actual
meeting of Congress." Id.
416. See An Act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the
United States, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).
417. Id. § 6, at 384. Also, the Act made it illegal for an Americafi citizen to assist a
"foreign prince or state in war by land or sea." Id. § 1, at 382. The Act outlawed a number of
offenses against the neutrality and imposed different fines and prison sentences, depending on
the offense. For the offenses and punishments, see id. §§ 1-7, at 382-84.
418. Id. § 8, at 384.
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measures] into statute."' 19 Thus, congressional enactments gave
Washington the statutory authority to enforce the neutrality, and indicated congressional approval of the President's broad exercise of
power.
Congressional response to Washington's message on the neutrality further demonstrates the legislative branch's favorable opinion of
Washington's actions. Washington addressed the Congress in an extremely deferential manner, explaining his issuance of the proclamation as "my duty to admonish our Citizens."420 Later in his address,
Washington emphasized that future enforcement and modification of
the American neutrality depended on congressional action. 421 The
Congress praised Washington for his conduct, with the House voting
422
unanimously to approve all of his actions regarding neutrality.
While there is no doubt that the Congress favorably viewed
Washington's actions, it cannot be determined to what extent
Washington's deferential tone and his personal popularity induced
Congress' positive response. Neither congressional approval of
Washington's measures nor the wisdom of his decision not to convene the Congress and risk its embroiling the country in a disastrous
war, should obscure the critical constitutional issues concerning
Washington's unilateral actions in enforcing the neutrality. The uniqueness of the circumstances involving the neutrality, including the
country's possible extinction and Washington's special status as the
hero of the Revolution and a man above parties, indicates that the
precedents of the first neutrality should be viewed cautiously. Arguments that Washington's actions are solid precedent for a dominant
presidential foreign policy role, and that Washington's neutrality
measures demonstrate the Framers' true intentions concerning- the
distribution of authority in the external sphere, must be viewed in
relation to arguments addressing the weak constitutional underpinnings of Washington's actions and the special circumstances that
prompted his particular response to the European war.
VI.

THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS LETTERS

Observing the popular uproar over the neutrality proclama419.

C. HYNEMAN, supra note 342, at 82 (footnote omitted).

420. Fifth Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 33 WASINGTON WRITINGS,
supra note 15, at 164.

421. Id. at 164-65.
422. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 17-18, 138-39 (1793). Besides approving of Washington's
actions, the Senate expressed pleasure at his re-election. Id. at 17-18.
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tion, 2 3 Hamilton justified the declaration in a newspaper series using
the pen name Pacificus 24 Hamilton's celebrated articles prompted
Jefferson to ask Madison to "[s]elect the most striking heresies and
cut him to pieces in the face of the public" since "[t]here is nobody
else who can and will enter the lists against him." 42 5 Madison responded to Jefferson's entreaties by publishing a series of letters
under the pseudonym Helvidius.4 26 The Pacificus-Helvidius letters
are of great interest to students of presidential power because the
letters illustrate the views of two men who played critical roles in the
development of the structure of the government in the area of presidential authority and its constitutional foundation.
A. Pacificus
Given Hamilton's views as expressed in the Constitutional Convention, 27 it is not surprising that Hamilton broadly defined the executive's role in foreign policy. Basing his theory of presidential powers on his interpretation of the executive clause, 428 Hamilton claimed
that the Constitution cloaked the President with extensive authority
in foreign affairs. 29 Further, Hamilton argued that presidential authority derived from the president's role as the organ of foreign relations, his power to receive ambassadors and his duty to preserve the
peace all pointed toward a prominent presidential role in foreign
affairs.
Hamilton stressed the difference between the phrasing found in
the constitutional grants of legislative and executive power. He noted
that the Constitution says "[a]ll legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a congress," and "[tihe executive power shall be
vested in a president. ' 43 0 Hamilton concluded that the Framers' use
of the phrasing "powers herein granted" was meant to limit the legislature to specifically enumerated powers, while their decision not to
use this phrasing for the executive clause signified their desire to
grant all executive power to the President. According to Hamilton,
423. See PAclFIcus-HELvIDIus LErrERS, supra note 360, at 5.
424. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 179 (1957).
425. 6 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138 (G. Hunt ed. 1906), quoted
In PAC Cus-HELVIDIUS LETrERS, supra note 360, at ix (footnote omitted).
426. PACiFICus-HELVIDIUS LETrERS, supra note 360, at xi.
427. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
428. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl.1.
429. See PACIFICus-HELVIDIUS LETTEs, supra note 360, at 10-11.
430. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, ci.
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the enumerated powers in the executive section were just the "principal articles implied in the definition of executive power," with additional authority being derived "from the general grant of [the executive] power.'

4 31

Hamilton argued that the general grant of executive power supplies the President with the whole gamut of executive power "subject
only to the exceptions and qualifications,which are expressed in the
instrument.'

4

2

Hamilton considered treaty power, appointment

power and congressional war power as exceptions to the general rule
that executive power is lodged in the President. He declared that
since the placement of treaty and war powers were mere exceptions
to the general distribution of executive powers, "they are to be construed strictly, and ought to be extended no further than is essential
to their execution.' 3 3 Because he claimed that war power should be
construed very narrowly, Hamilton could justify a proclamation of
neutrality as an executive function rather than as a legislative function derived from the war power. 4 Though admitting that only the
Congress could declare war, Hamilton claimed that the executive
had a duty to preserve peace (for example, by making a neutrality
43 5
proclamation) until Congress decided otherwise.
Hamilton found additional bases for presidential authority in
the foreign relations sphere. He claimed that since the President was
"the organ of intercourse between the nation and foreign nations," 436
the President could pronouce his views on treaty relations with other
governments. 37 In addition, Hamilton argued that presidential
power over the receiving of ambassadors enabled the President to
decide whether or not to recognize new rulers. Hamilton noted that
by making the decision whether to recognize a government, the President would also determine whether the United States would honor
its treaty obligations with the newly established foreign government. 38 Ultimately, Hamilton declared that the President, by his exercise of authority, could create a state of affairs that would have a
great effect on the legislature's own ability to decide whether to de431.

Id.

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 14.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 8-9.
Id. at 12-13.
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clare war.4 39
B. Helvidius
Madison's Helvidius articles refute Hamilton's argument in support of a dominant presidential role in external matters. Madison
counters Hamilton's assertions by examining both the nature of executive authority and the nature of presidential war and treatymaking powers. According to Madison, war and treaties "can never fall
within a proper definition of executive powers. 440 Madison notes
that executive action presupposes "the existence of the laws to be
executed."44 1 He further states that treaties have the force of law
and, like other laws, have a legislative nature, and that declaration
of war is not the execution of a law but instead is "one of the most
deliberative acts that can be performed. '442 Finally, he notes that
the declaration of war "has the effect of repealingall the laws" contrary to the state of war "and of enacting, as a rule for the executive, a new code4 43
adapted to the relation between the society and its
enemy.
foreign
After showing that war power and treaty power did not fit the
classic definition of executive power, Madison presented additional
arguments to show that the powers were not executive in nature. He
dismissed the notion that treaty and warmaking are executive functions, noting that this conception derived from spurned English royal
prerogatives. 4 Madison then quoted Hamilton's statement in The
Federalist that treaty power was more of a legislative than executive
function though it did not really belong in either branch.445 Madison
utilized Hamilton's article to show that even Hamilton in The Federalist Was "clear, consistent, and confidant [sic], in deciding that the
power is plainly and evidently not an executive power. '446 After concluding that war and treaty powers were substantially legislative
439. Id. at 13. Hamilton gave as an example a hypothetical situation in which the
United States had a treaty of alliance with France requiring it to aid France in the event that
France became embroiled in a war. Hamilton noted that the President, by acknowledging the
new French government, "would have put the United States in a condition to become an associate in the war with France, and would have laid the legislature under an obligation, if required, and there was otherwise no valid excuse, of exercising its power of declaring war." Id.
440. Id. at 57.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis in original).
444. See id. at 62.
445. Id. at 63 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 75).
446. Id. at 64 (emphasis in original).
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functions, Madison then adopted Hamilton's approach regarding the
limited scope of exceptions." He declared that since war and treaty
powers were basically legislative functions, exceptions to legislative
exercise of these functions should be interpreted in a narrow fashion
in order to avoid "executive pretensions.' ' 8
Madison's posture that exceptions to legislative control of warmaking be construed narrowly results in a greatly restricted presidential war role. Claiming that the Constitution vests war power
"fully and exclusively . . . in the legislature," Madison declares

that the President has no right to decide whether some incident is or
is not a cause for declaring war." 9 He goes so far as to state that the
executive must faithfully execute the laws even if the laws may lead
to war, and that he must let the legislature decide whether to change
the laws. 5° Madison concluded that the executive cannot decide the
war issue but instead must convene the Congress to determine the
proper course of action. 51
In addition to demonstrating that war power was a legislative
function and that exceptions to congressional warmaking, therefore,
should be construed narrowly, Madison refuted Hamilton's claims
that power to receive ambassadors furnished the President with substantial policy authority. Madison again used Hamilton's statements
in The Federalist to counter Hamilton's assertions. As Madison
noted, Hamilton said in The Federalist that "though [the receiving
of ambassadors] has been a rich theme of declamation, [it] is more a
447.
448.
449.
450.
on a war

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 73. Madison was quite wary of the possibility that a presidential statement
question would interfere with the congressional war power. He argued:
In exercising the constitutional power of deciding a question of war, the legislature ought to be as free to decide, according to its own sense of the public good, on
one side as on the other side. Had the proclamation prejudged the question on either
side, and proclaimed its decision to the world; the legislature, instead of being as
free as it ought, might be thrown under the dilemma, of either sacrificing its judgment to that of the executive; or, by opposing the executive judgment, of producing
a relation between the two departments, extremely delicate among ourselves, and of
the worst influence on the national character and interests abroad.
Id. at 96.
451. Id. at 73-74. Underlying Madison's viewpoint was his belief about the need to
maintain a separation of powers. Madison declared that "[t]hose who are to conduct a war
cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded." Id. at 61. Madison then alluded to the "great principle in
free government" whereby the power to execute laws is separated from the power to enact
laws. Id.
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matter of dignity than of authority," and "is a circumstance, that
will be without consequence in the administration of the government.' 52 Madison argues that "little, if any thing, more was intended by the clause" than to establish the mode of communication
45 3
and the ceremony for admitting ministers of foreign governments.
Finally, he pronounces his belief that it "would be highly improper
to magnify the function into an important prerogative, ' 45even where
no rights of other departments could be affected by it." '
Madison opposed presidential discretion over the receiving of
ambassadors. According to Madison, the President should just inquire whether the ambassador's credentials are from an existing government and are properly authenticated, and-should not question the
legitimacy of the government from which the representative was
sent.455 He rejected arguments that the President had the right, by
his ability to refuse to receive a minister, to decide against acknowledging a new government. 56 Madison suggested the possibility that
the government might decide against recognizing a new government,
but he said that the decision should not be made by the President,
and should "certainly not to be brought by any torture of words,
within the right to receive ambassadors."' 57 Ultimately, Madison
dismissed any claims of power derived from the presidential authority to receive ambassadors and declared that the President had no
discretion to refuse recognition to a government. Madison's analysis
of the clause thus conflicts sharply with Hamilton's position that the
President could decide for himself whether to recognize a government and could even cause a suspension of a treaty by this clause.458
The Pacificus-Helvidius letters illustrate two radically different
views of presidential power. Madison, as Helvidius, argues for a
dominant congressional role, advancing a theory that only Congress
can decide issues of war and peace,'4 and deploring any presidential
discretion over whether he should receive ambassadors from a particular country.6 In addition, he considers war and treaty powers to
452.
453.
note 143,
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. at 76 (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 69).
Id. For a discussion of the power to receive ambassadors, see L. HENKIN, supra
at 41.
PAcirncus-HELviDIus Lm7ERs, supra note 360, at 76.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 78, 83.
Id. at 78.
For a discussion of Hamilton's position, see supra text accompanying note 438.
See supra text accompanying notes 449-51.
See supra text accompanying notes 456-58.
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be legislative activities, and says that exceptions to legislative power
over these areas should be construed narrowly. 46 ' In contrast, Hamilton claims that congressional power over war, appointments and
treaties were exceptions to the general executive power, and as exceptions were to be viewed narrowly. 4 2 He develops a theory espousing broad executive powers, and he envisions presidential actions
that could possibly undermine congressional ability to make its own
determination on crucial foreign policy matters.4 63 Prior to the
Pacificus-Helvidius debate, the President had already issued his
proclamation and had begun to institute a series of neutrality measures without seeking congressional approval.46 4 Thus, by the time

the letters circulated throughout the country the President had already begun to dominate foreign policy even in areas where the Constitution pointed to a significant congressional role.

VII.

EXCURSION INTO EXECUTIVE POWER

Since politicians and historians have often based theories of
presidential power on the executive clause, it seems valuable to examine briefly the attitudes held at the time of the Convention and in
the early years of the republic regarding the clause. At the Convention, the Committee of Detail, which originated the clause's phrasing, used similar phrasing to define the legislative power; this language suggests the Committee did not intend any special powers
from this grant.46 5 Further, the executive powers granted by the
Constitution cannot be equated with the English executive powers
because the Framers purposefully rejected presidential exercise of
many traditional executive powers.4 66 In view of the Framers' distrust of the executive 46 ' and their distribution of foreign policy authority in the Constitution,46 8 it is unlikely that they would have in469
tended a broad interpretation of the executive clause.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 447-48.
462. See supra text accompanying note 433.
463. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.

464. See Sofaer, supra note 249, at 18.
465.

See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.

466. See Bestor, supra note 13, at 601.
467.

See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.

468. See supra text accompanying notes 165-97.
469. See Reveley, supra note 6, at 143 (who notes that evidence of the ratification debates show that the ratifiers read presidential powers as being limited to those enumerated,

and had no desire to cloak the president with powers that were not specifically delegated). But
it has been suggested that Federalist expressions of a limited presidential role were part of

their ratification strategy. See id.
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Whatever the Framers' view of the clause, at an early stage in
the Washington administration American leaders began to interpret
the executive clause as a significant grant of power. For example,Oliver Ellsworth, a Convention delegate from Connecticut, argued in
a Senate debate on removal power47 that the Constitution granted
executive power and thereby removal power, rather than just the
enumerated executive powers, to the President. 7 1 Most surprisingly,
Jefferson and Madison, who later would prove to be the strongest
opponents of Hamilton's Pacificus, advanced a broad view of executive power. Jefferson claimed that control of relations with foreign
governments was "Executive altogether" and that the President
could exercise this power except to the extent that he needed Senate
approval.47 2 During the removal debate, Madison put forth ideas
similar to those later pronounced by Pacificus, claiming that appointment power was an exception to the general rule that the Constitution vested the executive power in the President.473 It is possible that
at the time of the Helvidius articles Madison still believed in a broad
reading of the executive clause; in any event, Madison did not attempt in his Helvidius articles to counter Hamilton's assertions regarding the clause.'' Instead, Madison based his arguments on the
substantive foreign policy powers that the legislative bodies derived
from the Constitution.?
South Carolina Representative William Smith's speech, made in
470. At the time that the Congress established the executive departments, heated debate
ensued over the question of who would have the authority to remove the officials in charge of
the departments. The removal question sparked a great deal of debate about appointment
power and the nature of executive powers. For a discussion of the removal debate, see C.
THACH, supra note 127, at 140-65.
471. Id. at 155 (quoting 3 J. ADAMS, WORKS 409 (1851)).
472. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 297 n.10 (quoting 5 T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 162
(P. Ford ed. 1892) (emphasis in original)). Jefferson added that exceptions to the executive
power were "to be construed strictly." Id. at 298 n.10 (emphasis in original).
473. J. HART, supra note 222, at 179-80.
474. Madison did distinguish, however, between removal power and war and treaty
making powers. Madison declared:
To justify any favourable inference from this case, it must be shown, that the powers of war and treaties are of a kindred nature to the power of removal, or at least
are equally within a grant of executive power. Nothing of this sort has been attempted, nor probably will be attempted. Nothing can in truth be clearer, than that
no analogy, or shade of analogy, can be traced between a power in the supreme
officer responsible for the faithful execution of the laws, to displace a subaltern
officer employed in the execution of the laws; and a power to make treaties, and to
declare war.
PACIFiCUS-HELVIDIUS LETTERS, supra note 360, at 62.
475. See Id. at x.
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the House of Representatives on June 18, 1789 during the removal
debate, presents the case against executive removal power.47 8 Smith
criticized Madison's arguments that "all powers incidental to the executive" were vested in the President. 4 7 As Smith rightly pointed
out, "What powers are executive, or incidental to the executive department, will depend upon the nature of the Government." 478
Smith's point illustrates the flaws in Madison's removal posture and
in Hamilton's Pacificus. With regard to monarchies, Hamilton and
Madison are right in claiming broad executive powers. However, as
Smith pointed out, the Constitution did not vest all the executive
powers in the President. The Framers' care in delegating responsibilities over foreign policy 47 9 weighs against Hamilton's sweeping
claims of foreign policy authority derived from the executive clause.
VIII. THE JAY TREATY
The controversy regarding the Jay mission sheds light on a myriad of constitutional questions. The circumstances surrounding the
appointment of Jay, the issuance of his instructions, the Senate's action on the treaty, 8 0 and the House response to the treaty highlight
the interplay of constitutional and political motivation concerning
the Jay mission. In addition the debates over the treaty furnish insight into the constitutional interpretations espoused by American
political leaders during the years of Washington's presidency. Most
importantly, despite the possible constitutional infirmities involving
the Jay mission, the ratification of the treaty established a precedent
for future American treatymaking.
American consternation over British policies in general, and
British harassment of American shipping in particular, provides the
context of the Jay mission. Britain's continued refusal to relinquish
the northwestern trading posts, and its encouragement of Indian attacks in that area, provoked much resentment towards the British.48 1
Americans also were angered because the British continued to reap
the benefits of American trade while maintaining their discriminatory trade policies against American shipping. 48 2 A British order in
476. 1 ANNALS
477. Id.
478.

OF CONG.,

supra note 222, at 566.

Id.

479. See supra text accompanying notes 165-97.
480.

The Jay Treaty, November 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 116, T.S.

No. 105.
481.

T. BAILEY, supra note 151, at 72.

482. See supra notes 32-34, 41 and accompanying text. British discriminatory trade pol-
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council that authorized seizure of neutral ships carrying goods to or
from the French West Indies and the resultant capture of a great
number of American vessels further contributed to American exasperation over British policies. 483 Finally, Britain's seeming encouragement of Barbary depredations against American shipping in the
Atlantic added to American irritation at the British government. 4
The British demeanor and policies regarding the United States
caused great stirrings of public and congressional outrage.485
Several influential senate Federalists, 86 realizing that an embargo would not assuage American ill feelings toward the British
and believing that war would likely result unless American anger
subsided, met to discuss possible courses of action. 87 These senators
concluded that the United States should build fortifications, fill arsenals, increase the size of the armed forces and send an "Envoy extraordinary" to Great Britain "to require satisfaction for the loss of
our Property and to adjust those points which menaced a war between the two Countries.

48 8

These senators decided to send Senator Ellsworth to President
Washington in order to attempt to persuade him of the need for
sending a special envoy to England.48 9 After Ellsworth's presentation
icies were longstanding in nature. In fact, these policies played a role in convincing Americans
of the need for a strenghtened national government. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
483. T. BAILEY, supra note 151, at 73; see J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note
57, at 157-58; D. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 177-81
(1969).
484. See J. COMBs, supra note 31, at 116; D. STEWART,supra note 483, at 180.
485. For a discussion of the congressional reaction to the British policies and the measures proposed in Congress in response to British policy, see J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH,
supra note 57, at 158-64.
486. By this time the legislative bodies had split into rival factions, with the Federalists
generally supporting the President and the Republicans, also known as the Democratic-Republicans, serving as an opposition party on many issues. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson was
the spiritual leader of Republicans and Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton was the
spiritual head of the Federalists. Historians differ over the year that these parties came into
being. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY: BICENTENNIAL EDITION 148 (R. Morris
ed. 1976). See also J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA: 1789-1801, at 99-125 (1960) (discussing the emergence of the parties and making an assessment that Madison, rather than Jefferson, was the dominant force in the early days of the Republican party. Republicans generally
were sympathetic to the French cause, while Federalists generally favored the British side in
the British-French conflict. T. BAILEY, supra note 151, at 71-72.
487. 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RuFus KING 517 (C. King ed. 1894 &
photo. reprint 1971) [hereinafter cited as KING CORRESPONDENCE]. The Senators who met to
discuss the crisis were Rufus King (N.Y.), George Cabot (Mass.), Caleb Strong (Mass.) and
Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.). See id.
488. Id. at 518.
489. Id. at 517-18.
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helped convince Washington of the need for a special envoy,490 the
senators, together with Alexander Hamilton, waited on Chief Justice
Jay and induced him to take the post. 491 In addition, they urged him
to stress to Washington that proposed retaliatory measures against
Britain, under discussion in the House, would destroy any chance for
a successful mission.492 On April 16, 1794, one day after Jay met
with these prominent Federalists, Washington nominated Jay as a
special envoy. 493 Thus, Federalist senators played a critical role in
initiating the special mission to Great Britain.
The nomination of Jay as special envoy provoked strong protests
from some senators. These senators voiced three basic objections to
the Jay mission: The mission was unnecessary because the American
ambassador to Great Britain could perform the same role as Jay; Jay
was not the proper person for the mission;49 4 the appointment of the
Chief Justice as special envoy violated the principle of separation of
5
49

powers.

Republican senators dwelled on the constitutional and practical
problems involved with the appointment of the Chief Justice as Envoy extraordinary. In introducing a resolution designed to forestall
the sending of a special envoy, Senator Aaron Burr declared:
[T]o permit Judges of the Supreme Court to hold at the same time
any other office or employment, emanating from and holden at the
490. King noted that "[t]he President was at first reserved-finally more communicative
and apparently impressed with Ellsworth's representation." Id. at 518. The senators recommended that Washington select Hamilton to be envoy, but, as King noted, Washington had
reservations about nominating Hamilton because he "did not possess the general confidence of
the Country." Id. at 518.
491. See id. at 520.
492. See id.
493. Id. at 521.
494. For the reasons underlying Republican dissatisfaction with Jay's nomination, see
id. at 521-22 (noting Senate speeches by Virginia Senators John Taylor and James Monroe
opposing the Jay nomination); D. STEWART, supra note 483, at 188-89. Monroe declared that
Jay "was not a suitable character, since he held opinions as appears by his Reports while Secy.
of for. affairs, against the interest and just claims of the Country." 1 KING CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 487, at 521. Monroe gave three examples of these opinions: (1) that Jay decided in
favor of allowing interest on British debts, id. at 521-22; (2) that Jay "had acknowledged that
we were the first aggressors agt. the Treaty, and therefore that the Detention of the Posts, &c.,
was justifiable on the part of G. Britain," id. at 522; (3) that Jay's attitude regarding American navigation of the Mississippi was "unfriendly to our Rights and too complaisant to those
of Sp.;" id. at 522. One historian has noted that only the nomination of Hamilton would have
incensed Republicans more than the selection of Jay. See D. STEVART, supra note 483, at
188.
495. See R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 69-70. See also I KING CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 487, at 522.
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pleasure of the Executive, is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and, as tending to expose them to the influence of the Executive is mischievous and impolitic." 6
Senator John Taylor of Virginia voiced opposition to the Jay appointment on "the ground of incompatibility in the office of [Chief]
Justice and Envoy extraordinary," and because the "appointment
would destroy the independence of the Judiciary by teaching them to
look for lucrative employment from and dependent on the pleasure
of the Executive. '497 Taylor and Burr's views illustrate the Republican fear that the President might resort to using his appointment
power as a way to sway judges, and the Republican awareness of the
problem of having the Chief Justice negotiate treaties that he might
later be called upon to judge. 9
Although the nomination of Jay as Envoy extraordinary did not
immediately defuse anti-British sentiment, 49 Federalist senators
were able to amass enough votes to affirm Jay's nomination and to
defeat proposed retaliatory measures against the British. Washington had requested that the legislature refrain from passing these
measures because he felt that such measures would destroy any
chance of Jay achieving redress of American grievances .500 Despite
this importuning, the House easily passed a non-intercourse resolution (58 to 34) that would have halted trade relations with Great
Britain. 501 The Senate voted 13 to 13 on the resolution 50 2 with only
Vice President Adams' deciding vote preventing the Congress from
passing legislation that Federalists feared would have doomed Jay's
mission to failure.5 0 3 After the defeat of this measure, Republican
agitation for legislation directed against Britain ebbed, and the
House overwhelmingly voted against extending an embargo meant to
supra note 275, at 70 n.1 (quoting 1 SEN. ExEC. JOUR. 152).
supra note 487, at 522.
See D. STEWART, supra note 483, at 189.
Negative feelings toward the British proved strong enough to result in an extension
of the trade embargo for another month. J.CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at
168. Rufus King deplored the fact that "[a]s the prospects of peace brighten, the Efforts of
these Sons of Faction are redoubled." Letter from Rufus King [to unknown recipient] (Apr.
16, 1794), in 1 KING CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 487, at 562.
500. J.COMBS, supra note 31, at 126-27.
501. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 605-06 (1794). The House passed the resolution despite arguments that it "would be a bar" to the Jay negotiations. For the opposing positions on the issue
of non-intercourse with Great Britain, see Id. at 600.
502, Id. at 89-90.
503. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 168.
496.
497.
498.
499.

R.

HAYDEN,

1 KING

CORRESPONDENCE,
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affect British interests.' °"
The crucial precedent of the Jay mission lies not in the choice of
envoy but rather in Washington's determination not to seek Senate
advice'and consent on Jay's instructions. 505 Washington's determination mirrored the views of key Federalist confidants.506 Rufus King's
views indicate what may have been the motivating factor underlying
Washington's decision. King wrote: "From the Difficulty of passing
particular instructions in the Senate, it seems to me to be most suitable that the [President should] instruct, and that the Treaty [should]
be concluded subject to the approbation of the Senate. 507 Because
Washington did consult with the Senate on earlier negotiation instructions, 508 his decision to avoid the Senate's input on the Jay mission most likely stemmed from the difficulty he anticipated in receiving Senate instructions that would meet his approval and not from
any belief that the Constitution dictated such a procedure. 0 9 Although the Jay mission was not the first time that Washington departed from the system of prior consultation, 510 it was the Jay mis504. British seizures of American shipping had prompted the Congress to impose a
thirty-day embargo on all shipping to foreign ports (Mar. 26, 1794). Congress later extended
the embargo for an additional month. T. BAILEY, supra note 151, at 74. The House vote was
73 to 13 against extending the embargo beyond its second month. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 683
(1794). For a discussion of the erosion of congressional support for retaliatory measures
against Great Britain, see J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, 172-73.
505. For the text of the instructions to Jay (May 6, 1794), see 1 A.S.P.F.R., supra note
320, at 472-74.
506. Hamilton, Ellsworth, Cabot, King, and Jay all believed that Washington should
issue instructions to Jay without consulting the Senate. 1 KING CORRESPONDENCE, supra note
487, at 523. The Federalists were able to defeat a Senate resolution requesting Washington
"to inform the Senate of the whole business with which the proposed Envoy is to be charged."
R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 71 (quoting 1 SEN. EXEC. JOUR. 151).

507. 1 KING

CORRESPONDENCE,

supra note 487, at 521. The text of Washington's in-

structions to Jay would not likely have received Senate approval. The instructions gave Jay
great discretion. With the exception of two mandatory guidelines-that Jay enter into no commercial treaty contrary to American agreements with France and that he enter into no treaty
unless it provided for admission of American ships into the British West Indies, the instructions amounted to "recommendations only," which Jay could modify at his discretion. S.
BEMIS, supra note 30, at 291. Bemis states that "[p]erhaps never in the history of the United
States has a plenipotentiary been vested with more unfettered discretion than was Jay in the
critical negotiations of 1794." Id. Given the great distrust of Jay, many Senators would have
balked at letting him have such responsibility over the content of any treaty that might be
negotiated and, given Senate anger at Great Britain, many Senators likely would have demanded a firmer American position regarding negotiations.
508. See supra notes 288-91, 306-13 and accompanying text.
509. Alexander DeConde postulates that reasons of political expediency underlay Washington's precedent-making decision not to seek prior consultation. A. DECONDE, supra note
151, at 104.
510. See supra note 310 (General Putnam's treaty).
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sion that permanently destroyed this scheme. As one scholar
declared: "Senate partnership in formulation of foreign policy was
thus smothered in infancy."5 11 Though a trifle dramatic, this statement presents an essential truth. After the Jay mission, the President
would take the initiative in treatymaking and foreign policy in general, and would not consult the Senate prior to the completion of a
treaty, 512 even though he eventually needed the approval of twothirds of the Senate. Clearly, Washington decided not to consult the
Senate on treaty instructions because he was afraid that public resentment towards the British and Senate displeasure over the proposed instructions, would have doomed the treaty to defeat. He subverted the constitutional manner of treatymaking because he desired
to avoid the political difficulties that prior consultation would have
entailed.
In assessing Washington's determination not to consult the Senate, it is necessary to consider the objections to Washington's decision in conjunction with those factors indicating a need to depart
from a rigid system of prior consultation. Secretary of State Edmund
Randolph voiced his belief that the doctrines of international law necessitated prior consultation. He maintained:
To permit such a treaty to be signed by Mr. Jay, and transmitted
for ratification, is to abridge the power of the senate to judge of its
merits. For according to the rules of good faith, a treaty, which is
stipulated to be ratified, ought to be513
so, unless the conduct of the
minister be disavowed and punished.
During the fight over the treaty ratification some senators called for
Washington's impeachment because, among other things, he had violated the Constitution by not seeking Senate advice prior to negotiating the Jay Treaty.5 14 Whatever the merit of the Senate's constitutional position, it is clear that there are practical advantages in not
seeking prior consultation. One scholar notes "the practical necessity
for creative presidential diplomacy without the necessity of obtaining
at every uncture the 'advice and consent' of the Senate by prior
511. A. DECONDE, supra note 151, at 104.
512. See J. HART, supra note 222, at 94.
513. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (May 6, 1794), in 33
WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 355 n.90. However, according to Randolph, Trea-

sury Secretary Wolcott and Secretary of War Pickering believed it to be "constitutional and
expedient" for Jay to conclude a treaty without prior consultation. Id. For a discussion of the
doctrine of international law that Randolph referred to, see supra text accompanying note 281.
514. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 375 n.8.
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consultation. 51 5 The need for secrecy and the special benefits of
presidential diplomacy-speed, uniformity, and responsibility51
-suggests the value of the President being free to initiate negotiations on occasion without having previously consulted the Senate. 517
A.

Senate Ratification

Publication of the text of the Jay Treaty provoked public outrage and calls for the Senate to reject the Treaty. 518 Republican
pamphleteers heaped much vitriol upon Jay and his Treaty, 519 and
515. J. HART, supra note 222, at 100 (emphasis omitted).
516. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
517. DeConde notes that, given the size and divisiveness of the Senate, secrecy would
have been impossible to maintain. He took special note of the usefulness of presidential diplomacy in enabling the government to engage in the "[glive and take necessary in diplomatic
negotiation." A. DECONDE, supra note 151, at 104 n.8. DeConde declared that "Jefferson
recognized this and on more than one occasion viewed conduct of foreign affairs as belonging
to the President exclusively." Id.
518. Secretary of Treasury Oliver Wolcott wrote to his father that there was "most
violent opposition from a certain party in most of our great towns, but in the southern states
the opposition is pretty general." Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Oliver Wolcott, Sr. (Aug. 10,
1795), in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN ADAMS, EDITED
FROM THE PAPERS OF OLIVER WOLCOTT, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 224 (G. Gibbs ed.
1846) [hereinafter cited as WOLCOTT PAPERS]. Washington apprehensively viewed the "extraordinary proceedings which have, and are about taking place, in the Northern parts of the
union; and may be expected in the Southern." Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of State (July 29, 1795), in 34 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 254, 254-55.
On the same day Washington wrote that "at present the cry against the Treaty is like that
against a mad-dog; and every one, in a manner, seems engaged in running it down." Letter
from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (July 29, 1795), in id. at 262, 262.
519. Republican denunciation of Jay's treaty is best shown by a small sampling: (1) A
Kentucky newspaper published a "review" of a new play, "the noted burlesque of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, featuring 'Mr. Envoy' and 'that much-despised song,' Give up All
for Nothing at all." South Carolina State Gazette (Nov. 11, 1795), quoted in D. STEWART,
supra note 483, at 220. (2) A Richmond treaty opponent referred to the treaty "'entered into
by that damned arch-traitor John Jay and the British tyrant."' D. STEWART, supra note 483,
at 216. (3) A sample stanza of anti-Jay poetry reads:
United to the British crown
By treaty firm and binding,
Republicans must knuckle down,
For now they're not worth minding.
Transported with the glorious thought,
Each tory then will sing,
"Your Freedom's sold-your country's bought!
Huzza for George our King".
Greenleaf's New York Journal, Aug. 29, 1795, quoted in D. STEWART, supra note 483, at
216-17.
(4) As a crowd hanged Jay in effigy, one American declared,
I think j-y's treaty is truly a farce,
Fit only to wipe the national _.
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towns throughout the country showed their disapproval.520 Partisan
maneuvering flourished in the Senate as the parties battled over the
Treaty's ratification. 21 Senator Aaron Burr proposed a resolution to
postpone consideration of the Treaty and to recommend to Washington that he reopen negotiations on several Treaty articles.522 Passage
of this resolution would have had a dramatic effect on subsequent
presidential treatymaking, since the defeat of the Treaty would
likely have convinced presidents of the need to consult with and get
the prior approval of the Senate before commencing negotiations. 23
The Federalist party's success in mustering just enough votes for
Senate consent 524 derailed any Senate assertion of its right to prior
consultation and served to establish the President's right to initiate
treatymaking without first consulting the Senate. Thus, out of a circumstance in which there was heated opposition in the country and
Richmond and Manchester Advertiser, July 30, 1795, quoted in D. STEWART, supra note 483,
at 220. For further examples of poetry and prose about the treaty, see D. STEWART, supra
note 483, at 216-21.
520. Inhabitants of towns across the country approved and forwarded resolutions to
Washington condemning the Treaty and calling on him to reject it. Washington responded to
some of these resolutions. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the Boston Selectmen
[July 28, 1795] (footnote omitted), in 34 WASMNGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 252.
However, some letters he found so objectionable that he did not answer them. For example, he
did not answer letters from Petersburg, Virginia ("Tenor indecent No answer returned"), Bordentown, New Jersey and its neighbors ("No answer given. The Address too rude to merit
one"), and Scott County, Kentucky ('The Ignorance and indecency of these proceedings forbad an answr (sic]"). 34 WASMNGTON WRIUNGS, supra note 15, at 253-54 n.66.
521. The Treaty even sparked a drive to amend the Constitution. Virginia proposed,
with Madison's approval, a series of constitutional amendments that would have made treaties
subject to a majority vote in the House, would have increased public control over the-Senate,
and would have prohibited a federal judge from holding any other federal appointments. South
Carolina, Kentucky, and Georgia joined Virginia in endorsing similar constitutional amendments but nine states rejected them. J. CoMas, supra note 31, at 172.
522. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 253. There was some precedent
for Burr's action, since the Senate had passed a similar resolution in 1793 when it recommended that Washington reopen negotiations over General Putnam's treaty with the Wabash
and Illinois Indians. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 78-79. While the Federalists might have
believed that Burr's resolution passed constitutional muster, they rejected the resolution because it would have destroyed the treaty. See Id. at 78-79.
523. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 79.
524. The Senate approved the treaty by a 20 to 10 vote, R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at
82-83, the bare two-thirds required by the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The
circumstances of the vote indicate that if the vote had occurred a few months earlier the treaty
might have gone to defeat. British Ambassador Hammond believed that it was fortunate that
the treaty deliberations were not started until June, because two Senators favorable to the
treaty were seated prior to the debate. J. CARROLL & M. ASHiWORTH, supra note 57, at 254
n.91. A Republican broadside described the treaty as an "imp of darkness, illegitimately begotten, [which] commanded but the bare constitutional number required for ratification." Philadelphia Aurora, June 26, 1795, quoted in D. STEWART, supra note 483, at 198.
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in which the President's Treaty got a bare two-thirds majority, was
born a radically different form of treatymaking from that envisioned
by the Framers.
The precise manner of ratification proved to be crucial to the
development of the modern concept of the Senate treaty role. The
Senate did not consent to the Treaty as negotiated, but instead conditioned its assent on the addition of a supplemental article suspending a portion of the Treaty that unduly restricted American
trade with the British West Indies. 525 By its action, the Senate established its right to reject specific provisions of treaties negotiated
without its prior consent. This conditional ratification presented
Washington with the question of whether the new Treaty article had
to be submitted for Senate confirmation. Washington asked his Cabinet to submit opinions on whether the Constitution permitted the
"President to ratify the Treaty, without submitting the new article,
after it shall be agreed to by the British King, to the Senate for their
further advice and consent? 5 6 The Cabinet members were in
agreement that there was no need to seek Senate approval for the
new twelfth article. 527 In contrast, Hamilton initially advised Wash528
ington that he felt that the revised article required Senate consent.
Ultimately, Washington decided to proclaim the Treaty without
seeking further consultation. 529 It is unclear whether political motive
or constitutional belief underlay the decision. Secretary of Treasury
Wolcott and Secretary of State Randolph expressed doctrinal justifications for refusing to submit the Treaty provision to Senate confir525. See R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 76 (quoting 1 SEN. EXEC. JOUR. 182). Further,
the Senate recommended that Washington reopen negotiations over the British West Indies
trade. Id. Hamilton had written to fellow Federalists recommending a conditional assent. Id.
at 75-76. Treaty proponents aligned with Hamilton were responsible for originating the plan to
vote a conditional consent to the treaty. See id. at 75.
526. Letter from George Washington to the Cabinet (June 29, 1795), in 34 WASHINGTON WRINGS, supra note 15, at 224-25 (emphasis in original). Washington took the phrasing
of the questions from a letter to him by Secretary of State Edmund Randolph. J. CARROLL &
M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 257.

527. According to Carroll and Ashworth, Secretary of Treasury Wolcott and Secretary
of War Pickering unequivocally declared that the President did not have to deliver the revised
clause to the Senate, while Randolph spoke in "slightly less positive" terms. J.CARROLL & M.
ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 257.
528. See R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 84. For evidence of Washington's uneasiness at
Hamilton's belief that the administration had to submit the renegotiated article to the Senate,
see Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (July 14, 1795), in 34 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 241-42.
529. R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 88. Washington proclaimed the treaty on February
29, 1796. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

85

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 11:413

mation. Wolcott declared that if the President decided to approve
the Treaty with the exceptions imposed by the Senate, he could ratify the Treaty without resubmitting for advice and consent "such
rescinding clauses or articles, as it may be necessary to introduce
into the treaty, for the mere purpose of giving effect to the concurrent decisions of the President and Senate." 530 According to one historian who is familiar with Randolph's writings, Randolph stated
that the President was responsible for the ratification of the Treaty
and that if he
should ratify the treaty without again consulting that body he
would be responsible for the accuracy with which its advice was
followed; that if he should ratify what had not been advised [,] the
treaty would not be the supreme law of the land, and that the
rights of the Senate would for this very reason be safeguarded. 31
Notwithstanding possible constitutional considerations, the Cabinet likely was influenced by a fear that the Senate might defeat the
Treaty if Washington submitted the provision for Senate confirmation, instead of just proclaiming the Treaty to be ratified. 532 The
Cabinet's justification of Washington's course of action must be
viewed with skepticism. Wolcott's reasoning would enable the President, by claiming to give "effect to the concurrent decisions of the
President and Senate, ' 53 3 to ratify a treaty which on the whole may
not be acceptable to the Senate. The Senate could make known its
anger at the President's unilateral action by repudiating the Treaty,
but this repudiation would have significant international repercussions. Randolph's view that a provision contrary to what was advised
would not be law leaves the Senate in a similar quandary: The Senate could deny that the treaty was a law but this would risk possible
negative consequences involving the conduct of American foreign relations. Washington's action can be viewed as a purposeful rejection
530.
PAPERS,

Letter from Oliver Wolcott to George Washington (June 30, 1795), in 1 WOLCOTT

supra note 518, at 204, 205.

531. S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 80 (1916) (footnote
omitted).
532. Treaty opponents like former Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson hoped that
Washington would submit the treaty. Jefferson wrote Virginia Senator Henry Tazewell that he
was "not without hopes that the operations on the 12th article may render a recurrence to the
Senate yet necessary, and so give to the majority an opportunity of correcting the error into
which their exclusion of public light has led them." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry
Tazewell (Sept. 13, 1795), in 8 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 190, 191.
533. Letter from Oliver Wolcott to George Washington (June 30, 1795), in I WoLcorr
PAPERS, supra note 518, at 204-05.
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of the Constitution, since Washington intentionally decided not to
seek Senate advice on a treaty provision.534
B.

The House and the Jay Treaty

The House effectively could have destroyed the Jay Treaty by
refusing to vote appropriations to effectuate its specific provisions.
House debate on the Jay Treaty focused on the House's right to request documents related to the negotiations, and ultimately to prevent implementation of the Treaty. Congressman Edward Livingston
of New York introduced a resolution 535 that served as the focal point
for much House debate regarding the nature of treaty power and the
House's authority over treaties. 536 Livingston prefaced the introduction of his resolution by declaring that the House should have all the
documents that potentially could shed light on the "important Constitutional questions" that the House would address in its Jay Treaty
debate. 37 He proposed the following resolution:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to
lay before this House a copy of the instructions given to the Minister of the United States who negotiated the Treaty with Great
Britain, communicated by his Message on the first instant, together
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said
Treaty 53 -- excepting such of said papers 53as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed. 9
It is clear from statements made at the time that the American leaders understood the constitutional significance of the House attempt
to seek documents about and ultimately to pass judgment on the
534. But see R. HAYDEN, supra note 275, at 88 (Hayden notes that American politiclans of the time seem not to have questioned the constitutionality of Washington's action).
Washington's decision not to resubmit the treaty for Senate approval set a precedent that had
been uniformly followed prior to the publication of Hayden's work (1920) in cases where the
Senate had given a conditional assent. Id. at 85.
535.

4 ANNALS OF CONG. 400-01 (1796).

536. See J. COMBs, supra note 31, at 175-76.
537. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 400 (1796).
538. Id. at 400-01.
539. Id. at 424. Livingston amended his resolution by adding this section because "gentlemen for whose opinion he had a high respect" advised the addition in order to forestall
possible embarrassment to Washington concerning ongoing negotiations. Id. The suggestion to
amend the resolution has been attributed to James Madison. J. CoMBs, supra note 31, at 175.
Combs notes that Madison "tried to soften the resolution even further by leaving the choice of
the papers entirely to the discretion of the president," but the House defeated his proposed
amendment. Id. at 175-76.
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Treaty.54 0

Critics of the Resolution refuted Livingston's notion that the
House could request official documents relating to treaty negotiations, 5 " and strenuously objected to the House meddling with the
treaty power.54 2 They emphatically denied the House's right to de5 3
termine whether the President should renegotiate the Jay Treaty 4
or even to "investigate the merits of the Treaty. ' 544 According to
Representative William Smith of South Carolina, 54 5 the House had
"no agency in [treaties], except to make laws necessary to carry
them into operation." 54' Both he and Alexander Hamilton felt that
the Constitution obligated the House to implement ratified treaties.
In a draft proposed by Hamilton for Washington's message to Congress in response to Livingston's Resolution, Hamilton declared that
the House had
no moral power to refuse the execution of a treaty, which is not
contrary to the constitution,. . . and have no legal power to refuse
its execution because it is a law-until at least it ceases to be a law
540. Washington deplored the House action, which he believed brought the Constitution
to the "brink of a precipice," Letter from George Washington to Charles Carroll (May 1,
1796), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 29, 30, and denounced the House for
"striking at once, and boldly too, at the fundamental principles of the Constitution." Letter
from George Washington to Edward Carrington (May 1, 1796), in id. at 31, 32. Washington
felt so strongly about the House resolution because he believed that the House desired to
"render the Treaty making Power not only a nullity, but such an absolute absurdity as to
reflect disgrace on the framers of it." Id. at 32. Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts considered the Livingston Resolution "in principle, and in its consequences, as the
most important question which had ever been debated in [the] House." 4 ANNALS OF CONG.
514 (1796). For a discussion of Jefferson's view of the issue, see infra note 562.
541. Representative William Smith of South Carolina expressed this point in a most
vivid manner. He declared that the "House had no more right to send to the President for the
papers in question, than the printer of a newspaper had; he might communicate them to either
voluntarily, but neither had a right to demand them." 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 444 (1796).
542. See id. at 440 (speech by William Smith). Washington said that the real dispute
was "whether there should be a Treaty at all without the concurrence of the House of Representatives." Letter from George Washington to Edward Carrington (May 1, 1796), in 35
WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 29, 32 (emphasis in original). Former constitutional delegate and Constitution signer, Oliver Ellsworth, who at the time of the House debate
was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, privately advised Washington that Livingston's
presumption to participate in treatymaking was "as unwarranted as it [was] dangerous." Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull (Mar. 13, 1796), quoted in J. CARROLL & M.
ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 349.
543. E.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (1796) (speech of Representative William Smith).
544. Id. at 439.
545. For a biography of Smith, see G. RoGaEs, EvoLuTION OF A FEDERALIST: WILLIAM
LOUGHTON SMITH OF CHARLESTON (1758-1812) (1962).

546. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1796) (speech of Representative William Smith).
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by a regular act of revocation of the competent authority."

7

Smith asserted that the House had no constitutional prerogative to
judge the propriety of implementing a treaty, and that the Constitution obligated the House to execute a treaty."8 According to Smith,
only in the exceptional case where an "instrument was clearly unconstitutional" could the House refuse to execute a treaty." 9
In a letter to Rufus King, Hamilton posited thirteen points in
support of his conclusion that Washington should resist House
"usurpation" of treaty authority. 55 0 Hamilton distinguished legislative enactments from treaties: "The Treaty Power binds the will of
the nation, [and] must within its constitutional limits be paramount
to the Legislative Power, which is that will; or, at least, the last law
being a Treaty must repeal an antecedent contradictory law. ' 55 1 He
pronounced his belief that if the legislature could repeal a treaty it
had to be done by legislative enactment and not by one branch refusing to follow the law.552 Finally, Hamilton stated that if any other
interpretation of the House's powers was permitted the House would
exercise a treaty power that the Constitution clearly forestalled. 553
547. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796) (enclosure), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 85, 98.
548. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1796). Former Virginia Senator John Taylor, who had
opposed Jay's nomination as envoy, believed that "the House should have executed [the
Treaty] 'with groans and execrations,' on the ground that they could not constitutionally refuse." H. SiMMs, LiFE OF JOHN TAYLOR 63 (1932) (quoting letter from John Taylor to Senator Henry Tazewell). Taylor would then have used this result as a basis for a campaign to
amend the Constitution and check the Federalist system. Id.
549. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1796). The issue of whether the House had a duty to
implement treaties was sharply presented during Washington administration discussions about
whether to ransom from Algiers those American seamen captured by the Barbary Pirates.
Jefferson felt that a treaty would obligate the House to supply the funds, but he believed that
the House might ignore its duty. He did note, however, that it was possible to conceive of
treaties that the House would not be obligated to implement. THE ANAs, supra note 334, at
73. Jefferson had noted earlier in The Anas that the House had a right to expect to be consulted when a treaty called for the legislature to provide funding, id. at 63, and he indicated
that "it would be prudent to consult them previously," when a treaty required implementing
legislation. Id. at 73. He advised against Washington committing himself to the treaty when
he might be put in a most embarrassing situation if the House refused to execute the treaty.
Id.
550. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (Mar. 16, 1796), in 2 KING CORRESPONDENCE,

supra note 487, at 56, 57-58.

551. Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
552. Id.
553. See id. at 57. Similarly, Washington opined: "[F]or will any dne suppose, that they
who framed, or those who adopted that Instrument, ever intended to give the power to the
President and Senate to make Treaties (and declaring that when made and ratified, they
should be the Supreme law of the land) wd. in the same breath place it in the powers of the
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Besides having constitutional reservations about the Livingston
Resolution and the House attempt to involve itself in treatymaking,
opponents of the Resolution feared that the Resolution could adversely affect the practice of diplomacy. Critics of the Resolution
admonished their colleagues of the disastrous impact that a House
refusal to implement the treaty could have on the conduct of foreign
relations. Congressmen like Fisher Ames expressed concern over the
55 4
diplomatic repercussions of repudiating a good faith agreement.
As a constituent of Theodore Sedgwick rightly warned, countries
would be unwilling to make treaties with the United States if the
House could nullify them by refusing to execute them. 555 Alexander
Hamilton noted that a House decision not to implement the treaty
would cause "extreme embarrassment in proceeding in any pending
or future negotiation which the affairs of the U. States may require,
inasmuch as [the President] cannot look for due confidence from
others, nor give them the requisite expectation that stipulations will
be fulfilled on our part." 558 Finally, the Resolution opponents voiced
their disapproval because they perceived a need for secrecy in diplomatic transactions, and because they feared that House treaty involvement could result in the publication of matters at great inconve57
nience to the United States and Great Britain.
Supporters of the Livingston Resolution and the House's right
to make an independent determination on any expenditure by the
government advanced a series of arguments to counter the Federalist
orators.5 58 Emphasizing the constitutional underpinnings of their
viewpoint, 559 they stressed the responsibilities of the House and the
house of Representatives to fix their Veto on them?" Letter from George Washington to Edward Carrington (May 1, 1796), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 29, 32.
554. See J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 371-72.

555. Id. at 349.
556. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King (Apr. 15, 1796), reprinted in 2
KING CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 487, at 59. But see Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary
Practice,reprinted In S. Doc. No. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 435 (1971). Jefferson declares that
"as the negotiations are carried on by the Executive alone, the subjecting to the ratification of

the Representatives such articles as are within their participation is no more inconvenient than
to the Senate." Id. at 517-18.
557.
558.

See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 441-42 (1796) (speech by Smith).
Some Republicans did begin "to express doubts as to the constitutionality of the

House of Representatives mixing in the treaty-making province of the president and the Senate," J. CoMBs, supra note 31, at 173 (Combs draws his conclusion from a letter written by
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson on December 13, 1795).

559. For example, Representative William Giles of Virginia based one of his arguments
on the system of checks and balances, admonishing his fellow legislators that "a despotism of
the worst kind" would result if the House could not check treatymaking. See J. CARROLL &
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limits of treatymaking. Some House members argued that treaties
could only regulate areas that could not be properly governed by legislation.56 0 Some claimed that treaties could not concern matters delegated by the Constitution to the Congress since such treaty subject
matter would exclude the House from exercising its rightful legislative role.561 At the heart of the position taken by the Livingston Resolution supporters was the belief that treaty power could not override
the House's right to act on all matters within its constitutional
power.582 This belief resulted in the passage of a House Resolution
which said that in instances where a treaty called for congressional
enactment, the House had a constitutional right "to deliberate on '5the
6
expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect."

3

As was his usual practice on important matters, Washington
consulted his Cabinet and his confidant, Hamilton, before determinM. AsHwoRTH, supra note 57, at 351 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 502-14 (1796)). Giles
deplored the fact that treatymaking would be "undefined in its nature, unlimited in its extent
and paramount in its authority" if the House could not check the Senate by making its own
determination whenever a treaty required implementing legislation. See id. at 351 n.64 (quoting Letter from William Giles to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 26, 1796)). Representative Gallatin
took pains to note that Livingston's requests derived from "the very letter of the Constitution."
Id. at 353 (footnote omitted).
560. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 148. Jefferson made this point in his Manual of
ParliamentaryPractice, supra note 556, at 517. He stated that "[b]y the general power to
make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those subjects which
are usually regulated by treaty, and can not be otherwise regulated." Id.
561. L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 148. For Jefferson's view on this point, see his Manual of ParliamentaryPractice, supra note 556, at 517. Jefferson declared that the Constitution must have intended "to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a participation
to the House of Representatives." Id. Jefferson noted that "It]his last exception is denied by
some on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The
less the better, say others." Id. Henkin notes that Jefferson's treaty analysis has been totally
rejected but that in many other respects the manual "is still recognized as authoritative and
underlies the current rules of both Houses of Congress." L. HENKIN, supra note 143, at 142.
For a discussion of Jefferson's points on the limits of treatymaking, see id. at 142-56. Hamilton, in his proposed draft of a presidential message in response to the House request, effectively counters Jefferson's point: "Because unless the Power of Treaty can embrace objects
upon which the legislative power may also act, it is essentially nugatory-often inadequate to
mere treaties of Peace-always inadequate to Treaties of Alliance or Commerce." Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 29, 1796), (enclosure), in 20 HAmLTON
PAPERs, supra note 345, at 91-92.
562. See A. SOFAER, supra note 55, at 98. Jefferson set forth most vividly the Republican view concerning the control of treatymaking. He said that "[o]n the precedent now to be
set will depend the future construction of our constitution, and whether the powers of legislation shall be transferred from the P. Senate & H. of R. to the P. Senate & Piarningo or any
other Indian, Algerine or other chief." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar.
21, 1796), in 8 JEFFERSON WORKS, supra note 330, at 229, 230.
563. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (Apr. 1796, Resolution by Representative Thomas
Blount). For the vote on the resolution, see id. at 782-83.
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ing how to respond to the House request for documents relating to
the Jay Treaty negotiations. Washington inquired whether they believed that the House had a constitutional right to call for the diplomatic correspondence and, if they did not, whether he should furnish
the documents anyway. 64 The Cabinet was unanimous in its belief
that the Constitution did not authorize the House to request such
documents. 6 5 Hamilton reached the same conclusion, and urged the
President to refuse the House request.56 6 A few days after the Cabinet submitted their opinions to Washington, he wrote Hamilton:
From the first moment, and from the fullest conviction in my own
mind, I had resolved to resist the principle [which] was evidently
intended to be established by the call of the House of Representatives; and only deliberated on the manner,
in which this could be
5 67
done, with the least bad consequences.

In a message to the House on March 30, 1796, Washington rejected
the House request. 6 6
Washington stressed that treaty power rested exclusively with
564. Letter from George Washington to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and the
Attorney General (Mar. 25, 1796), in 34 WASmNGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 505.
Before reaching a final decision on the matter, Washington asked two members of the Cabinet
to examine the Journal of the House to see whether he had inadvertently provided some precedent for the House treaty request. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 354.
565. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 354. Attorney General Charles
Lee felt that Washington should accomodate the House by transmitting the Jay papers to it,
even though he believed that the House had no constitutional right to demand these documents. Id. Secretaries Wolcott and McHenry voiced strong objections to giving into the House
demand. Id.
566. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Mar. 28, 1796) (footnote omitted), in 20 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 345, at 83, 83-85. For Hamilton's reasons
for concluding that Washington should not furnish the House with any of the Treaty documents, see supra text accompanying notes 550-53.
567. Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 31, 1796), in 35
WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 6 (emphasis in original). Washington did consider
submitting some of the papers with a "pointed protest" because of "the peculiar circumstances
of this case." Id. at 7. He felt that "fi]t merited consideration, if the principle [that the House
had no right to interfere with treaties] could be saved, whether facility in the provisions might
not result from a compliance." Id. Washington decided against furnishing any of the documents to the House. He stated his reasons:
An attentive examination however of the Papers and the subject, soon convinced me
that to furnish all the Papers would be highly improper; and that a partial deliver
of them would leave the door open for as much calumny as the entire refusal, perhaps more so, as it might, and I have no doubt would be said, that all such as were
essential to the purposes of the House, were withheld.
Id.
568. See Message from George Washington to the House of Representatives (Mar. 30,
1796), in Id. at 2.
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the Senate and the President, and that treaties were the law of the
land.5 9 In turning down the House request, Washington declared
that it was essential to the well-being of the government to maintain
constitutional boundaries, such as those involving treaty power.570 In

addition to advancing constitutional motivations for his determination, Washington noted that disclosure of the details of negotiations
to the House "would be extremely impolitic: for this might have a
pernicious influence on future negotiations." 57 1 Thus, Washington
declared that separation of powers and the difficulties that would result in negotiations precluded him from acceding to the House
demands.
Washington's refusal to furnish the Treaty documents to the
House left unresolved the question of whether the House would vote
the funds required to implement the Treaty. Fearing that the House
might refuse to execute the Treaty, some Federalist representatives
572
considered political maneuvers to garner the necessary votes.

It

took the vote of the chairman of the committee of the whole House
called to debate the Treaty to break a 49 to 49 deadlock and save
the Treaty appropriation from being killed in committee.57 3 By the
569. Id. at 3.
570. Id. at 5. Washington made special note of the fact that the Constitutional Convention had considered and rejected House involvement with treaties when it defeated a proposed
constitutional provision "that no Treaty should be binding on the United States which was not
ratified by a Law." Id. For Madison's opinion of the speech, see James Madison in the House
of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796) (footnote omitted), reprintedin 3 Farrand, REcoRDs, supra
note 4, at 372, 372-75.
571. Message from George Washington to the House of Representatives (Mar. 30,
1796), in 35 WASMNGTON WRITNGS, supra note 15, at 2.
572. Representative Theodore Sedgwick attempted to tie together the vote on the implementation of the Jay Treaty with the votes on the implementation of popular treaties with
Spain and Algiers. J. Co.BS, supra note 31, at 180. The Senate considered refusing appropriations for these treaties until the House passed the funding for the Jay Treaty. Federalist Representative Chauncy Goodrich even expected the Senate to delay other bills and disrupt the
operation of the government until the House gave in. Id. at 181. Alexander Hamilton opposed
moves to bind funding of the two popular treaties to the passage of Jay Treaty funding, stating: "But this will be altogether wrong & impolitic. The misconduct of the other party cannot
justify in us an imitation of their principles." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King
(Apr. 15, 1796), reprintedin 2 KING CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 487, at 59, 60. Hamilton
added that he thought it best not to encumber the other treaties, and that "if a feint of opposition is deemed adviseable, it ought to be left to the Senate by postponement &c. But even this
is very delicate and very questionable." Id. at 60.
573. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1280 (1796). It is stated that, considering the absent members, a majority of the House opposed implementing the treaty. House Speaker, Frederick
Muhlenberg, spurned his Republican allies by casting the deciding vote in favor of the Treaty.
See J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supranote 57, at 375. The personal history of Muhlenberg
evidences the intensity of feelings regarding the treaty. The Federalist father of the girl Muh-
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narrowest of margins, the House voted to implement the Treaty; but
the actions of the deeply divided body left open the question of
whether the House had the right to refuse to enact legislation needed
to implement a Treaty.5 74
IX.

THE FAREWELL ADDRESS

Washington's Farewell Address 575 is the final significant
landmark in the growth of presidential foreign policy power to come
out of the Washington years. In one part of the Address, Washington offered his sentiments about the best course for the nation to
follow in its foreign relations. Washington's admonishment to his fellow citizens about the virtue of steering "clear of permanent Alliances" is so well known that it need not be quoted here.57 6 The Farewell Address had such a profound impact because, as one scholar
has noted, "[iut was the first statement, comprehensive and authoritative at the same time, of the principles of American foreign policy. ' 57 7 The Address proved to be an important milestone in the
growth of presidential power, since it enhanced the President's position as the American foreign policy spokesman.57 8 From the beginning of his administration and culminating in the Farewell Address,
Washington undertook to develop and pronounce American policy in
the foreign relation sphere.
X.

WASHINGTON IN PERSPECTIVE

American leaders in the early years of the Republic proved to
be acutely aware of the importance of the precedents that their aclenberg's son was courting had delivered an ultimatum to Muhlenberg that he would not permit a marriage if Muhlenberg voted against the Treaty. J. COMBS, supra note 31, at 184.
After his vote, Muhlenberg suffered defeat in his bid for reelection to the House and saw his
political career abruptly end. J. CARROLL & M. ASHWORTH, supra note 57, at 375 & n.251.
574. Louis Henkin notes that although Congress has asserted the right to refuse to implement treaties, it has not failed to carry out American treaty obligations. L. HENKIN, supra
note 143, at 162. The final vote was 51 to 48 in favor of the appropriation. 4 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1291 (1796).

575. Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) (footnote omitted), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITsupra note 15, at 214. For studies of the formulation of the address and of attribution of
authorship, see H. BINNEY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE FORMATION OF WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL
ADDRESS (1859 & photo. reprint 1969); V. PALTSITS, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS
(1935 & photo. reprint 1971).
576. Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15,
at 234. See generally id. at 231-36.
577. F. GILBERT, supra note 33, at 135.
578. 1 W. GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 427 (1974).
INGS,
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tions would create. Washington, for example, stated on May 10,
1789: "Many things which appear of little importance in themselves

and at the beginning, may have great and durable consequences
from their having been established at the commencement of a new
general government. 57 9
Although most Americans trusted Washington, some worried

about the precedents that Washington would set. 580 Also, there was
some concern about how his successors would act once those prece-

dents were firmly in place.5 81 In evaluating the precedents of the
Washington administration, one must not lose sight of the special
circumstances that shaped his presidency. Washington had not desired the presidency 582 which was thrust upon him by a nation that
clamored for him to become its president.5 83 This reluctance gave

credence to those who claimed that Washington had the country's
interest solely in mind and had no wish to expand his authority.

Washington had such strong popular appeal that he was able to garner a unanimous vote in the electoral college.58 Even after four
years as president and during a time when partisan politics began to
579. Queries on a Line of Conduct to be Pursued by the President (May 10, 1789), in
30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 319, 321.

580. Senator Maclay said about Washington: "He ...is but a man, but a really good
one, and we can have nothing to fear from him, but much from the precedents which he may
establish." G. HAYNES, supra note 285, at 40.
581. See J. CARROLL & M. ASHwORTH, supra note 57, at 366. Representative Ruther-

ford of Virginia stated:
To tell the people that a Washington presides, and therefore all must be right, is
feeble language .... Though we all concur respecting that honest man, we know at
the same time that he. . .must ere long yield to an immutable clause in the universal law. And have this people any security for the upright actings and doings of
his successor, perhaps a mere Nero, though he has been an Octavius, an Alfred?
Id. (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1116-20 (1796)).
582. Washington said about his presumed selection by the electors: "[I]f I should receive the appointment and if I should be prevailed upon to accept it, the acceptance would be
attended with more diffidence and reluctance that I ever experienced before in my life." Letter
from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 3, 1788), in 30 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 109, 111. For a discussion of Washington's reluctance to accept the
presidency and his reasons for hesitating, see 6 D. FREEMAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON 147-50,
153-54 (1954).
583. Friends such as Lafayette and Hamilton called on Washington to accept the presidency. See D. FREEMAN, supra note 582, at 146, 147-48. Douglas Southall Freeman notes that
the July 4, 1788 celebration "became in large part a general call for the election of Washington as President." Id. at 146. Jefferson wrote to a correspondent: "I presume there will not be
a vote against him in the U.S." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael (Aug.
12, 1788), in 13 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 318, at 502, 502.
584. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY: BICENTENNIAL EDITION, supra note 486,
at 145.
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flourish, Washington still commanded almost total support in the
electoral college.58 5 Still, the electoral figures do not give a complete
picture of Washington's popularity. The country idolized their President; 8 the people showered him with affection as he journeyed to
New York for his inaugeration.5 7 Masses of people thronged the inaugural route to see and pay
homage to the man they viewed as the
8

"Father of his Country.

58

Washington had a special relationship with the Congress which
is worthy of attention. While modern day presidents have flaunted

the president's foreign policy powers, Washington, particularly in the
early years of his administration, showed much deference to the
Congress and hesitated before overstepping his authority.5 8 9 Besides
585. Washington received 132 electoral votes and there were three abstentions. The
party split is exemplified by the vice-presidential contest, where Federalist John Adams was
reelected with 77 votes and anti-Federalist George Clinton garnered 50 votes. Id. at 149.
586. Washington's reception as he passed through Trenton on his way to the inauguration is quite revealing about popular opinion of Washington. Girls in white dresses and prominent Trenton matrons lined his route and sang an ode to Washington:
Welcome, mighty Chiefi once more
Welcome to this grateful shore!
Now no mercenary foe
Aims again the fatal blowAims at thee the fatal blow.
Virgins fair, and Matrons grave,
Those thy conquering arms did save,
Build for thee triumphant bowers
Strew, ye fair, his way with flowersStrew your Hero's way with flowers.
W. STRYKER, WASHINGTON'S RECEPTION BY THE PEOPLE OF NEw JERSEY IN 1789, at 7,
quoted in D. FREEMAN, supra note 582, at 175-76 (footnote omitted). The French Minister in
the United States, who was present at Washington's inauguration, wrote to his government
that "never has [a] sovereign reigned more completely in the hearts of his subjects than did
Washington in those of his fellow-citizens. . . . He has the soul, look and figure of a hero
united in him." Letter from Moustier to the Comte de Montmorin (June 5, 1789), quoted in
D. FREEMAN, supra note 582, at 195 (footnote omitted).
587. See generally D. FREEMAN, supra note 582, at 167-84.
588. See Id. at 183.
589. Id. at 280. Washington's deferential manner is exemplified by his message informing the Congress of his neutrality proclamation. See supra text accompanying note 420. For
Washington's views on the expansion of executive power, see Letter from George Washington
to the Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1794), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15,
at 420, 422. Washington stated:
The powers of the Executive of the U. States are more definite, and better understood perhaps than those of almost any other Country; and my aim has been, and
will continue to be, neither to stretch, nor relax from them in any instance whatever,
unless imperious circumstances shd. render the measure indispensible.
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acting in a deferential manner, Washington refrained from involving
himself in the legislative disputes of the early years of the new government.5 90 Throughout his tenure Washington attempted to project
an image of being above party squabble.5 91 There can be no doubt
that Washington's image and his immense popularity contributed to
the Congress' acquiescence to the President's increasing control of
American foreign policy. Senator Maclay, 592 in a manner of expression extreme even for him, illustrates a crucial point about the
Washington administration. Maclay declared:
Republicans are borne down by fashion and a fear of being
charged with a want of respect to General Washington. If there is
treason in the wish I retract it, but would to God this same General
Washington were in heaven! We would not then have him brought
forward as the constant cover to every unconstitutional and irrepublican act.59 3

It is clear, as Maclay states, that the special relationship Washington had with his countrymen greatly tempered criticism of Washington 594 and enabled him to exercise authority in a manner that would
have been condemned if another man had acted in such a fashion.
XI.

CONCLUSION

No matter what the Framers had intended concerning the distribution of foreign policy authority, by the end of the Washington
administration the President had come to dominate foreign policy
making. Although the Framers desired a significant congressional
role 59 5 and early precedents reflected the prominent Senate treaty
role envisioned by the Framers, 598 in the early years of the Republic
there was a gradual evolution of a prominent presidential foreign
Id.
590. See id. at 280.
591. This image is highlighted by Washington's cautioning his fellow citizens in his
Farewell Address about the "mischiefs of the spirit of Party." Farewell Address (Sept. 19,
1796), in 35 WASHINGTON WRITINGS, supra note 15, at 227. See generally id. at 226-28.
592. See supra notes 293-94, 328.
593.

THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, supra note 293, at xi.

594. Washington was not immune however to criticism. The neutrality measures and the
Jay Treaty sparked numerous writers to heap abuse on Washington. See D. STEWART, supra
note 483, at 147-48, 225-26. A pamphlet that Washington found especially galling was titled
"the funeral of George W._n, and James Wilson, King and Judge, &c., where the President
was placed on a guillotine." THE ANAS, supra note 334, at 159.
595. See supra text accompanying notes 175-97.
596. See supra notes 284-87, 306-10, 315 and accompanying text.
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policy role.59 Washington's exercise of authority over American
neutrality in 179358 and over the Jay mission 599 resulted in presidential control over decisionmaking regarding external affairs.
It is impossible to be certain about the true intentions of the
Framers on any particular issue. 00 But the historical background of
the Convention,601 the debates in the Convention, 0 2 and the statements of prominent American leaders provide guidance concerning
the proper interpretation of the Constitution's distribution of foreign
policy authority. These sources indicate that the Framers shared
both an awareness of the problems that confronted the country during the Confederation period and a common world view. Influential
American leaders recognized the flaws of the Articles of Confederation and realized that the weakness of the Confederation government
greatly hindered American diplomatic efforts.60 3 Perception of these
flaws prompted many prominent American figures to see604the need
for a convention to amend the Articles of Confederation.
While the delegates elected to this Convention recognized the
need for an overhaul of the Articles and for a drastic increase in the
power of the federal government, they worried about the risks to liberty that a strong government would pose.605 Americans at the time
of the Convention generally distrusted human nature and believed
that men always sought greater power. 06 Derived from this view of
humanity was the Framers' trepidation over the possibility that the
executive or legislative branches might foster a tyranny. Due to their
awareness of both the need for and the dangers of a strong central
government, the Framers were determined to incorporate a system of
checks 607 into the Constitution to forestall any branch from exceeding its powers.
Despite the fact that the delegates engaged in an exceedingly
small number of debates on the distribution of authority over the
military and foreign relations,608 the Convention proceedings provide
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 311-14, 316, 320-23.
supra notes 329-422 and accompanying text.
supra notes 480-517 and accompanying text.
supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
supra notes 80-164 and accompanying text.
supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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some clues about the Framers' intent regarding the allocation of
these powers. Early debates in the Convention demonstrate a great
mistrust of the executive and a strong desire on the part of most of
the delegates to constrain the executive in external matters.609 The
initial draft debated by the delegates evinces the delegates' desire to
create a system of checks and to insure congressional control of foreign relations. The Committee of Detail, which prepared the first
working draft of a constitution, delegated the crucial aspects of foreign affairs-war power, commerce power, treaty power and control
over the high seas and the law of nations-to the legislative
branch. 610 The fact that the same Committee also originated the executive clause61 shows that the men responsible for the executive
clause did not equate it with any substantive foreign policy power.
Regarding treaty power, it was not until two weeks before the end of
the Convention that the delegates changed the mode of treatymaking
from a purely senatorial function to one that mixed presidential and
Senate authority. 12 The debates indicate that dissatisfaction with
the exclusive Senate role and realization of the need for executive
negotiating underlay the acceptance of the treaty scheme. 13
The final text of the Constitution points to a dominant congressional role in foreign policy. It provides for congressional control over
foreign commerce, the declaration of war, letters of marque and reprisal, the raising of armed forces, rules concerning the law of nations and the high seas, and state involvement with foreign countries.6 4 In addition, it calls for a joint Senate-presidential treaty
role.611 In stark contrast, the president was limited to his treaty role,
the role of commander-in-chief and the power to receive
ambassadors. 16
Thus, the distribution of power shows clearly that the Framers
intended the Congress to predominate in foreign policy. Not only did
they delegate almost the entire scope of foreign relations power to
Congress, but they provided safeguards against the limited powers
given to the President. The Framers desired the President to be commander-in-chief because they felt it was vital to have a unified mili609.

See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.

610. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
611.

See supra text accompanying note 112.

612. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
613.
614.
615.
616.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 175-80.
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 191-93.
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tary command. Nevertheless, they feared presidential exercise of war
power and, therefore, delegated control of the raising of armed
forces and control over any outbreak of hostilities to the Congress.
They envisioned a commander who would direct the troops only after
the Congress had declared war or had instigated military action
short of war by issuing letters of marque and reprisal. 617 Regarding
treaty power, the Framers restricted the President by requiring Senate advice and consent. By using the term advice and consent, with
its historical connotations implying significant parliamentary input
into policymaking, the delegates selected phrasing suggestive of a
critical Senate treaty role. 1 8 The remaining presidential power, that
of receiving ambassadors, was viewed at the time to be purely a ceremonial function. 61 9 The delegates thus provided for a dominant congressional role and carefully guarded against the President's abuse of
his power.
Notwithstanding this constitutionally ordained congressional
pre-eminence in foreign policy matters, presidents from the early
days of the Washington administration to the present day have controlled American relations with other countries. Initially, Washington showed great deference towards the Congress and shied away
from exceeding his constitutional powers. Still, early in his administration, Washington established precedents, involving executive
agreements 620 and the sending of executive agents abroad, 621 that
would come to have much historical importance. The sending of the
executive agents was especially important because by this act Washington made a major policy decision without consulting the Senate. 22 Probably because of their understanding of Washington's reasons for sending an executive agent, the senators, with the exception
of Maclay, do not seem to have voiced any criticism of Washington's
delaying for months before telling the Senate of the missions. 23 The
legislature's recognition of the need on occasion for informal and secret diplomatic missions, as evidenced by congressional legislation
617. For a discussion of the commander-in-chief clause, see supra notes 198-222 and
accompanying text.
618. For a discussion of the treaty clause, see supra notes 250-77 and accompanying
text.
619. See supra text accompanying notes 452-54.
620. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
621. See supra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
622. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
623. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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funding American diplomats, 2 ' also likely influenced congressional
acquiescence in the unauthorized missions. The resulting precedent
enabled presidents to send informal messengers even though the
Constitution did not address this power.
Early attempts at treatymaking caused a change in the system
of advice and consent. As the background of the famed first attempt
at prior consultation indicates, Washington desired leeway to choose
the best means of consultation, but envisioned face-to-face consultation with the Senate prior to most negotiations. 2 5 The experience of
in-person consultation proved so unpleasant to Washington and the
Senate, however, that Washington never tried it again. Nevertheless,
Washington continued to seek prior Senate advice by submitting
written questions to it, and the Senate exercised an important treaty
role in the years following the first treaty consultation.626
One historian has stated that "[t]he Washington administration
made its most significant contribution to the growth of presidential
power by its clear and uncompromising assumption of responsibilities
not clearly and precisely outlined in the Constitution. 627 Washington's proclamation of an impartial stance regarding the European
hostilities6 28 was just such an assumption of responsibility in a circumstance where it was not clear which branch had the right to issue such a proclamation. In two momentous foreign policy moves,
the enforcement of neutrality6 29 and the sending of Jay as a special
envoy, 630 Washington totally ignored constitutional mandates. Washington enforced the neutrality that he had unilaterally proclaimed,
and he even issued a code of rules to port collectors about how to
enforce the neutrality." 1 By enforcing his own proclamation and by
making rules to govern the neutrality, Washington acted in both legislative and executive capacities. In addition, Washington promulgated a series of rules regulating captures at sea,632 thereby exceeding his authority since the Constitution delegated to the Congress
the authority to make rules concerning captures at sea, to define and
punish felonies committed on the high seas, and to define offenses
624. See supra text accompanying notes 324-28.

625. See supra text accompanying notes 284-87.
626. See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.

627. W. GoDsmiTH, supra note 578, at 427.
628. See supra text accompanying notes 337-39.
629. See supra notes 366-412 and accompanying text.

630. See supra notes 490-517 and accompanying text.
631.

See supra text accompanying notes 368-70.

632. See supra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

101

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:'413

against the law of nations. 33 Further, Washington placed the Congress in an awkward position by informing the French and British
ambassadors that, in his opinion, it was incumbent on the United
States to compensate, in certain instances, parties who lost their
ships because of hostilities committed in contravention of American
law. Washington created a dilemma for congressmen who were
forced to choose between abandoning their position or risking damage to Washington's and to the nation's prestige. 3 Finally, Washington even acted in a judicial capacity by making determinations in
cases involving prize disputes where the parties could not agree on a
panel of arbitrators to determine the ship's rightful owner. 635

Due to the American government's need to take immediate action to prevent its citizens from engaging in the European hostilities
and possibly drawing the United States into the conflict, Washington
was justified in quickly issuing a neutrality proclamation. There was
no such urgent need, however, for implementation of enforcement
measures. Washington could have convened the Congress to deal
with neutrality measures, but he decided against doing so because he
feared public and congressional sympathy toward the French
cause. 36 Probably because it recognized the need for neutrality and
expected that Washington would act in the nation's best interest, the
Congress did not criticize Washington for not convening it to address
neutrality questions. Even if one concedes the wisdom of Washington's neutrality measures, one cannot ignore his blatant usurpation
of congressional power. The critical circumstances facing the nation
and his special relationship with his countrymen allowed Washington
to exercise great power; these factors call for restraint in using his
action as a precedent. 37 Although Washington's moves succeeded, it
would be unwise to risk allowing another president to exercise such
extensive powers while ignoring the authority of Congress and the
wishes of the country at large.
Regarding the circumstances surrounding the Jay mission, it is
clear that Washington ignored any constitutional problems and decided that the risk of war with Great Britain necessitated his sending
Jay without seeking prior congressional approval of Jay's instruc633. See supra text accompanying notes 378-79.
634.
635.
636.
637.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 371-77 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 394-95.
supra text accompanying notes 403-07.
generally supra notes 580-94 and accompanying text.
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tions6 3 8 Washington's early forays into treatymaking demonstrate
his belief that constitutional advice and consent mandated Senate
approval prior to the completion of negotiations. 39 At the time of
the Jay Treaty, however, he decided to abandon prior consultation
because he faced great difficulty obtaining Senate consent to Jay's
instructions, and he feared that rejection of the instructions and the
resulting collapse of the mission might have led to the outbreak of
war with Great Britain.
By the end of his administration Washington, with the acquiescence of a Congress comprised of many former Convention delegates, '0 had greatly expanded presidential authority over foreign relations. Of course, if the Constitution is interpreted in light of this
history, it appears that the Framers intended a greater presidential
role than seems evident from the face of the document. Alternatively, Washington's actions can be viewed as a drastic departure
from intended practices, which were acquiesced to by a Congress
that recognized the serious dangers facing the country and felt confident with Washington at the helm.
Examination of the history of the United States in the administrations following Washington's, brings into focus the troubles that
have plagued the country as a result of the move away from the
Constitution. Presidents have engaged the country in a series of military confrontations despite the constitutional allocation of war powers to the Congress." 1 Regarding treatymaking, the abandonment of
prior consultation has had a tremendous impact on American history. Senate defeat of treaties, such as the Versailles Treaty," 2 and
638. For Federalist fears about the risk of war and the possible defeat of any treaty with
Great Britain, see supra text accompanying notes 487, 506-12.
639.

See supra text accompanying notes 284-87.

640. See C. THACH, supra note 127, at 141-43. Thach notes that eighteen of the fiftyfive Convention delegates served in the first Congress and half of the Senators had been Convention delegates. Id.
641.

See Indochina: the Constitutional Crisis, in 116 CONG. REc. 15,409-16 (1970).

The authors of this study point to the early twentieth century as a critical period in the growth
of presidential warmaking. In addition, the authors note that since 1945, presidents have often
used military force abroad without getting congressional consent. Id. at 15,410. The authors
view this trend toward presidential warmaking as a departure from the Framers' intent and
the practice in the nineteenth century where presidents, as a general rule, tended to defer to
congressional warmaking power. Id. For an analytical survey of warmaking throughout American history, see R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 75-88 (1974).
642.

See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY: BICENTENNIAL EDITION,

supra note 486, at 376-77; J. GARRATY,

HENRY CABOT LODGE 348-90 (1953); K.

SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MASSACHUSETTS:

HENRY CABOT LODGE 331-51

(1944).
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the resulting international repercussions show the great dangers in
not consulting the Senate before the completion of treaties. In addition, the elimination of prior consultation has significantly undermined the Senate treaty role. Senators are often faced with presidential declarations of the harm that would result to presidential
prestige and American diplomacy if they should refuse to consent to
a negotiated treaty. Thus, the Senators are no longer free to judge a
treaty solely on its merits, and the critical check on treatymaking,
whereby two separate bodies must both independently approve the
worth of a treaty, has been significantly eroded. Recent history has
substantiated the Framers' worries about possible encroachments by
one branch on another's authority and has vindicated the system of
checks they developed to prevent abuses in the foreign relations
sphere. 3
Bruce Stein

643. The Vietnam War and its evidence of executive misconduct comes most quickly to
mind. See generally THE PENTAGON PAPERS (M. Gravel ed. 1971-1972). Arthur Schlesinger

advances a theory of an "imperial Presidency" which "overwhelmed the traditional separation
of powers in foreign affairs." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 208 (1973).

Schlesinger's chapter, "The Presidency Rampant: Vietnam," shows the manifestation of this
imperial presidency and the consequences of the presidential warmaking. See id. at 177-207.
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